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Introduction
Social and economic interactions always take place in some institutional framework
that describes technological, legal or contractual constraints on possible actions and
resulting material payoffs. The theory of games allows to describe such institutions in
a mathematical way and to analyze how rational actors behave in a given institutional
framework.
This thesis applies game theoretic methods to analyze consequences, emergence and
design of institutions in three different contexts. The first chapter analyzes selection
of norms and institutions in a world where some people are intrinsically motivated
to follow non-enforceable social norms. The second and third chapters compare dif-
ferent unbundling requirements for natural monopolies that provide essential inputs
to downstream firms. The fourth chapter studies issues in the design of franchise
organizations and franchise contracts. Every chapter forms an independent and self-
contained unit.
Chapter 1 is motivated by the observation that social interactions are not only guided
by enforceable institutional rules, but typically also by non-enforceable social or moral
norms that describe how people are supposed to act (see e.g. Elster 1989 for a sur-
vey). Compliance with such norms may not always be selfish rational and for social
psychologists it has long been clear that a substantial fraction of people complies to
norms because they feel guilty when breaking norms that they are expected to follow,
see e.g. Heider (1946), Newcomb (1953), Festinger (1957) or Cialdini (1993). On
the other hand, not all people care equally strong about norm compliance and some
people seem not to feel guilty at all when breaking norms.
We examine the question how social interactions, norms and institutions are likely
to be structured in a world where people with different intrinsic motivation to follow
norms interact with each other. To formalize this question, we consider a simple model
with only two types of players: ’compliers’, who always comply with social or moral
norms by intrinsic motivation, and types who act selfishly rational without feeling
guilty if such behavior violates norms. We assume that types are private knowledge,
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i.e. no one can see from the outside whether another person is a complier or selfishly
rational.
To study the question which norms and institutions could plausibly emerge in such
a society, a voting-by-feet model is considered where the society consists of different
communities that each have their own norms and institutions that govern social in-
teractions. Inhabitants can freely migrate between communities and will join another
community if that yields higher expected utility for themselves. While compliers feel
morally obliged to follow the norms of the community they decided to join, selfish play-
ers feel not guilty when breaking those norms. Still, norms can indirectly influence
selfish players’ behavior, because selfish types take compliers’ behavior strategically
into account.
Voting-by-feet models have a long tradition in the literature of local provision of public
goods initiated by Tiebout (1956). There is a notorious difficulty, however, in finding
an appropriate equilibrium concept. Typically, a multiplicity of Nash equilibria exist
(e.g. Westhoff, 1977) while the core is often empty (e.g. Greenberg and Weber, 1986).
One way to deal with these problems is to consider equilibrium concepts that require
stability only against coalitional deviations that remain beneficial if it is taken into
account that the deviation can induce future deviations by others. Examples are the
migration-proof Tiebout equilibrium by Conley and Konishi (2002), the theory of
social situations by Greenberg (1990) or the largest consistent set by Chwe (1994).
These concepts all assume that types are perfect knowledge and do not account for
possible problems of coalition formation under incomplete information. We therefore
introduce the novel — but related — concept of ’migration-proof equilibrium’. It
allows for public announcements that propose a joint migration to another community,
but takes into account that it is not possible to exclude selfish players from such
a migration because types are private information. Inhabitants participate in an
announced migration only if it is still beneficial when one accounts for the fact that
non-invited inhabitants may want to join.
We show that essentially all migration-proof equilibria lead to complier optimal norms
and institutions. These are those norms and institutions that maximize the expected
utility of compliant inhabitants given the fraction of compliers and selfish types in the
total population.
To check the empirical relevance of this result, one ideally would like to analyze
whether real-world institutions are complier optimal or whether in a given institutional
framework observed non-selfish behavior is in line with complier optimal norms. Such
an approach would be quite demanding, however, since precise information on selected
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and feasible actions, material payoffs or the set of technologically feasible institutions
in the real world is almost impossible to obtain.
Economic experiments, however, provide plenty of observations about actual behavior
in controlled institutional frameworks. We show that the stylized facts across popular
economic experiments that study fairness and social preferences are indeed in line with
a model where some players follow complier optimal norms and others act selfishly.
Examples are the use of costly punishment, conditional cooperation, the fact that
intentions matter, and concerns for social efficiency.
The voting-by-feet model and the experimental results are not the only motivation
for complier optimal norms. Complier optimality can also be motivated as a sensible
moral principle. We show that the basic idea is a variation of rule-utilitarianism,
which has been strongly advocated as a rational form of moral behavior by John
Harsanyi (e.g. 1985 or 1992). A substantial part of Chapter 1 is devoted to compare
the differences and similarities in the moral justification and the implications of the
two principles.
Chapters 2 and 3 deal with an interesting regulatory problem of important practical
relevance. The declared goal of the European Union’s liberalization policy for energy
markets is to benefit consumers by encouraging competition among energy suppliers.
Competition is a delicate issue, however, because the delivery of electricity or gas
requires the use of transmission networks, which are classical examples of natural
monopolies.
Although network access prices are typically regulated, preventing non-tariff discrim-
ination by a network operator seems much more difficult in practice. Where network
operators are vertically integrated with an incumbent energy supplier, regulators re-
port of ”sabotage” of downstream competitors in form of discriminatory information
flows, undue delays in delivery of the service, overly complex contractual requirements,
requiring unreasonably high bank guarantees and the like.1
An important regulatory question therefore is whether energy suppliers should be al-
lowed to own or to control transmission networks. In its proposal for a new regulation
of the energy sectors, the EU Commission strongly recommends complete ownership
unbundling, i.e. energy suppliers and producers are not allowed to hold any shares
in firms that operate the transmission networks. While most academic research com-
pares ownership separation with unrestricted vertical integration, the actual standard
1See, e.g., European Commission, Energy Sector Inquiry (Jan. 10, 2007), Competition report on
energy sector inquiry, part 1, para 169, or para 493, p. 163.
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requirements for the energy industry in the EU prescribes a very interesting form of
partial separation labeled as legal unbundling.2
Legal unbundling essentially means that the network must be operated by a legally
independent upstream firm, but the upstream firm may be fully or partially owned by
an incumbent firm active in the downstream market. The downstream incumbent is
not allowed to directly interfere in the upstream operations, but its ownership share
gives entitlement to the corresponding proportion of upstream profits.
In Chapter 2, we formalize legal unbundling as follows: The legally unbundled up-
stream firm maximizes only its own profits, while the downstream incumbent that
owns the upstream firm maximizes the joint profits of the integrated firm.
The basic idea to model legal unbundling in the form that the unbundled firm in-
dependently maximizes its own profits has been introduced by Sibley and Weisman
(1998) and Cremer, Cre´mer, and De Donder (2006), which to our knowledge are the
only previous works that analyzes a theoretical model of legal unbundling.
One difference to our model is that they assume that the downstream operations are
legally unbundled while the upstream firm maximizes joint profits (for comparison,
we also examine their case, which we call “reverse” legal unbundling). A model where
the upstream firm is legally unbundled is in our opinion, however, closer to legal
practice where regulations prescribe that the network must be operated by a legally
independent firm.
We compare the outcome under legal unbundling with the outcomes under vertical
integration and ownership separation under the assumption that access prices are
regulated (for the largest part of the analysis we consider a linear access price above
marginal costs of network access) while non-tariff discrimination by the upstream firm
cannot prevented.
Under fairly general assumptions on the form of downstream competition and on the
possible effects of non-tariff discrimination, we find that legal unbundling leads to
(weakly) higher total output than both vertical integration and ownership separation.
In many cases this result implies that also consumer surplus is highest under legal
unbundling.
The intuition why legal unbundling leads to higher total output than vertical integra-
tion is as follows. Due to the access price regulation, upstream profits are maximized
when total output is maximal. Thus, if the upstream firm is legally unbundled, it
2For the electricity market see Directive 2003/54/EC, Articles 10 (1) and 15 (1), for the gas
market see Directive 2003/55/EC, Articles 9 (1) and 13 (1). The regulations are required in all
member states only since July, 2007.
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wants to maximize total output and refrains from sabotage of downstream firms. In
contrast, under vertical integration, upstream decisions also consider the incumbent’s
downstream profits, and to maximize joint profits it may be optimal to sabotage
downstream competitors by making network access more difficult. We call this the
“sabotage effect”.
When comparing legal unbundling to ownership separation, more complex forces are
at work. First, since in both cases the upstream monopolist wants to maximize total
output, typically neither under legal unbundling nor under vertical separation will the
upstream monopolist sabotage downstream firms.
Second, while a vertically separated downstream incumbent is interested only in its
own profits, under legal unbundling the downstream incumbent also has an interest
in high upstream profits — and thereby in a high overall output. Under legal un-
bundling, the downstream incumbent will therefore select strategies that yield higher
total output compared to ownership separation. We call this the “downstream expan-
sion effect”.
Since one of the main policy concerns is about efficient network investments, we extend
our analysis to different forms of investment decisions. Given our quantity results,
it is quite intuitive that incentives for reducing the upstream firm’s marginal costs
are highest under legal unbundling. We also discuss capacity investments, which can
discriminate between downstream firms, and incentives to invest in network reliability.
For these two types of investments it is not generally clear that legal unbundling
provides the highest investment incentives, although legal unbundling exhibits some
desirable properties also for these sorts of investment decisions.
In Chapter 3, we allow for imperfections in legal unbundling in the form that the
management of the upstream firm may not act completely independent but can be
manipulated by the management of the downstream incumbent. We also allow for
the case that the downstream incumbent has only partial ownership in the upstream
firm.
We find that for any given ownership share, total output weakly increases if regulations
become tougher in the sense that it is more costly for the downstream incumbent to
manipulate the upstream firms’ management. This is simply due to the fact that
the sabotage effect becomes more severe when the upstream management is easily
manipulated by the downstream management.
An increase incumbent’s ownership share in the upstream firm on total output in
general has ambiguous effects. On the one hand, the downstream expansion effect is
stronger for larger ownership shares and therefore suggests higher total output. On
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the other hand, larger ownership shares could make manipulation of the upstream firm
easier and therefore increase the sabotage effect and reduce total output. While in the
presence of imperfections we can thus no longer generally say whether legal unbundling
is superior to ownership separation, the detailed analysis yields nevertheless important
insights for regulatory policy.
One important insight is that the downstream expansion effect is more likely to dom-
inate the sabotage effect under strict regulations that make manipulation of the up-
stream firm more difficult. This means that even if in cases of weak regulation owner-
ship separation can lead to higher total output than legal unbundling, legal unbundling
can become the better solution for consumers once regulation becomes stricter.
Furthermore, the analysis suggests that it could be beneficial for consumers to require
that a minority stake of, say 10% or 20% in the network company is given to an
outside investor, who receives substantial control rights over the network operator’s
management. The downstream incumbent is allowed to own the remaining shares of
the upstream firm and receives the corresponding fraction profits, but is granted only
very limited control rights. Since the downstream incumbent would still receive most
of the upstream profits, the downstream expansion effect should remain of substantial
size. At the same time, the outside investor has an interest to enforce that the
network company maximizes only its own profits, which should make manipulation
by the downstream incumbent much more difficult and therefore reduce the sabotage
effect.
Chapter 4 analyzes organizational and contractual arrangements in franchise systems.
A puzzling empirical regularity in franchising is the stable coexistence of franchised
and company-owned stores within a chain. Following Bradach & Eccles (1989), we
call this arrangement a plural form. In an extensive panel-data study Lafontaine and
Shaw (2005) show that after some adjustment period the fraction of company-owned
stores remains relatively stable over time and seems to be deliberately targeted in
most franchise chains.
These observations contrast an early branch of literature (e.g. Oxenfeldt & Kelly,
1969), which considered franchising and the plural form to be transitory phenomena
that facilitate access to initially scarce resources like capital (Caves & Murphy, 1976),
managerial talent (Norton, 1988) or local information (Minkler, 1990). In the model
of Gallini and Lutz (1992) the transition is reversed: chains start with company-
ownership to signal profitable business to franchisees but once signalling is successful
they can move towards a higher fraction of franchised stores.
To explain the long-run coexistence of company-owned and franchised stores, some
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literature focus on differences between locations of individual stores. For example,
Brickely and Dark (1987) find empirically that a smaller distance to chain head-
quarters or a lower proportion of repeat business makes a store more likely to be
company-owned. Chakrabarty et. al. (2002) theoretically analyze how the plural
form can arise if the chain has better information about the profitability of differ-
ent store locations. Affuso (2002) adopts a different approach where the plural form
can be optimal when managers are heterogeneous and self-select into franchise or
company-employment contracts. She shows empirically that characteristics of store
managers indeed significantly differ between franchise and company-owned stores.
Other papers focus on chain wide implications of the decision to have some company-
owned stores. Scott (1995) and especially Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) have strong
empirical arguments that company ownership is important to protect a chain’s brand
value. Bai and Tao (2000) provide a corresponding theoretical model for the plural
form, where goodwill-effort of company-owned stores protects a chain’s brand name,
while franchise stores have higher sales efforts. Sorensen and Sorensen (2001) explain
the plural form by focusing on the different roles of franchise and company-owned
stores in exploration and organizational learning.
We have collected contract, interview and background data from the US fast-food
industry to motivate a game-theoretic analysis that illustrates an additional reason for
the plural form. The analysis is based on two stylized facts about franchise contracts,
which hold in our sample and are more generally observed in franchising (see e.g.
Bradach, 1998, or Blair & Lafontaine, 2005, for overviews): First, contracts typically
give the chain strong power to decide upon certain activities, like introduction of new
products or changes in building requirements. Once a chain selects such an activity, it
must be implemented by franchisees. Second, franchisees have to pay royalties, which
are fraction of sales-revenues, to the chain.
These two contractual features create a source of inefficiencies in decision making.
Since royalties are based on revenues, and costs are born only by franchisees, the
chain has incentives to choose inefficient activities that lead to high revenues but
can be very costly for a store. A substantial fraction of company-stores can function
as a commitment device for the chain to select more efficient activities, however.
Such a commitment effect is present when the chain is obliged to uniform standards
that require that the same activities must be selected for company-owned stores as
for franchise stores. The reason is simply that for the fraction of the chain’s total
income that is contributed by company-owned stores, the cost of activities are fully
internalized. Therefore, inefficient activities that lead to high revenues — but are very
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costly — become less attractive as the fraction of company-owned stores increases.
We perform an game theoretic analysis of three different cases. In the first case, we
assume that the chain is obliged to uniform standards between company-owned and
franchise stores and chooses endogenously the optimal fraction of company-owned
stores. We model the interaction between the chain and franchisees via a three stage
game. In the first stage, the chain commits to a fraction of company-owned stores
and offers a franchise contract that specifies the royalty. When franchisees accept the
contract in Stage 2, nature draws a state of the world that determines revenues and
costs, as well as the optimal chain-wide activities. In Stage 3, the chain observes the
state of the world and selects a chain-wide activity. Finally revenues and costs are
realized and split according to the franchise contract. We show that the chain may
select a positive fraction of company-owned stores, even if company-owned stores are
run less efficiently than franchise stores. Thus, the plural form endogenously results
from our model.
In the second case, the chain selects not only the fraction of company-owned stores, but
also decides whether to commit to uniform standards between franchise and company-
owned stores. The analysis straightforwardly shows that in this case it is always
optimal for the chain to contractually commit itself to such uniform standards.
Finally, we analyze the case where the optimal fraction of company-owned stores is
determined by factors outside our model. We consider the extreme case where the
fraction of company-owned stores is completely exogenous and analyze when it is
optimal for the chain to have a contractual commitment to uniform standards. We
show that for a sufficiently high fraction of company-owned stores, it is optimal to
include such a commitment into the contract whereas for a sufficiently low fraction of
company-owned stores, it is optimal not to have such a commitment.
This prediction is supported by our empirical analysis. We find a significant correla-
tion between the fraction of company-owned stores and the strength of a contractual
commitment to uniform standards in the data. We confirm in an ordered probit re-
gression that this positive relation is robust to the inclusion of several control variables
like a chain’s size, age or its main product.
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Chapter 1
Norms in a Partly Compliant
Society
1.1 Introduction
The traditional economic postulate of a society inhabited only by selfish individuals
has been severely challenged over the last decades by the insights of experimental
economics. Although a substantial fraction of people shows behavior that is consistent
with selfish behavior, a large fraction of people often acts in a reciprocal or altruistic
way. For example, in one-shot interactions people cooperate in public good games or
punish unfair behavior when punishment is costly (see e.g. Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000a).
One reason for the observed behavior could be that people are guided by a set of
implicit or explicit norms that describe how members of a community are supposed
to interact (see Elster 1989 for a survey on social norms). Compliance with such norms
may not always be selfish rational, and recent work like Charness and Dufwenberg
(2005), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) or Gneezy (2005) explores the notion that
compliance can arise because of intrinsic motivation, or feelings of guilt when one
breaks norms that one has promised to keep or is expected to follow.1
To effectively incorporate norm-compliance into economic models, it is essential to
have a tractable theory that predicts which concrete norms people follow in different
situations. This paper proposes a simple, general principle that yields clear and
empirically plausible predictions concerning such norms: complier optimality.
We consider a simple model with only two types of players: compliers, who are willing
1People’s desire to avoid feelings of guilt together with a desire of consistency of words and actions
has also long been analyzed in psycholgy, see e.g. Heider (1946), Newcomb (1953), Festinger (1957)
or Cialdini (1993).
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to follow norms by intrinsic motivation, and types who act selfishly rational and do not
feel guilty when breaking a norm. Types are private knowledge, but the probability
that a player is a complier (called complier’s share) is commonly known. A complier
optimal norm is a strategy-profile that maximizes the expected average utility of
compliant types, given that it is common knowledge that compliers follow this norm.
The principle of complier optimality is related to the philosophical concept of rule-
utilitarianism, which has been strongly advocated as a rational form of moral behavior
by John Harsanyi (see e.g. 1985 or 1992). The difference to complier optimal norms
is that rule-utilitarian norms maximize the expected average of all players’ utility —
including utility of selfish types.
The main part of the paper analyses the predictions under complier optimal norms
and rule-utilitarian norms for a series of games that have been widely analyzed in the
experimental literature on fairness and social preferences.2
Already under the assumption that every player’s material utility is linear in money,
the model with complier optimal norms captures many of the experimental stylized
facts. Examples are conditional cooperation, the use of costly punishment, the role
of intentions, the observation that reciprocal subjects tend to trust more, or concerns
for social efficiency.
For zero-sum games, complier optimal norms generally prescribe to act selfishly ra-
tional. Altruistic acts in games that are zero-sum in monetary payoffs, like giving in
dictator games, can still be complier optimal, however, if preferences over material
outcomes are extended for factors like risk-aversion, loss-aversion or envy.
Predicted behavior under rule-utilitarian norms is in some cases identical to, but of-
ten differs from, behavior under complier optimal norms. Roughly summarized, both
types of norms have in common that they prescribe to punish non-cooperative behav-
ior (or reward cooperative behavior), whenever common knowledge of such a norm
can effectively induce selfish players to act more cooperatively. Rule-utilitarian and
complier optimal norms usually differ, when no norm can effectively induce cooper-
ative behavior by selfish types. This is for example the case when there is no or
only a weak punishment option or norms cannot substantially change selfish players’
incentives because the compliers’ share is too small. In such cases, rule-utilitarian
2Although in recent years there has been a big interest in formalizing fairness and social pref-
erences, we do not know of any work that analysis whether observations accross popular fairness
experiments are in line with a model where some people follow rule-utilitarian norms. In general,
there are surprisingly few applications or extensions of Harsanyi’s game theoretic formulizations of
rule-utilitarianism in the economic literature. One notable exception is the model by Feddersen and
Sandroni (2006) who analyze voting-behaviour in a society with rule-utilitarian players.
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norms essentially prescribe to act altruistic towards selfish players. An example is
to cooperate as a second mover in a sequential prisoners’ dilemma game even if the
first-mover has defected — a prediction that is almost never observed in experiments.
In contrast, complier optimal norms essentially prescribe in those cases to act selfishly
towards selfish types; this means altruistic acts are only conducted if the probability
that the other player is a complier is sufficiently large.
The range of experimental stylized facts matched by the model with complier opti-
mal norms is quite large, compared to prominent models of social-preferences and
reciprocity.3 We compare the different concepts in Section 1.4.
Section 1.5 motivates complier optimal norms by showing that they arise endogenously
in a voting-by-feet model. The basic idea is that a society consists of different commu-
nities that each have their own norm that prescribes how members of the community
shall interact with each other. Players can freely migrate between communities and
will join another community if that yields higher expected utility for themselves. In
contrast to selfish players, a complier feels obliged to honestly follow the norm of the
community she decided to join. We assume that no person can be prevented from
migration — especially, compliers are not able to exclude selfish immigrants from
their community. As is often the case in voting-by-feet models (see e.g. Conley and
Konishi, 2002) traditional solution concepts do not yield satisfying results: in Nash
equilibrium all norms can occur in populated communities; strong Nash equilibria
typically do not exist. To make reasonable predictions, we introduce migration-proof
equilibrium as a stability criterion. It requires stability against beneficial coalitional
migrations. When evaluating the benefits of a coalitional migration, it is taken into
account that uninvited players may join the migration.
We show first that — under some regularity conditions — a society constitutes a
migration proof equilibrium if its entire population is located in a single community
whose norm is complier optimal given the compliers’ share of the total population.
Second, in every migration-proof equilibrium, compliers’ expected utility will be the
same as in the society above. The voting-by-feet model can be easily extended by
allowing communities also to differ in their institutions, which describe the enforceable
rules that govern social interactions. We show that also complier optimal institutions
arise.
The voting-by-feet approach differs from models that analyze development of pro-
3For example, Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000), Charness and Rabin (2002), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Falk and Fischbacher
(2006), Segal and Sobel (2007), or Cox et. al. (2007).
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social behavior and culture from evolutionary perspectives (see Ostrom, 2000 or
Bergstrom, 2002 for surveys). This is because in our model compliers, although
voting-by-feet on norms and institutions, do not face evolutionary selection pressures
when having lower payoffs than selfish players. We discuss the differences to evolu-
tionary models in Section 1.6.2.
In Section 1.7, we present a moral justification for complier optimal norms. It is
related to John Harsanyi’s famous justification for rule-utilitarianism, which examines
the moral code that people would rationally select in a fictitious ‘original position’
behind a veil of ignorance. Essential for the moral justification of complier optimal
norms is the observation that even though selfish types receive no explicit welfare
weight, they always have (weakly) higher expected utility than compliers. The reason
is that, because types are private information, selfish types have the option to perfectly
mimic compliant types.
The remaining paper is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, we present the basic
model with compliers and selfish players, define complier optimal norms and rule-
utilitarian norms and give existence results. In Section 1.3, we examine the model
for prominent games analysed in the economic literature on fairness and compare
predicted behavior with the experimental findings. In Section 1.4, we compare our
approach with existing models of social preferences. Section 1.5 shows that complier
optimal norms arise from a model of voting-by-feet. In Section 1.6, we discuss the
voting-by-feet model and the differences to evolutionary approaches. Section 1.7 ex-
amines a moral justification for complier optimal norms. Section 1.8 concludes and
illustrates a possible extension.
1.2 Basic Model
We first analyze the interaction between selfish players and compliers for any arbitrary
norm. Resulting behavior is described by a norm equilibrium, for which we prove
existence. Then we formally define rule-utilitarian and complier optimal norms.
1.2.1 Basic definitions
Social interaction in absence of compliers shall be described by a ‘underlying game’
with normal-form representation G = (N,S, u). Note that G may be the normal-form
representation of an extensive-form game. N = {1, ..., n} describes the set of players;
S = S1 × ...× Sn is the strategy space; u : S → Rn is the tuple of utility functions.
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There are two types of players: compliers and selfish players. Types are private
knowledge. Let θ = (θ1, ..., θn) denote the actually drawn vector of players’ types,
where θi = 0 means that player i is selfish and θi = 1 means that player i is a
complier. Types are independently drawn. The probability to draw a complier is κ
and to draw a selfish player is 1− κ, with κ being common knowledge. We call κ the
compliers’ share in the population.
There is a norm r = (r1, ..., rn) ∈ S, which is simply a strategy-profile of the game
G. Compliers always follow the norm, i.e. if player i is a complier she will play the
strategy ri ∈ Si.
Selfish players take into account the behavior of compliers but do not feel guilty when
violating the norm. Hence, for selfish players the presence of compliers transforms the
original game G into a game of incomplete information. Let s = (s1, ..., sn) denote
the strategy profile played by selfish types in this game of incomplete information and
define sθ(s, r) by
sθi (s, r) :=
{
si if θi = 0
ri if θi = 1
. (1.1)
Thus, sθ describes the strategies that are actually played, when the vector of selfish
and compliant types θ is drawn. Let θ−i and sθ−i(s, r) denote the types and played
strategies of all players other than player i. For a given norm r and compliers’ share
κ, expected payoff of a selfish player i is then given by
uκ,ri (s) :=
∑
θ−i
Pr(θ−i|κ)ui(si, sθ−i(s, r)) (1.2)
where Pr(θ−i|κ) =
∏
j 6=i κ
θj(1− κ)1−θj . Since selfish players act individually rational,
they must play a Nash equilibrium of the induced game with payoff function uκ,r(s).
We denote this induced game by Gκ,r = (N,S, uκ,r) and formally define
Definition 1.1 A pair (r, s) of norm and selfish equilibrium strategy profile is a norm
equilibrium for a compliers share κ and a game G if s is a Nash equilibrium of the
induced game Gκ,r.4
We will refer to the strategy profile s, which is played by selfish players in a norm
equilibrium, as the selfish (Nash) equilibrium.
4Note that the norm r is not endogenously determined in a norm equilibrium. Endogenous in a
norm equilibrium are only the selfish equilibrium strategies, which are induced by the given norm
and compliers’ share.
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1.2.2 Existence of norm equilibria
We begin by establishing existence of norm-equilibria under relatively weak conditions.
Proposition 1.1 If the underlying game G = (N,S, u) fulfills the following three
conditions
1. Si is nonempty, compact and convex,
2. ui(s) is continuous in (s1, ..., sn),
3. ui(s) is concave in si
then for every κ ∈ [0, 1] and every r ∈ S a norm equilibrium exists.
Proof.
We need to show that for every r ∈ S and every κ ∈ [0, 1] the game Gκ,r has a Nash
equilibrium. We note that when G fulfills the three stated conditions, Gκ,r also fulfills these
conditions. For condition 1 this is clear, since Gκ,r has the same strategy space as G. For
Conditions 2 and 3 this holds true, because the payoff function of Gκ,r, i.e. uκ,r(s), is a
linear combination of payoffs described by u(s) and thus continuity / concavity of u implies
continuity / concavity of uκ,r(s). The last step is to note that Conditions 1-3 are sufficient
conditions for existence of a Nash equilibrium using the standard Nash-existence proof (see
e.g. Mas-Colell et. al. 1995, p. 260-261).
In the usual Nash existence proof, only quasi-concavity of ui(s) in si instead of con-
cavity is necessary. We need concavity because linear combinations of quasi-concave
functions are not necessarily quasi-concave. The conditions stated in Proposition 1.1
are always fulfilled if G is a finite game, i.e. if every player’s strategy space Si is given
by all mixed strategies over a finite set of pure strategies.
1.2.3 Equilibrium selection and refinements
In general, the game Gκ,r may have multiple Nash equilibria, i.e. multiple norm
equilibria may exist for a given norm and compliers’ share. In those cases, we will
define complier-optimal and rule-utilitarian norms conditional on a selfish equilibrium
selection function ψ : [0; 1]×S → S, which selects for every compliers’ share and norm
a unique selfish Nash equilibrium of the game Gκ,r.5 The selfish equilibrium selection
5A selection function technically facilitates the welfare analysis, since it guarantees a complete
ordering of norms with respect to the expected average of compliers’ or all players’ utility. Robustness
of the results can be checked by considering different equilibrium selection functions.
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function can impose refinements on the class of selected equilibria. Especially, if the
underlying game has sequential moves, selfish Nash equilibria that are not sequentially
rational in the presence of compliers should be ruled out.6 The selected selfish Nash
equilibrium is denoted by s(κ, r) := ψ(κ, r).
1.2.4 Selfish players’ and compliers’ expected utility
For a given selfish equilibrium selection function, we can write down the expected
payoffs of a selfish player and a complier as a function of κ and r. For a selfish player
i expected utility is given by
Ui(κ, r) := u
κ,r
i (s(κ, r)) =
∑
θ−i
Pr(θ−i|κ)ui(si(κ, r), sθ−i(s(κ, r), r)). (1.3)
A compliant player i plays ri and therefore her expected utility is given by
Vi(κ, r) := u
κ,r
i (ri, s−i(κ, r)) =
∑
θ−i
Pr(θ−i|κ)ui(ri, sθ−i(s(κ, r), r)). (1.4)
Since we assumed that each player has the same probability to be a complier, expected
utility for selfish types is given by U(κ, r) := 1
n
∑n
i=1 Ui(κ, r) and for compliers by
V (κ, r) := 1
n
∑n
i=1 Vi(κ, r).
Remark 1.1 For every norm selfish players are weakly better off than compliers, i.e.
Vi(κ, r) ≤ Ui(κ, r) ∀i and V (κ, r) ≤ U(κ, r). (1.5)
These inequalities must hold because types are private information and therefore a
selfish player i can guarantee himself the expected payoff of a compliant player i by
simply playing ri himself.
1.2.5 Complier optimal and rule-utilitarian norms
Given a selfish equilibrium selection function ψ, we can now formally define complier
optimal and rule-utilitarian norms. A norm ro is complier optimal for a given share
of compliers κ if it maximizes the expected average utility of compliant players, i.e.
ro(κ) ∈ argmax
r∈S
{V (κ, r)} . (1.6)
6A sufficient condition for existence of a sequential equilibrium for every norm and compliers’
share is that in every decision node of the underlying game there is only a finite set of possible
actions. Examples 3.2, 3.3 and 3.5 illustrate games with sequential moves.
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A rule-utilitarian norm ru maximizes the expected average utility of all players (in-
cluding selfish types), i.e.
ru(κ) ∈ argmax
r∈S
{κV (κ, r) + (1− κ)U(κ, r)} . (1.7)
We call a norm equilibrium with a complier optimal norm for a given κ, i.e. (ro(κ),
s(κ, ro(κ))), a complier optimal norm equilibrium (CONE), and define similarly a
rule-utilitarian norm equilibria (RUNE).
Unfortunately, the sufficient conditions for existence of norm equilibria in Proposition
1.1 are not sufficient for the existence of complier optimal and rule-utilitarian norm
equilibria. One can construct selfish equilibrium selection functions such that the
objective functions on the right hand sides of equations (6) and (7) have no maximum,
but only a supremum.7 We can establish, however, a weaker existence result:
Proposition 1.2 Assume G fulfills the conditions stated in Proposition 1.1. Then
there exists a selfish equilibrium selection function ψ for which complier optimal norm
equilibria (rule-utilitarian norm equilibria) exist for all κ.
The proof is delegated to the appendix. It relies on an existence result for subgame-
perfect equilibria in games with continuous strategy spaces by Bo¨rgers (1991).
1.3 Examples
In this section, we illustrate the models with complier optimal norms and rule-
utilitarian norms for simple games that have been widely studied in the literature
on fairness and compare the predictions with the experimental stylized facts.
We assume that selfish players act sequentially rational, and are ‘weakly nice’ in the
sense that whenever they are indifferent between two actions, they choose that action
that yields higher payoff for the other player. This guarantees existence of complier
optimal and rule-utilitarian norm equilibria in all examples below.
1.3.1 A public goods game
Suppose social interaction is described by a simple public goods game with n ≥ 2
players. Each player i chooses simultaneously an action ci ∈ {0, 1} where ci = 1
7Consider, for example, a game where player 1 chooses a value x ∈ [0, 1] and player 2 has no action.
Player 1’s payoff is always 0 and player 2’s payoff is x. Consider a selfish equilibrium selection function
where selfish player 1 chooses x = 0 if the norm says to choose 1, and x = 1 for every other norm.
Then no complier optimal and no rule-utilitarian norm exist.
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means she contributes one unit of money to a public good and ci = 0 means she keeps
the money for herself. We assume that every player has an identical linear utility
function over monetary payoffs and that final payoffs are given by
ui = γ
n∑
j=1
cj − ci with 1
n
< γ < 1 (1.8)
The parameter γ denotes the per capita return of contributing one unit to the public
good. Since 1
n
< γ < 1, it is a strictly dominant strategy not to contribute, while
the sum of payoffs is maximized if everyone contributes. Thus, selfish players will
never contribute and it is straightforward to see that ‘always contribute’ is the unique
rule-utilitarian norm for all feasible values of κ,8 γ, and n. Complier optimal norms
are characterized as follows:
Proposition 1.3 For κ > 1−γ
nγ−γ , the unique complier optimal norm is that all compli-
ers contribute. For κ < 1−γ
nγ−γ , the unique complier optimal norm is that no complier
contributes. For κ = 1−γ
nγ−γ , every norm is complier optimal.
Proof.
Since non-contribution is strictly dominant, the norm has no influence on selfish players’
behavior. Since, furthermore, the payoff is additive in each player’s contribution, we can
determine for each player i separately the complier optimal norm ri. If a compliant player
i contributes, her own payoff is reduced by 1− γ, but the payoff of each of the other n− 1
players increases by γ. A compliant player i knows for sure that she herself is a complier,
but each other player is a complier only with probability κ. Therefore, contribution strictly
increases compliers’ expected utility if and only if κ (n− 1) γ > 1 − γ, which is equivalent
to κ > 1−γnγ−γ . The other two cases follow by similar reasoning.
The result is due to a trade-off between two factors. On the one hand, compliers
should contribute, because other compliers can benefit from the positive externali-
ties. On the other hand, contribution leads to a expected transfer of resources from
compliers to selfish players (who themselves never contribute). Hence, in contrast to
the rule-utilitarian norm, a complier optimal norm prescribes contribution only if the
compliers’ share κ is sufficiently high.
Furthermore, we find from the right hand side of the inequality κ > 1−γ
nγ−γ that compli-
ers are rather willing to contribute if — ceteris paribus — the per capita return γ or
8To be precise, for κ = 0 every norm is a rule-utilitarian norm, which is true in all our exam-
ples. For briefness sake, we will not explicitly repeat this fact, but silently assume κ > 0 when we
characterize rule-utilitarian norms.
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the number of subjects n increase. That is because the expected positive externalities
of contributions for other compliers become larger. This prediction is in line with
the comparative statics from public goods experiments, see e.g. Isaac and Walker
(1988), who show that — ceteris paribus — average contributions increase in the per
capita return γ and group size n. In addition, Isaac and Walker find weak evidence
that contributions fall in group size n when the total return of one contributed unit,
i.e. nγ, is kept constant. This finding is also in line with predictions under complier
optimal norms.9
1.3.2 A public goods game with a costly punishment tech-
nology
The experimental literature has established that contributions in public goods games
can substantially increase if players have the opportunity to punish non-contributors,
even if punishment is costly (see e.g. Fehr and Gaechter, 2000b). We show that these
results are predicted by a models with complier optimal or rule-utilitarian norms.
Consider the two player version of the public goods game from Section 1.3.1 with a
second stage where players can spend p units of money in order to reduce the other
player’s payoff by ηp. The parameter η > 0 describes the effectiveness of punishment.
Thus, final payoffs after contributions (c1, c2) and punishment levels (p1, p2) are given
by:
ui = γ(c1 + c2)− ci − pi − ηpj for j = 3− i
The level of punishment p must be chosen from the interval [0, p], where p denotes an
upper limit on the possible level of punishment.
Proposition 1.4 If κηp ≥ 1 − γ then complier optimal and rule-utilitarian norms
prescribe punishment of non-contributors with some (expected) level p that fulfills p ≥
1−γ
ηκ
. In every resulting norm equilibrium all types contribute on the equilibrium path.
If κηp < 1 − γ, no player will punish and outcomes are as in the public goods game
without punishment.
Proof.
Clearly, a sequential rational selfish player will never punish. Under a norm that prescribes
punishment with an (expected) level of p after non-contribution and no punishment after
9Denote the total return by τ = nγ. Compliers contribute whenever κ > 1−
τ
n
τ− τn . Since 1 < τ < n,
the right hand side is increasing in n. Thus, if τ is kept constant, compliers are less willing to
contribute as n increases.
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contribution, a selfish player will contribute if and only if κηp ≥ 1 − γ or p ≥ 1−γηκ . If also
compliers contribute, this norm achieves the first best-outcome that everyone contributes
and there is no punishment on the equilibrium path. Since this norm yields the first-best
outcome, it is clearly rule-utilitarian. Since, additionally, compliers have the same expected
utility than selfish types, the norm must also be complier optimal (recall that compliers can
never have higher expected payoffs than selfish types).
For κηp < 1 − γ, it is always rational for selfish players not to contribute, even when they
will be maximally punished. Thus, punishment cannot change selfish players’ behavior and
therefore it cannot be complier optimal (or a rule-utilitarian norm) to spend any resources
on costly punishment. Since there is no punishment, selfish players do not contribute and
complier optimal and rule-utilitarian contribution decisions are the same as in the public
goods game without punishment technology.
Thus, under a sufficiently strong punishment technology (i.e. κηp > 1 − γ), it is
a complier optimal and rule-utilitarian norm to punish non-contributors in order to
induce selfish players to contribute.
Our model predicts that on the equilibrium path punishment must never be carried
out by compliers. Punishment can occur with positive probability, however, if one
relaxes the assumptions that the norm and compliers’ share are common knowledge
or that all selfish players act perfectly rational.10
1.3.3 A sequential prisoners’ dilemma or simple trust game
We illustrate now a sequential prisoners’ dilemma game, which can also be interpreted
as a simple trust game. Assume payoffs are given as in the public goods game in
Section 1.3.1, but there are only two players who sequentially decide whether to
contribute or not. To simplify the exposition, we assume that the game is in pure
strategies only. Since there are only 8 different pure strategy-profiles, the following
intuitive results are straightforward to verify and we omit the formal proofs.11
Obviously, a sequential rational selfish player 2 will never contribute. A selfish player
1 may strictly prefer to contribute, however, if a compliant player 2 follows the norm of
conditional cooperation: ‘Contribute if and only if player 1 has contributed’. Expected
10For example, assume that a percentage q of selfish players errorneously believes that there are
no compliers and therefore does not contribute. It is then complier optimal to contribute and to
punish non-contributors with level p∗ = 1−γηκ whenever (κ+ (1− q)(1− κ)) γ− (1−γ)−q(1−κ)p∗ ≥
max{κγ − (1− γ), 0}.
11Equilibrium outcomes remain the same, if we allow for mixed strategies and no interesting
additional insights are gained.
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payoff for a selfish player 1 from contributing is then given by κγ+γ−1. Since his payoff
from not contributing is zero, he strictly prefers to contribute whenever κγ+γ−1 > 0,
which is equivalent to κ > 1−γ
γ
. If this condition holds, the unique complier optimal
norm and rule-utilitarian norm are identical and prescribe conditional cooperation for
player 2 and contribution for player 1.
If the compliers’ share is below the threshold 1−γ
γ
, a selfish player 1 cannot be influ-
enced by any norm and will never contribute. Complier optimal and rule-utilitarian
norms differ in this case.
The unique rule-utilitarian norm then prescribes contribution for player 1 and uncon-
ditional contribution by player 2. This means that, in order to increase total welfare,
a player 2 shall contribute, even if he observes that player 1 has not contributed.
In contrast, conditional cooperation by player 2 and contribution by player 1 remains
the unique complier optimal norm in the range 1−γ
3γ−1 < κ ≤ 1−γγ . Given that a com-
pliant player 1 contributes and therefore perfectly separates from a selfish player 1,
it is clear that conditional cooperation by player 2 must be complier optimal. Note,
however, that a compliant player 1 has a negative expected payoff from contributing
in this range. The reason that contributing is still complier optimal is that it creates
a positive externality for a compliant player 2. A general interpretation of this result
is that it can be complier optimal to trust other people to a larger extend than is
individually rational. For κ < 1−γ
3γ−1 , contribution becomes too costly for a compli-
ant player 1, however, and in no complier optimal norm equilibrium there will be
contribution on the equilibrium path.
That player 2 either conditionally cooperates or does never cooperate is in line with
experimental studies of sequential Prisoners’ Dilemma games (see Bolle and Ockenfels,
1990, and Clark and Sefton, 2001, or Berg et. al., 1995, for trust games), where
unconditional cooperation by player 2 is almost never observed. Thus, the predictions
under complier optimal norms seem more plausible than under rule-utilitarian norms.
The prediction that, as second movers, compliers act reciprocal while, as first movers,
they trust more than selfish players is in line with recent experimental results by
Altmann et. al. (forthcoming), who find that reciprocal subjects trust significantly
more than selfish subjects.
1.3.4 Two player zero-sum games
Consider a two player zero-sum game G = ({1, 2}, S, u), with u1(s)+u2(s) = 0 for all
s ∈ S. A general zero-sum theorem states that s∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G if and only
if for both players s∗i is a maxmin strategy, i.e. s
∗
i ∈ argmaxsi∈Si minsj∈Sj ui(si, sj).
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Further, all Nash equilibria give the same expected payoff for player i, denoted by
umaxmini . We show that also in every complier optimal norm equilibrium expected
payoff for both a compliant and selfish player i is given by umaxmini .
Proposition 1.5 Assume κ < 1. A norm ro is complier optimal in a two player
zero-sum game G if and only if Vi(κ, r
o) = Ui(κ, r
o) = umaxmini ∀i.12
Proof.
Define ∆i := Ui(κ, r)− Vi(κ, r) and note that ∆i ≥ 0 (see Remark 1.1). Expected utility in
a zero-sum game is 0, i.e. κV (κ, r) + (1− κ)U(κ, r) = 0. This can be written as κV (κ, r) +
(1 − κ) [V (κ, r) + 12∑∆i] = 0, yielding V (κ, r) = −(1 − κ)12∑∆i. If for some complier
Vj(κ, r) 6= umaxminj at least one complier i gets lower expected utility than umaxmini . Since
a selfish player i can guarantee himself expected payoff of at least umaxmini , by playing a
maxmin strategy, this leads to ∆i > 0, implying V (κ, r) < 0. This cannot be complier
optimal, since compliers’ expected utility is 0 when the norm equals a profile of maxmin
strategies.
Thus, complier optimal norms essentially prescribe to act selfishly in the zero-sum
game. In contrast, every strategy-profile is a rule-utilitarian norm in a zero-sum
game, since the sum of utilities does not depend on the played strategies.
Consider a dictator game where player 1 splits 1 unit of money between him and player
2. Assume both players have identical linear utility in own monetary payoff (using
ui(pii) = pii − 0.5 this yields a zero-sum game). By our result, the unique complier
optimal norm is that player 1 keeps all money for himself. For intuition, note that
with probability (1 − κ) transferred money would be given to a selfish player, which
would reduce expected monetary payoff of compliers.
1.3.5 Dictator and ultimatum games and envy
Considering the previous example, note that a game which is zero-sum in monetary
payoffs is not necessarily a zero-sum game according to players preferences, for ex-
ample when players are risk-averse or feel envious. In this example, we illustrate
the interplay between complier optimal norms and envy using the following utility
12Usually, this means that ro must be profile of maxmin strategies itself. For a counterexample,
however, consider a matching pennies game with u(H,H) = u(T, T ) = (1,−1) and u(H,T ) =
u(T,H) = (−1, 1). The only maxmin strategy is an equal mix between H and T. For κ = 0.5, there
exists, however, a complier optimal norm equilibrium with norm (H,H) and selfish equilibrium
strategies (T, T ), i.e. randomization takes place via a player’s type.
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function over monetary payoffs
ui(pii, pij) = pii − αmax{pij − pii, 0} with α > 0.
Here, a player feels envy when he has a lower monetary payoff than the other player.
The degree of envy α is assumed to be equal for all players, irrespective of whether a
player is selfish or a complier. This utility function is a simplified version of inequity
aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) — simplified, because we do not incorporate a
term that explicitly models “guilt”, felt by a player who has a higher payoff than the
other.
Dictator game
In a dictator game player 1 splits an amount of money between him and player 2. Let
the total amount of money be normalized to 1 and let x denote the share offered to
player 2. Clearly, a selfish player 1 will give nothing to player 2. When a compliant
player 1 gives an amount xo ≤ 0.5 to player 2, compliers’ expected utility is given
by 1
2
((1 − xo) + κ(xo − α(1 − xo − xo)). Maximization of this term implies that it is
complier optimal to offer
xo ∈

0 if κ < 1
1+2α
[0, 0.5] if κ = 1
1+2α
0.5 if κ > 1
1+2α
.
The condition κ Q 1
1+2α
illustrates two factors that determine how much a compliant
player 1 should give to player 2. On the one hand, an equal split is beneficial because
it reduces envy of a compliant player 2. On the other hand, transferring money has
a negative effect because with probability 1 − κ it is given to a selfish player 2. For
κ = 1
1+2α
both effects balance out. For example, if α = 1
3
an equal split would be
complier optimal in a dictator game whenever κ ≥ 0.6.
Andreoni and Miller (2002) performed dictator experiments where transfers were mul-
tiplied by an efficiency factor f , i.e. monetary payoffs are given by (1− x, fx). They
show that for higher efficiency factors, dictators are more willing to make an equal
split or even allow the responder to have a higher payoff. As is intuitively clear, our
model matches this stylized fact.13
13In the set-up of Andreoni and Miller, a compliant dictator should give nothing if κ < 1f+(1+f)α ,
equalize final payoffs if 1f+(1+f)α < κ <
1+(1+f)α
f and give everything if κ >
1+(1+f)α
f .
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Ultimatum game
An ultimatum game extends a dictator game by giving player 2 (called responder)
the opportunity to reject the offer x by player 1 (called proposer), in which case both
get paid zero. It is straightforward to show that an envious selfish responder accepts
only offers that are weakly higher than x∗ := α
1+2α
. Furthermore, we find:
Proposition 1.6 In every complier optimal norm equilibrium all proposers offer
xo := min{0.5, κ + (1 − κ)x∗} and all offers are accepted on the equilibrium path.
Outcomes of rule-utilitarian norm equilibria are the same with the one exception that
compliant proposers always offer x = 0.5.
The formal proof is relegated to the appendix, but we give the basic intuition here. If
compliant responders follow a norm where they reject all offers below a level xo > x∗
and accept an offer of xo, a selfish proposer, who trades-off the probability of a rejection
and the gains from offering only x∗, is willing to offer xo as long as xo ≤ κ+(1−κ)x∗.
It can never be complier optimal (or a rule-utilitarian norm) that a compliant proposer
offers less than a selfish proposer.14 It is therefore optimal to induce selfish proposers
to make offers that are as near as possible to an equal split in order to reduce total
envy , i.e. to select xo := min{0.5, κ + (1 − κ)x∗}. That under a complier optimal
norm a compliant proposer offers never more than xo, becomes intuitively clear from
the following observation: whenever κ and α are sufficiently high such that an equal
split in the dictator game is complier optimal, we also have xo = 0.5.
In contrast to the dictator game, in the ultimatum game an arbitrary small amount
of envy already suffices to find substantial offers in complier optimal norm equilibria,
since
lim
α→0
xo = min{κ, 0.5}.15
The stylized facts from ultimatum experiments (see for example the overviews by
Gu¨th, 1995, Camerer and Thaler, 1995 or Roth, 1995), can be summarized as follows:
The vast majority of offers lie between 0.4 and 0.5, virtually no offer exceeds 0.5 and
offers below 0.2 are very rare. Offers near 0.5 are practically never rejected, whereas
the rejection rate for offers below 0.2 is very high. In our model we find, that all offers
14Intuitively, this is simply a consequence of the general fact that a compliant proposer can never
have higher expected payoff than a selfish proposer.
15The same result holds if players are infinitesimal loss-averse with reference level 0.5 or risk averse
under equal initial wealth. When players are monetary payoff maximizers, offers between 0 and κ
can be found in different complier optimal norm equilibria.
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below 0.2 are rejected if x∗ = 0.2, which corresponds to α = 1
3
. For this level of α we
find xo = min{0.2 + 0.8κ, 0.5}. This means that already for κ ≥ 1
4
observed offers xo
should lie between 0.4 and 0.5.
Ultimatum game with non-intentional offers
Blount (1995) performed an experimental treatment where the offer was not selected
by the proposer but randomly chosen by a computer. She showed that minimal
acceptance levels are significantly lower when the offer was randomly selected, but
that some offers still were rejected. Blount’s finding can be explained by our model.
It is straightforward to check that for α < κ, complier optimality prescribes that
a compliant responder accepts all offers (for rule-utilitarian norms the condition is
α < 1; if envy is larger, very unequal offers may be rejected under both norms,
however). A compliant responder still feels envy, but weighs the monetary payoff of a
compliant proposer higher than her envy. The difference to the intentional treatment
arises because for random offers a norm has no strategic impact on proposers’ behavior.
An envious selfish responder, however, still rejects every offer below x∗, since it does
not matter for him how the offers were selected.
Our model similarly also captures the role of intentions in other experiments, like
behavior in best-shot games (see Harrison and Hirshleifer 1989, Prasnikar and Roth
1992) or the mini-ultimatum games analyzed in Falk et. al. (2003).
1.4 Comparison with models of social preferences
In the examples of Section 1.3, we illustrated that our behavioral model based on
complier optimal norms is in line with important stylized facts from experiments, like
conditional cooperation, costly punishment of non-cooperators, the role of intentions,
as well as concerns for social efficiency. In this section we briefly review some promi-
nent models of social preferences (see Sobel, 2005 for a detailed survey), and discuss
an important conceptual difference to our model.
Overview of existing models
In inequity aversion theories, as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000), players do not like inequalities in monetary outcomes, which can explain
costly punishment like rejection of low offers. Since utility depends only on outcomes,
these models have the advantage to be analytically convenient, but also the drawback
that they cannot account for the role of intentions.
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In Levine (1998) and in the generalization by Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) types are
to a different degree altruistic or spiteful and there is a reciprocal element in the form
that players like high payoffs for altruistic types but dislike high payoffs for spiteful
types. In their model intentions can matter because selected actions can signal a
players’ type.
Another set of social-preference models, including Rabin’s (1993) fairness theory for
normal form games, builds on psychological game theory (Geanakoplos et. al., 1989)
where players can get utility from beliefs. The reciprocity models by Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004) or Falk and Fischbacher (2006) extend the framework to extensive
form games. In these models, another player’s action is classified as ‘unkind’ if he also
could have chosen another action that would lead to a higher payoff on the equilibrium
path for oneself (Falk and Fischbacher also include equity concerns). Players get
emotional satisfaction from punishing ‘unkind’ actions and rewarding ‘kind’ actions.
Charness and Rabin (2002) consider a welfare criterion that is a mixture of the sum
and minimum of all players’ payoffs. Reciprocal players dislike other players whose
strategies show that they do not put sufficient weight on the welfare criterion. Their
exact solution concept is implicitly based on psychological games and quite complex.16
Lo´pez-Pe´rez (2006) proposes a ‘norm-based’ approach that uses the same welfare-
criterion as Charness and Rabin. He assumes that there are some morally motivated
people who follow that strategy-profile that would maximize the criterion if every-
one complied to this strategy-profile. While those strategy-profiles do not prescribe
punishment, he assumes that players feel not obliged to follow the norm once another
player deviated and get emotional satisfaction from punishing the deviator.
A different rationale for costly punishment
The presented models describe the use of costly punishment as a consequence of
negative emotions like envy, dislike, or anger towards non-cooperative people that
one is currently interacting with. In contrast, a prescription by complier optimal
norms and rule-utilitarian norms to punish non-cooperators is based on a positive
concern for the broad group of all compliers or all people, respectively.
For example, the reasoning of a complier who observed non-cooperative behavior in
a situation where costly punishment is complier optimal could be as follows: ”I do
not like to punish this selfish guy, since it is costly for me and I do not care about his
payoff. If every complier, however, thought this way and decided not to punish then
selfish players would not take the threat of punishment seriously and the welfare of
16For alternative reciprocity models, see also Cox et. al. (2007) or Segal and Sobel (2007).
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every complier would be reduced in the long run. Therefore, I will punish him — for
the sake of all compliers.”
In most situations it is difficult to distinguish whether a decision to punish is trig-
gered by negative emotions or because people think it is a social duty to punish
non-cooperators. Indeed, in our opinion both factors are likely to play a role, and
to increase the realism of our model negative emotions should be included, as we
illustrated for the case of envy.
The hypothesis that compliance to social norms plays at least some role in a decision
to punish non-cooperative behavior is supported by a neuro-economic study by Knoch
et. al. (2006). They considered the question whether subjects that are confronted
with a low offer in an ultimatum game have either an immediate emotional impulse
to reject the low offer that can be overwritten by rational concerns to take the money,
or whether there is an immediate selfish impulse to take the money that can be
overwritten by concerns for social or moral norms to reject the low offer. They show
that disruption of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), a part of the brain
that is widely thought as a control instance that can inhibit immediate motivational
impulses, leads to substantially higher acceptance rates in ultimatum games. They
interpret this result as indication that subjects have an immediate selfish impulse to
accept low offers, but that a non-disrupted DLPFC can inhibit such an selfish impulse
if it contradicts social or moral norms.
1.5 Competition of norms and institutions via vot-
ing by feet
1.5.1 Overview
In this section we show that complier optimal norms arise from a model of voting-by-
feet. The basic idea is that a society consists of different communities with different
norms. Social interactions take place only within a community, but inhabitants can
freely migrate between communities. While compliers always accept and follow the
norms of the community they decided to join, selfish players do not feel guilty when
breaking those norms. It is straightforward to allow communities not only to differ
in their norms, but also in their institutions that describe the enforceable rules and
technological constraints of social interactions.
We do not claim that selection of norms and institutions in real world does mainly
occur via voting-by-feet. Instead this selection seems to be the outcome of a rather
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complex process, influenced by historical events, opinion leaders, election outcomes
and many more factors. Nevertheless, although being a rough simplification, we think
that our voting-by-feet model is able to capture important elements of this selection
process, like the idea that the success of new norms or institutions depends on which
types of inhabitants are primarily attracted by these new norms and institutions.
To simplify the exposition, we first introduce our voting-by-feet model by analyzing
competition of norms only. We start with a formal definition of a society and define a
Nash-stable equilibrium as a society where no individual inhabitant wants to migrate
to another community. Then we introduce the concept of a migration-proof equilib-
rium, where we additionally require stability against coalitional migrations that are
successful even if non-invited players join. We then discuss five conditions that are
needed for the main results, which follow. Afterwards, we extend the model such that
the voting-by-feet process jointly determines institutions and norms. In Section 1.6,
we discuss the relation of our stability criterion to existing concepts.
1.5.2 Formal definition of a society
A society is populated by a continuum of compliant and selfish inhabitants of measures
µˆc and µˆs, respectively. The compliers’ share in the society’s total population is
denoted by κ̂ := µˆc
µˆc+µˆs
. A society is described by a finite set of communities {Cj}j∈J
(indexed by a set J) over which the total population is distributed. Each community is
characterized by a tuple Cj = (µjs, µ
j
c, r
j), where µ js and µ
j
c are the measures of selfish
and compliant inhabitants and rj the community’s norm. We assume that every
community has a positive measure of inhabitants and let κj denote the compliers’
share in community Cj. A community’s inhabitants randomly meet in small groups
and play a game G that describes the institutional rules of social interaction. Until
Section 1.5.8 we consider the game G, and the selfish equilibrium selection function ψ
to be exogenously given and to be the same in all communities. We assume that each
position in the game is equally likely for each inhabitant. Thus, expected utility of a
compliant inhabitant of community Cj is given by V (κj, rj) and of a selfish inhabitant
by U(κj, rj).
1.5.3 Nash-stable equilibrium
Our first requirement for a stable society is that there are no two communities where
inhabitants of the same type get different expected utility. We say a single selfish /
compliant inhabitant prefers to move from his origin community Co to a populated
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destination community Cd if selfish / compliant inhabitants’ expected utility in Cd is
strictly higher than in Co. We formally define:
Definition 1.2 A society {Cj}j∈J constitutes a Nash-stable equilibrium if no
inhabitant prefers to move to another existing community.
Since we do not allow a single inhabitant to create a new community, every society
consisting of a single community is Nash-stable, i.e. every norm can occur in some
Nash-stable society.
1.5.4 Motivating migration-proof equilibrium
In the concept of migration-proof equilibrium —introduced below— we allow for the
possibility that inhabitants can jointly migrate to a new or existing community. The
concept takes seriously the limits of coalition formation due to private information of
types and our assumption that no one can be prevented from migration.
We want to motivate the basic ideas with a simple example: Let the game G be
a public goods game and consider a society with initially only one community C0,
which has as norm that nobody contributes. Consider now the possibility of public
announcements like the following: ”To all compliers in community C0, let us migrate
jointly to a new community C1, where will all follow the norm to contribute to the
public good! You will all be better off there!”. Our solution concept will be based on
the idea that the addressees of such announcements are willing to migrate if and only if
migration is strictly beneficial even in the case where other, non-invited, inhabitants,
who prefer to follow to the new community, join the migration.
In our example, also all selfish players prefer to migrate from C0 to C1, once compliers
follow the announcement and move to C1. Since types are private knowledge, we
assume that compliers are not able to exclude the selfish inhabitants from their new
community C1. If all selfish inhabitants follow to C1, resulting compliers’ share in C1
will be again κ̂. Thus, in this example, the joint migration will be beneficial in the
long run for the originally addressed compliers only if contribution in a population
with compliers’ share κ̂ leads to higher compliers’ expected utility than following a
norm of no contribution.
1.5.5 Formalizing migration-proof equilibrium
Let a collection M = ({mjc,mjs}Jj=1, Cd), describe a simultaneous migration to a com-
munity Cd. An entry {mjc,mjs} means that from community Cj compliers of measure
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mjc and selfish inhabitants of measure m
j
s participate in the migration M . As one
building stone of our definition, we need to introduce the notion of uncoordinated
migration:
Definition 1.3 We say a migration M can occur uncoordinatedly if the destination
community Cd already exists and every participant of M prefers to move from her
origin community to the destination community (evaluating expected utilities as given
before the migration).
Obviously, uncoordinated migration can occur only in societies that are not Nash-
stable. In the spirit of the example above, we also want to allow for announced
migrations, where a set of inhabitants is invited to jointly migrate to some new or
existing community Cd. If people follow the announcement and the coordinated migra-
tion takes place, the society may not be Nash-stable anymore and other inhabitants
may follow to Cd via uncoordinated migration. We assume that individuals are skep-
tical about announcements and only want to participate in the announced migration,
if this is strictly beneficial, no matter who follows to Cd via uncoordinated migration.
Formally:
Definition 1.4 An announced migration M to a destination community Cd is
successful if and only if for every sequence of uncoordinated migrations to Cd that
may occur afterwards, the participants of M are strictly better off in Cd than they
were initially.
This leads to the definition of a migration-proof equilibrium:
Definition 1.5 A society constitutes a migration-proof equilibrium if it is Nash-
stable and no successful announced migration exists.
1.5.6 Conditions
We will now present joint conditions on the game and selfish equilibrium selection
function, that are required for our results.
Condition 1 (C1) A complier optimal norm ro(κ) exists for all κ.17
All our examples fulfill this condition.
17Condition C1 can be relaxed such that a complier optimal norm has to exist just for κ̂. This
requires, however, a more complicated formulation of conditions C3, C4.
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Condition 2 (C2) There are at least some compliers in the society, i.e. κ̂ > 0.
Condition 2 is relevant because we can obviously say nothing interesting about norms
when it is common knowledge that there are no compliers at all.
For the next condition, let us define the highest payoff that selfish inhabitants can
achieve, under the given selfish equilibrium selection function, when no compliers are
present by
Uκ=0 := max
r∈S
U(0, r). (1.9)
Condition 3 (C3) For every κ compliers can be least as well off as inhabitants of a
purely selfish community, i.e. V (κ, ro(κ)) ≥ Uκ=0 ∀κ.
Condition 4 (C4) The highest expected utility that compliers can achieve in a com-
munity with the societies’ share of compliers κ̂ is as least as high as the expected
utility compliers can achieve in a community with a smaller compliers’ share, i.e.
V (κ, ro(κ)) ≤ V (κ̂, ro(κ̂)) for all κ < κ̂.
Conditions C3 and C4 could only be violated when there are multiple selfish Nash
equilibria, and even then only for certain ill-behaved selfish equilibrium selection func-
tions. To illustrate a violation consider a game G with payoff-matrix
A B
A 1,1 0,1
B 1,0 0,0
The unique complier optimal norm is (A,A), but every strategy-profile is a selfish
Nash equilibrium. Problems arise, for example, with a selfish equilibrium selection
function that selects (B,B) when in a community κ ≥ κ̂ and (A,A) when κ < κ̂.
Then conditions C3 and C4 are violated and one can easily show that no migration-
proof equilibrium exists where a community has complier share κ̂, i.e. Proposition 1.8
(below) could not hold. For ‘regular’ selfish equilibrium selection functions conditions
C3 and C4 are, however, always fulfilled. The following proposition exemplifies a
sufficient condition, on the selfish equilibrium selection function.
Proposition 1.7 Conditions C3 and C4 are fulfilled if always a selfish Nash equilib-
rium s(κ, r) is selected that maximizes compliers’ expected utility.
Proof.
C3: Let sκ=0 be a Nash equilibrium where players in a completely selfish community get
utility of Uκ=0.Under the norm r := sκ=0, for every compliers’ share the strategy profile
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sκ=0 is a selfish Nash equilibrium, i.e. compliers get expected payoff of at least Uκ=0 if the
complier optimal selfish Nash equilibrium is chosen.
C4: We find a moral norm r′ that guarantees compliers a payoff of at least V (κ, ro(κ)) for
any κ′ > κ . For all i, let r′i be a mixed strategy where with probability
κ
κ′ the original moral
norm roi (κ) is played and with probability (1 − κκ′ ) the selfish Nash strategy si(κ, ro(κ)) is
played. When complier apply r′ in a community with complier share κ′, clearly s(κ, ro(κ))
will be a selfish equilibrium. When s(κ, ro(κ)) is selected complier’ expected utility is given
by κκ′V (κ, r
o(κ))+(1− κκ′ )U(κ, ro(κ)) ≥ V (κ, ro(κ)).
Conditions C1-C4 are fulfilled in all examples in Section 1.3 and are sufficient for our
existence result (Proposition 1.8 below). For the uniqueness result (Proposition 1.9
below), we additionally need the following condition:
Condition 5 (C5) There exists a complier optimal norm ro(κ̂) such that for all κ >
κ̂ one has V (κ, ro(κ̂)) ≥ V (κ̂, ro(κ̂)).
Condition C5 says that at least for some complier optimal norm ro(κ̂), compliers’
are not worse off when the fraction of compliers is higher than κ̂, i.e. selfish players
are not needed to obtain a compliers’ expected utility of at least V (κ̂, ro(κ̂)). The
condition is fulfilled for all examples in Section 1.3.
1.5.7 Main results
The following propositions characterize all migration-proof equilibria, and show that
norms arise that are complier optimal for the society’s share of compliers κ̂.
Proposition 1.8 Assume conditions C1-C4 hold. A society consisting of a single
community that applies a complier optimal norm ro(κ̂) constitutes a migration-proof
equilibrium.
Proposition 1.9 Assume conditions C1-C5 hold. In every migration-proof equilib-
rium compliers’ expected utility equals V (κ̂, ro(κ̂)) in all communities.
The basic intuition behind these results is simply that selfish players want to be where
compliers are and compliers (who cannot get rid of selfish players) want to be in a
place with a complier optimal norm. The robustness of these results and the relation
to different solution concepts are discussed in Section 1.6.
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1.5.8 Simultaneous competition of institutions and norms
It is straightforward to extend the voting-by-feet model, by allowing communities also
to differ in the game that describes the enforceable rules of social interaction (this
game is labeled as an ‘institution’) and in the way how selfish Nash equilibria are
selected.
Assume social interactions can be structured in different ways that are characterized
by a set of possible games Γ.18 Let N(G), u(G), S(G) denote the set of players, payoff
functions, and strategy profiles of a game G ∈ Γ. For each game G there is a set of
possible selfish equilibrium selection functions Ψ(G). As described in Section 1.2.3,
a selfish equilibrium selection function ψ ∈ Ψ(G) selects for every norm and compli-
ers’ share a Nash equilibrium of the induced game Gκ,r, which is played by selfish
players. The set of selfish equilibrium selection functions Ψ(G) should include only
those selection functions that obey sensible equilibrium refinements, like sequential
equilibrium.
A community shall be characterized by its population as well as a triple of game, norm
and selfish equilibrium selection functions λ = (G, r, ψ) with r ∈ S(G) and ψ ∈ Ψ(G).
We call λ a norm-institution and denote by Λ the set of all possible norm-institutions.
Expected utility of compliers and selfish inhabitants within a given community are
denoted by V (κ, λ) and U(κ, λ) and are defined as in Section 1.2.4. A norm-institution
that is complier optimal for complier share κ is defined by
λo(κ) ∈ Λo(κ) := argmax
λ∈Λ
V (κ, λ). (1.10)
It turns out that the same definitions, which we used to model competition of norms,
can be used to model competition of norm-institutions and that we get equivalent
results. To derive this model, we simply have to replace every norm that appears in
conditions C1-C5 and in Propositions 1.8 and 1.9 and their proofs by the corresponding
norm-institution. The proofs of Propositions 1.8 and 1.9 carry over, because they only
make use of conditions C1-C5 (especially the monotonicity conditions C3-C5) and of
the fact that in no community selfish players can be worse off than compliers, which
is also true when communities are described by norm-institutions.
To sum up, this implies, first that there is always a migration-proof equilibrium with
the entire population in a community Co that has a complier optimal norm-institution
λo(κ̂), and second that in all migration-proof equilibria compliers’ utility is given by
18Except for requiring that the modified versions of conditions C1-C5 (see in the text below) hold,
we need no additional restriction on the set of games.
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V (κ̂, λo(κ̂)). In other words: A complier optimal combination of institution, norm,
and selfish equilibrium strategies arises.
Gu¨rerk et. al. (2006) conducted an economic experiment where subjects could vote-
by-feet between two different institutions: a public goods game with a costly pun-
ishment option and one without (Section 1.3.2 illustrates that having a punishment
option is indeed always weakly better for compliers). In their experiment, virtually
the whole population migrates to the community with the institution that allows for
costly punishment, which is in line with our theoretical prediction. There over 40%
of subjects punish non-contributors and high levels of contribution can be stabilized.
1.6 Discussion of the voting-by-feet model
1.6.1 Migration-proof equilibrium compared to existing con-
cepts
Voting-by-feet is much analyzed in a branch of literature emerging from Tiebout
(1956), who analyzed local provision of public goods. In voting-by-feet models there
is a notorious difficulty in finding an appropriate solution concept. One faces a prob-
lem of too many equilibria when using a Nash concept (e.g. Westhoff, 1977) or of
non-existence when requiring stability against all immediately beneficial coalitional
deviations (see e.g. Greenberg and Weber, 1986). Conley and Konishi (2002) discuss
these problems and resolve some of them for a special Tiebout model by defining
a “migration-proof Tiebout equilibrium”, which requires stability only against those
coalitional deviations that can be successful when accounting for possibly induced
future migration. More generally applicable are the theory of social situations by
Greenberg (1990) or the largest consistent set by Chwe (1994), which are based on
related ideas.
These concepts, however, are defined only for a finite number of inhabitants. Also,
they consider a full information environment where types of all players are known and
there are no informational problems in coalition formation. Thus, we cannot directly
use these concepts but define migration-proof equilibria to extend the basic ideas to
our set-up.
Since the results of voting-by-feet models depend on the solution concept, we want to
sketch which aspects of migration-proof equilibrium are crucial for our results.
Under concepts that require stability against all immediately beneficial coalitional
deviations (like strong Nash equilibrium or the core), equilibria in our set-up would
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generally not exist. For example, suppose the institution is given by the public goods
game described in Section 1.3.1. If a society has a community inhabited only by
compliers with contribution as norm, a coalition of selfish inhabitants benefits by
migrating to this community. In all other societies, a coalition of compliers benefits
by creating such a community. Therefore, no society would be stable against all
immediately beneficial coalitional deviations.
We already noted that in a Nash stable society all norms can arise in societies consist-
ing only of a single community, because a single player cannot create a new community.
We also would not get our general results in a model with myopic migration dynamics
where new communities arise by chance with some random initial population — a
setup resembling models of competition of conventions in coordination games, like
Ely (2002) or Oechssler (1997). In such a model, stability would strongly depend on
the exact specification of the underlying migration dynamics — especially it would
hinge on the factors determining whether compliers or selfish inhabitants migrate
more quickly to a newly emerged community. To get some intuition why, note that
a community with high compliers’ share and a reasonable norm will be an attractive
destination for both compliant and selfish migrants. If compliers initially migrate
more quickly, the compliers’ share in such a new community will remain high and the
compliers’ share in the existing communities will fall. This makes further migration
more attractive, and the new community can grow and thereby substantially destabi-
lize the society. If, on the other hand, initially many selfish inhabitants migrate to the
new community, its complier share will drop, making further migration unattractive
and may even induce the few initial compliers to leave. The new community may
therefore quickly cease existence, i.e. it would not destabilize society.
In summary, to get our general results it is important that new communities are
created by coalitional migrations and it is also important that members of a coalition
take into account that other non-invited inhabitants may follow the migration. One
will find, however, that our results are robust to several variations of the equilibrium
concept that do not violate these key assumptions. For example, it is not crucial that
members of the coalition only worry about uncoordinated migration by uninvited
inhabitants: Even if one defined an announced migration M to be successful when
participants of M are strictly better off by migration no matter which subset of
uninvited inhabitants joins the migration, the results in Propositions 1.8 and 1.9
would still hold.
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1.6.2 Relation to evolutionary models
It is reasonable to assume that over a long period of human history, reproductive
success was strongly linked to material wealth, while at the same time most people
stayed for their whole life within the same local communities, where neighbors usually
were well informed about of each others’ behavior. A series of papers (see Ostrom,
2000 or Bergstrom, 2002 for excellent surveys) have shown how under such conditions
pro-social behavior, like conditional cooperation, or preferences that can lead to such
behavior, like an aversion to break norms, can survive biological evolution.
Our voting-by-feet model considers a quite different world where guilt-averse and
selfish players interact, but reproductive success is not linked to material wealth, in-
teractions can take place anonymously, and people can freely choose between different
communities where they perform social interactions. We argue that these assumptions
indeed capture important aspects of the modern world.
First, in modern welfare-states it seems clearly no longer the case that only rich people
are able to get many offsprings. Also, cross-country correlations yield no evidence for
a positive correlation between material income and population growth in the modern
world. Using the Penn World Table (Heston et. al. 2006), one finds that in every
year since 1984 a country’s population growth rate is even negatively correlated to its
previous year’s GDP per head.19
Second, many people in the modern world are mobile and have substantial freedom in
choosing their communities in which different forms of social interactions take place,
like the firm they work in, the clubs and organizations in which they spend their free
time, or the online communities where they sell and buy used products.
Third, with modern information technology it is feasible and often inexpensive to
create institutions in which social and economic interactions take place anonymously.
If in the modern world still many interactions take place within institutions that try
to avoid anonymity and make a person’s past behavior transparent (like, for example,
the reputation mechanism used by Ebay), this may simply be due to the fact that
such institutions are selected because they are complier optimal.
Often evolutionary models do not intend to model biological evolution, but interpret
the evolutionary process as a learning model where players imitate other successful
players. Thinking of such models, one could ask why we assume that compliers do
not learn to be selfish. A simple answer is that a guilt averse player may not want to
imitate selfish persons who break their communities’ norms, since she would feel bad
19For the whole data set, starting in 1950, we find such negative cross-country correlations in more
than 75% of all years.
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when doing so.
In summary, our analysis is not targeted to substitute evolutionary or learning mod-
els but aimed to complement their insights by analyzing competition of norms and
institutions under different assumptions that form a somewhat opposite but never-
theless sensible approximation of the modern world. Since the behavioral predictions
of the two approaches are quite similar, i.e. reciprocity and conditional cooperation
typically emerge in both settings, our findings add therefore to the robustness of the
general insights from evolutionary models.
1.7 A moral justification for complier optimal
norms
This section describes an alternative justification — a moral justification — for com-
plier optimal norms, which is based on a variation of the tale that John Harsanyi (e.g.
1985 or 1992) used to motivate rule-utilitarianism. Harsanyi, similar to John Rawls
(1973), considered a fictitious original position where all people of a society gather
to decide upon a moral code. This gathering takes place behind a veil of ignorance,
where no one knows what will be his position later in real life. Harsanyi shows that in
such an original position everyone wants to choose rule-utilitarian norms, i.e. norms
that maximize every person’s identical expected utility behind this veil of ignorance.
In our model with selfish and compliant types, rule-utilitarian norms would be pre-
ferred by every person in the original position if there is complete ignorance about
one’s type later in life, i.e. if no one knows whether she will be compliant or selfish.
In our variation of this tale, the gathering in the original position consists of two steps.
In the first step, every person is free to make a commitment to comply —later in life—
to the moral code that will be selected in the second step, i.e. every person decides
whether she wants to be a complier or not. In the second step, those and only those
people that declared compliance will gather and decide upon the moral code. Since
only compliers are present in the second gathering, everyone prefers those norms that
maximize expected utility of compliers, i.e. complier optimal norms.
How is the procedure in our tale that only compliers decide over the moral code morally
justified? An initial decision to be a complier can be considered as a gift to the other
members of the society. That is because everyone in the society is weakly better off
if some people decide to be compliant than if everyone were selfish. Furthermore,
this gift is costly for compliers in so far that selfish people are always weakly better
off than compliers. We find it indeed morally well justified that a poorer person
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(complier) making a costly gift to richer persons (selfish types), who do not make a
gift themselves, can at least freely decide how much she wants to give. This means
it is acceptable to choose complier optimal norms and thereby make a smaller, less
costly gift to selfish players than if rule-utilitarian norms were selected.
In our variation of the tale, we assumed that the decision to be a complier or selfish
is a deliberate decision of every person, while in the first version types are something
that nature chooses when it determines the positions in real life. Asking whether the
one or the other version seems more reasonable leads to deep philosophical questions
about whether all our preferences and acts are predetermined or whether we indeed
have a free will and a free choice to act morally or not and can be held responsible
for our choice. Since a thorough discussion is far beyond the scope of this paper, we
only note that many authors in the philosophical and ethical literature share the view
that there is free choice and personal accountability for a decision to act morally or
not (see e.g. Eshleman, 2004, and, O’Connor, 2006, for good introductionary surveys
on the topics).
Finally, we want to stress that the given moral justification for complier optimal norms
is based on the assumption that selfish types are never worse off than compliers, which
is the case in our model because selfish types act rationally, types are private knowl-
edge and both types have identical abilities and preferences over material payoffs. It
is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate moral implications in situations where
selfish players may also be worse off than compliers, like cases where selfish types are
bounded rational.
1.8 Concluding remarks
Like existing models of social preferences and reciprocity this paper has been moti-
vated by the large amount of experimental evidence showing that many people deviate
in systematic ways from selfish behavior. The common approach of social preference
models is to directly augment preferences by concerns for other players’ payoffs (these
concerns can depend on types, observed actions or beliefs) such that resulting equi-
librium behavior matches empirical stylized facts. This paper has contributed to the
development of an alternative approach: First, assume some players are willing to
follow strategies that correspond to certain social or moral norms; then find a general
and tractable principle that describes for any given game the precise form of these
norms and makes predictions that are in line with empirical stylized facts.
We have proposed complier optimality as such a general principle. It has some ap-
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pealing properties. First, although we consider a very simple model with only two
types, predictions are in line with many important stylized facts across experiments.
Second, like rule-utilitarianism, it can be justified as a moral principle that describes
a form of collectively rational behavior. Third, complier optimal norms arise from a
model of voting-by-feet.
Despite these appealing properties, it is also clear that the presented model with only
two types is neither able nor intended to match in detail the large heterogeneity in
individual behavior that is typically observed in experiments. In principle the idea
of complier optimal norms could be extended to more complex models with several
types, who, for example, differ in their degree of norm compliance. While allowing
for more realism, such extensions are likely to reduce the tractability of the model,
however.
Some analytically simple modification of the model can be achieved by letting complier
optimal norms maximize some transformed version V˜ (κ, r) of compliers’ expected
utility. For example, compliers may dislike when selfish players are in expectation
much better off. A quadratic formulation of such exploitation aversion is incorporated
by setting V˜ (κ, r) := V (κ, r)− γ(U(κ, r)− V (κ, r))2 with γ > 0.
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Chapter 2
Legal Unbundling can be a Golden
Mean between Vertical Integration
and Ownership Separation
2.1 Introduction
In many industries vertically integrated firms are not only active in the final product
market, but they also supply essential inputs to potential downstream competitors.
Prominent examples are network industries, like energy, rail, or telecommunications
where access to a transmission or a railway network is an essential input. Another
example is the software industry where, e.g., Microsoft offers “compatibility” to Win-
dows and at the same time competes in the applications market. An important and
heavily researched policy question is: should vertical integration be allowed? Standard
arguments in favor of integration are that integration at least partially overcomes the
double marginalization problem and that it might provide better investment incen-
tives for the upstream operations. The main motivation to vertically separate an
integrated firm is that integration can lead to discriminatory behavior against down-
stream competitors.
We analyze a third alternative: legal unbundling. Legal unbundling means that the
essential input must be controlled by a legally independent entity with an autonomous
management, but a firm that is active in the downstream market is still allowed to
own this entity. Ownership under legal unbundling entitles the downstream firm to
receive the entity’s profits, but interferences in the entity’s operations are forbidden.
Forms of legal unbundling are commonly observed in network industries. Legal un-
bundling is the current standard requirement for the energy industry in Europe, and
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the related concept of “Independent System Operators” is also an option in the pro-
posals for a new EU regulation.1 In the US, forms of legal unbundling exist for natural
gas pipelines and in large parts of the electricity transmission systems that are op-
erated by Regional Transmission Organizations or Independent System Operators.2
Similar forms of “partial separation” are also common in the telecommunications
industry in Europe and the US.3
Irrespective of how the industry is vertically structured, the price for the essential
input is usually regulated. Typically, regulators use linear tariffs above the marginal
cost, e.g., in order to allow for the coverage of fixed costs. While non-discrimination
with respect to the access tariff is relatively easy to impose,4 non-tariff discrimination
remains an important problem in practice. Regulators and competitors report of
such ”sabotage” in form of discriminatory information flows, undue delays in delivery
of the service, overly complex contractual requirements, requiring unreasonably high
bank guarantees and the like.5 Our research question therefore is: How does legal
unbundling compare to the outcomes of vertical integration and vertical separation if
access prices are regulated while non-tariff discrimination cannot be prevented?
To answer this, we propose a fairly general setup. There is one upstream monopolist
(F0), a potentially integrated affiliated downstream firm (F1), the “incumbent”, and
1For the electricity market, see Directive 2003/54/EC, Articles 10 (1) and 15 (1), for the gas
market, see Directive 2003/55/EC, Articles 9 (1) and 13 (1) and the proposal to amend this Directive
issued 2007-09-19.
2See Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Order 636 (issued 1992-04-18) for natural gas and
Order 2000 (issued 1999-12-20) for electricity transmission.
3For the US see Section 272 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; for the European Union see
Directive 2002/21/EC, Article 13 (1b).
4Although this also can be an issue, e.g., if non-linear tariffs are used. They might be tailored such
that only the subsidiary of the integrated company can realize low prices. Exactly for this reason,
regulators are skeptical about such tariffs. See, e.g., European Commission, Energy Sector Inquiry,
Competition report on energy sector inquiry (Jan. 10, 2007), part 1, para 155, p. 58. One example
was the access to the Deutsche Telekom network required to offer narrowband internet access (a
product called T-Online-Connect-Interconnect), where Deutsche Telekom offered quantity rebates
which were only realized by its own subsidiary ”T-Online”. The regulatory authority ruled this to
be discriminatory. See the German regulator’s annual report ”Ta¨tigkeitsbericht 1998/99”, p. 67.
5See, e.g., European Commission, Energy Sector Inquiry (Jan. 10, 2007), Competition report on
energy sector inquiry, part 1, para 169, or para 493, p. 163: For the Telecommunications sector, see
for instance a submission of the VATM (Association of competitors to Deutsche Telekom) to the Eu-
ropean Commission, ”Markteintrittsbarrieren im deutschen Telekommunikationsmarkt”, September
2001.
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n − 1 potential downstream competitors. The upstream firm produces an essential
input at constant marginal cost c0, which the downstream firms need in a fixed propor-
tion to produce the final output. We impose no other restriction on the downstream
firms’ technologies, in particular, some or all competitors might be more or less effi-
cient than the incumbent F1. In the downstream market, the incumbent moves first; no
other restrictions are imposed on the downstream competition. Strategies could, for
example, affect quantities, (non-linear) prices, investments or entry decisions. That
the incumbent moves first is mainly a simplifying assumption; we exemplify with
Cournot competition that the main results also apply with simultaneous moves in the
downstream market.
The upstream firm F0 sells the input to all downstream firms at a regulated linear
access price a above marginal costs (we also extend this setup to more general forms
of price regulation). Although price discrimination is not possible, F0 can “sabotage”
the downstream firms, i.e., it can influence the cost and demand situation of each
downstream firm.
Four different vertical structures are compared: integration of F0 and F1; separa-
tion (i.e., all firms are independent); legal unbundling (F0 is legally independent and
maximizes its own profits but is owned by F1); additionally, we discuss also ”reverse
unbundling” where the downstream firm is legally unbundled — although this seems
to be of less relevance in practice.
Our main result is that legal unbundling leads to (weakly) higher levels of output
than all the other vertical structures. In many cases, higher output will translate into
(weakly) higher consumer surplus under legal unbundling. The intuition for why legal
unbundling leads to higher quantities than vertical integration is as follows. Due to
the access price regulation, upstream profits of F0 are maximized when total output
is maximal. Thus, if F0 is legally unbundled, it wants to maximize total output and
refrains from sabotage of the downstream firms. In contrast, with vertical integration,
F0 also takes into account downstream profits of F1 and may engage in sabotage of
downstream competitors in order to increase downstream profits. We call this the
“sabotage effect”.
When comparing legal unbundling to vertical separation, more complex forces are
at work. First, since in both cases the upstream firm wants to maximize total out-
put, neither under legal unbundling nor under vertical separation will the upstream
(usually) sabotage downstream firms, i.e., there is essentially no sabotage effect.
Second, while a vertically separated downstream firm F1 is interested only in its own
profits, under legal unbundling F1 also has an interest in high upstream profits — and
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thereby in a high overall output. Under legal unbundling, the downstream firm F1
will therefore select strategies that yield higher total output compared to separation.
We call this the “downstream expansion effect”.
Part of the downstream expansion effect is explained by the well-known intuition from
the double marginalization problem: Under legal unbundling the incumbent calculates
with the true input costs c0 and not — as under separation — with the higher access
price a and is therefore willing to expand output. In addition, the incumbent takes
into account that he can induce an output change by downstream competitors. We
call this the “induced output effect”. For instance, in the case of legal unbundling
and price competition, the incumbent sets a lower price than under separation, in
order to increase the output of entrants, who respond to the more aggressive pricing
by lowering their own prices. That the induced output effect is indeed additional
to the effect from double marginalization becomes apparent when one considers more
sophisticated regulatory schemes that solve the double marginalization problem. Even
under those schemes, the induced output effect can lead to output expansion under
legal unbundling, as discussed in Section 2.5.1.
Since one of the main policy concerns is about efficient network investments, we extend
our analysis to different forms of investment decisions. Given our quantity results,
it is quite intuitive that incentives for reducing the upstream firm’s marginal costs
are highest under legal unbundling. We also discuss capacity investments, which can
discriminate between downstream firms, and incentives to invest in network reliability.
For these two types of investments it is not generally clear that legal unbundling
provides the highest investment incentives. Nevertheless, legal unbundling exhibits
some desirable properties also for these sorts of investment decisions.
Despite its great policy relevance in the European Union, there is little literature
on legal unbundling. Two important exceptions are Sibley and Weisman (1998) and
Cremer, Cre´mer, and De Donder (2006). They have introduced the idea that the un-
bundled firm independently maximizes its own profits, while being a fully-owned sub-
sidiary. Both analyse, however, only the case that we label reverse legal unbundling.
This means they assume that the downstream firm has an independent management
that maximizes own profits while the upstream firm maximizes joint profits.6
Sibley and Weisman analyse in a Cournot set-up whether an upstream monopolist has
stronger incentives for sabotage under reverse legal unbundling than under vertical
6Despite some ambiguity in regulatory practice, the case of legal unbundling seems, in our opinion,
closer to most existing regulatory requirements that prescribe legally independent network operators
than the case of reverse legal unbundling.
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integration, and find mixed results. Cremer et. al. compare reverse legal unbundling
with ownership separation in a model that does not consider sabotage, but focuses
on relationship-specific investments. In their model, reverse legal unbundling leads to
higher total output than ownership separation.
Our analysis shows, however, that, for quite general forms of downstream competition
and sabotage technologies, reverse legal unbundling always leads to (weakly) lower
output than ownership separation, which suggests that, unlike legal unbundling of
the upstream operations, reverse legal unbundling seems not to be an arrangement
that is beneficial for consumers.
In a companion paper, Ho¨ffler and Kranz (2007), which is included as Chapter 3 in
this dissertation, we analyze the effects of imperfections in legal unbundling. This
provides a robustness check for our results and is briefly reviewed in Section 2.6.
Apart from this, our paper is related to the general literature on vertical integration,
where an overview is provided, e.g., in Perry (1989). Vickers (1995) compares vertical
integration with ownership separation under access price regulation and finds mixed
welfare results. More recent papers compare investment incentives under vertical
integration and separation, like Bu¨hler, Schmutzler, and Benz (2004), who find that
generally incentives for quality investments are higher under vertical integration.
Incentives for sabotage by a vertically integrated upstream monopolist have, for ex-
ample, been studied by Economides (1998), Beard et. al. (2001) or Mandy and
Sappington (2007) for different sabotage technologies and forms of downstream com-
petition. The seminal analysis on the issue of cost raising strategies and sabotage of
competitors is given by Salop and Scheffman (1983).
Studying legal unbundling also offers interesting insights into the role of ownership in
the theory of the firm. The defining characteristic of ownership can be the right for
residual cash-flows (i.e. profits) as in Alchian and Demsetz (1972) or, alternatively, a
residual right of control as in Grossman and Hart (1986). Whereas under vertical in-
tegration both rights are granted to the incumbent, under legal unbundling ownership
entitles to claim residual cash-flows, but grants no (or very limited) residual rights of
control.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the basic
model, where we assume a regulated linear access price, and where we derive the basic
results. Section 2.3 examines the different types of upstream investments. Several
results are illustrated for the case of price competition with homogenous goods in
Section 2.4, which also includes a complete welfare analysis for this example. In
Section 2.5, we present a general class of regulatory pricing schemes (including two-
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part tariffs for downstream firms), for which our results hold. Section 2.6 discusses
the results, policy implications, and the effects of imperfect legal unbundling. Section
2.7 concludes. Unless otherwise stated, all proofs can be found in the appendix.
2.2 Basic model and results
2.2.1 Assumptions and main results
Structure and Regulation There is a monopolistic upstream firm F0 that produces
a good at constant marginal costs c0, which is used as input good for n competing
downstream firms, F1, ..., Fn. Each downstream firm needs a constant and identical
amount of the input good to create an output good. For simplicity, we normalize input
quantities such that each firm needs exactly one unit of the input good to create one
unit of an output good.
Non-tariff Discrimination We assume F0 is a regulated natural monopoly, e.g. the
owner of an essential transmission network in electricity or telecommunication mar-
kets. The regulator fixes a per-unit access price a > c0 that F0 must charge from all
downstream firms (in Section 2.5, more general pricing schemes are considered). The
regulator can enforce the access price but cannot prevent F0 from hindering some or
all downstream firms in some other way. F0 chooses an action h ∈ H that specifies
some sabotage strategy against downstream firms, like non-disclosure of essential in-
formation or undue delays in the provision of ancillary services. Sabotage can increase
access costs for certain downstream firms or reduce their demand by creating incon-
veniences for customers. We assume that the choice of h has no direct impact on the
profit of F0, although perhaps indirectly it does, if it changes the total quantity sold.
Timing First, F0 chooses its sabotage strategy h. In the extensions of Section 2.3,
F0 also makes investment decisions. Then, downstream firms engage in downstream
competition. An action of downstream firm i is denoted by xi and x = (x1, ..., xn)
denotes a profile of actions selected by the downstream firms. Downstream actions can
describe a broad range of decisions, for example about quantities, prices, investments,
entry or sabotage against competitors.
Unless otherwise stated, we assume that the downstream incumbent F1 moves first
and that F2, ..., Fn can observe the chosen action x1. Whether the other downstream
firms afterwards move simultaneously or sequentially does not matter for our results.
The assumption that the incumbent moves first significantly facilitates the analysis.
The basic intuition carries over also to simultaneous move games; however, for these
games some additional standard regularity assumptions are required, as we exemplify
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for Cournot competition.
We are focusing on subgame perfect equilibria in each of the different games.
Downstream Market and Payoffs Downstream actions, together with sabotage,
determine downstream firm i’s output qi(x, h), its market price pi(x, h) and total costs
Ci(x, h|a). Total output quantity is given by Q(h, x) =
∑n
i=1 qi(x, h).
7 F0’s profits
are given by
pi0(x, h|a) = (a− c0)Q(x, h)−K + S (2.1)
The constant K represents fixed costs and the constant S possible state subsidies.
Note that these upstream profits pi0 are strictly increasing in total output Q. Profits
of downstream firm i are given by
pii(x, h|a) = pi(x, h)qi(x, h)− Ci(x, h|a) for i = 1, ..., n (2.2)
Besides a regularity condition that subgame-perfect equilibria exist in every continu-
ation game (Condition C1 below), we make no restrictions on functional forms.
Vertical structures We compare the following four vertical structures.
v : Vertical integration. F0 and F1 maximize their joint profits pi01, given by
pi01 = pi1 + pi0 (2.3)
s : Vertical separation. All firms maximize their own profits pii.
u : Legal unbundling: F0 maximizes its own profits, whereas F1 maximizes the joint
profits pi01.
r : Reverse legal unbundling: For comparison reasons, we also consider this case where
F0 maximizes joint profits pi01 and F1 maximizes its own profits pi1.
The entering downstream firms i = 2, ..., n maximize their own profits pii under all
vertical structures.
Legal unbundling requires that the network part, or more generally, the part of the
company controlling the essential facility, has to be separated into a legally indepen-
dent entity. The EU legislation explicitly states, however, that legal unbundling does
not imply that the integrated firm has to sell the network operations. Thus, 100%
ownership of the network operations F0 by the incumbent F1 is current practice under
legal unbundling in many European countries (e.g. in the energy industries in France
and Germany).
Legal unbundling in our model is perfect in the sense that we assume that regulators
are able to incentivize the management of F0 such that it maximizes only upstream
7If firms play mixed strategies, these variables denote expected values. In that case, we assume
that all firms are risk-neutral.
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profits pi0 without considering the incumbent’s downstream profits pi1. Arguably, this
does not always mirror the actual practice of legal unbundling; however, existing
legislation explicitly excludes direct instructions of the mother company (Directive
2003/54/EC, Article 10 and 15) or prescribes arm’s-length relations (US Telecom-
munications Act 1996, Section 272 (b) [5]). A couple of other rules and initiatives
may help to implement legal unbundling in a way that comes closer to the “ideal”
form assumed in the model. This includes the current requirement in the EU energy
industry to have strict personnel separation, ensuring that professional interests of
the upstream firm’s employees are separated from downstream interests (e.g. the net-
work unit’s managers should not participate in the group’s stock option programs).
Furthermore, strict compliance with these independence requirements are compulsory
for ‘Independent System Operators’ in the new EU proposal for an amendment of Di-
rective 2003/54/EC (issued 2007-09-19). However, to see how our results are affected
by a less stringent separation of interests, we discuss the effects of “imperfect legal
unbundling” in Section 2.6.
Access prices When we compare the different vertical structures, we consider a
given access price a that is the same in every vertical structure. We will perform
this comparison for every possible access price a > c0. As we will discuss below, our
results are more general than if we had compared only the optimum access price for
each vertical structure.
Regularity conditions Since we compare different vertical structures, we essentially
compare outcomes of different games. Note, however, that — although payoffs of F0
and F1 differ — the timing, the set of players and the strategy space is the same under
every vertical structure. To facilitate the comparison of different vertical structures,
we introduce two regularity conditions. A situation shall describe a vertical structure
and a non-terminal history of the multi-stage game, i.e. a history where at least one
player still has to move. In order to avoid technical complications that could arise if
some continuation games have no subgame-perfect equilibrium, we require:
C1 In every situation there is a subgame-perfect continuation equilibrium.
Note that for some forms of downstream competition and sabotage technologies, a
given situation can have multiple subgame-perfect continuation equilibria. To sim-
plify comparison between vertical structures in those cases, we also make a regularity
condition on equilibrium selection:
C2 Assume two situations have an identical set of subgame-perfect continuation equi-
libria. Then in both situations the same subgame-perfect continuation equilibrium shall
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be selected from this identical set.8
This regularity condition avoids tedious comparison of sets of equilibria. Note that C2
is obviously not needed when, in every situation, there is a unique continuation equi-
librium. The following remark summarizes the essential implications of the regularity
conditions for the subgame-perfect equilibria in our model:
Remark Since downstream entrants’ profits do depend on h and x, but not directly
on the vertical structure, our regularity condition implies that the equilibrium actions
of downstream entrants are a function of h and x1 only. Furthermore, assuming the
same sabotage strategy h is chosen under legal unbundling and vertical integration,
then downstream firms choose the same equilibrium actions x, since the incumbent
maximizes joint profits pi0 + pi1 under both vertical structures.
We are now ready to state our first basic result.
Proposition 2.1 Under legal unbundling, total output Q and upstream profits pi0 are
(weakly) higher than under vertical integration. The result still holds under down-
stream competition in simultaneous moves.
Intuitively, total output is higher under legal unbundling than under vertical integra-
tion, because vertical integration can cause a sabotage effect. Recall from the remark
that the outcome under legal unbundling and vertical integration can differ only if
F0’s sabotage strategy h differs. (This still holds if the downstream incumbent moves
simultaneously with downstream entrants.) Under legal unbundling, F0 considers
only upstream profits pi0 and therefore chooses h in order to maximize total output
Q. This choice can usually be interpreted as performing no sabotage. Under vertical
integration, however, F0 has incentives to sabotage downstream competitors whenever
sabotage sufficiently increases the incumbent’s downstream profits pi1 — even though
the sabotage may decrease upstream profits pi0 and total output Q. We now state our
second basic result:
Proposition 2.2 Under legal unbundling total output Q and upstream profits pi0 are
(weakly) higher than under separation.
The intuition for Proposition 2.2 differs from that of Proposition 2.1. Under both legal
unbundling and separation, the upstream firm F0 wants to maximize total output Q,
i.e. there is no sabotage effect. In contrast to separation, under legal unbundling
8Note that there is no conceptual problem in determining whether continuation equilibria under
different vertical structures are identical or not, since equilibria are strategy profiles and the strategy
space is the same under every vertical structure.
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the downstream incumbent F1 participates in the upstream profits pi0 and therefore
has an interest to select a decision x1 that expands total output Q. We call this the
downstream expansion effect.
To gain further intuition for the downstream expansion effect, we consider some spe-
cific examples of downstream competition. It is helpful to decompose the output
expansion under legal unbundling into two parts: the change in the incumbent’s own
output q1 and an induced output effect that measures the aggregate change in down-
stream entrants’ output.
Consider first the simple case that there are no entrants and F1 is a downstream mo-
nopolist, i.e. there is no induced output effect. Then the output expansion under legal
unbundling is due to the intuition known from the double marginalization problem:
Under legal unbundling F1 considers only the true marginal costs c0 instead of the
higher access price a and therefore chooses a higher output than under separation.
In the presence of entrants, the incumbent additionally takes the induced output effect
into account. In Section 2.4, we discuss in detail an example where firms compete in
prices. Basically, the incumbent sets an aggressively low price in order to induce higher
output by the downstream entrants who match the low price. Even if the access price
a converges to the marginal cost c0, the quantity under legal unbundling is still larger
than under vertical separation since—although the double marginalization problem
vanishes—the induced output effect is still present.
If firms compete in quantities, a quantity expansion by the incumbent typically induces
an output reduction by the entrants. Since the incumbent moves first, he will always
take the induced output effect into account and we will thus never find that F1 takes an
action such that total output is lower under legal unbundling than under separation.
This means the downstream expansion effect will never be negative when F1 moves
first.
2.2.2 Additional results
Legal unbundling vs separation under simultaneous moves If the incumbent
and entrants move simultaneously, F1 still prefers higher total output under legal
unbundling than under separation. We cannot, however, in general exclude that
the incumbent’s desire to have higher total output may paradoxically lead to lower
total output in equilibrium. Thus, the result of Proposition 2.2 will typically hold
only under additional assumptions when downstream firms move simultaneously. An
example for this is to consider Cournot competition downstream and to assume a
specific sabotage technology: Assume that sabotage linearly increases costs, i.e. h =
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{h1, ..., hn} ∈ Rn such that the costs of firm i become Ci (h) = (a+ hi) qi + C˜i (qi)
where C˜i (qi) is just some arbitrary function of qi. With this assumption, we retain
our result of larger quantities under legal unbundling also for the case of simultaneous
quantity competition:
Proposition 2.3 Consider the special case of the linear sabotage technology. Assume
downstream firms compete by simultaneously setting quantities (goods can be differen-
tiated). Then total output is (weakly) higher under legal unbundling than under both
separation and vertical integration.
Under Cournot competition the incumbent does not directly take the induced output
effect into account, i.e. its best reply function takes competitors’ output as given.
The downstream expansion effect is therefore driven by the double marginalization
problem: Under legal unbundling, the incumbent calculates with true marginal costs
c0 instead of the higher access price a. Typically, a reduction in one firm’s marginal
costs will lead to a higher total output in the Cournot equilibrium (see, for example,
Farell and Shapiro (1990) for weak regularity conditions for the case of homogeneous
goods). The reason that Proposition 2.3 also holds for cases where total output
is increasing in a firm’s marginal cost, is that the upstream firm can then prevent
output reduction by increasing the incumbent’s marginal costs via the linear sabotage
technology.
Let us finally discuss simultaneous price competition with differentiated products in
the downstream market. Under price competition, the incumbent wants to set lower
prices under legal unbundling than under separation, because lower prices increase
output. As long as prices are strategic complements, i.e. entrants react to a lower price
of the incumbent by lowering their own prices, and total output is weakly decreasing
in each firm’s price, we find that under legal unbundling no firm sets higher prices
and total output is weakly higher than under separation.
Implications of the output results Our output results suggest that from the
consumers’ perspective, legal unbundling is likely to be superior to the other two
vertical structures. In particular, if the downstream products are homogenous (like,
e.g., voice calls, electricity, or gas) and if downstream firms charge linear tariffs, it is
immediate that higher quantities yield also a higher consumer surplus.
Corollary 2.1 If output goods are perfect substitutes and downstream firms use linear
tariffs, consumer surplus is weakly highest under legal unbundling.
Legal unbundling can also be preferred by taxpayers, since F0 makes higher profits
than under the other vertical structures: if the regulatory regime requires an ex ante
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subsidy that ensures that F0 will break even, then such a subsidy would be lowest
under legal unbundling.
Corollary 2.2 The minimal state subsidy, which guarantees that F0 makes no losses,
is lowest under legal unbundling.
Total welfare Without assumptions on how discrimination works and how down-
stream competition works, results on total welfare are not possible. Clearly there are
cases where legal unbundling leads to higher output but to lower welfare, for example
if there are sunk costs and legal unbundling facilitates excess entry (see the seminal
paper by Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). Nevertheless, there will be many cases where
total welfare is also highest under legal unbundling. One such case — a homogeneous
goods duopoly with price competition — is exemplified in Section 2.4.
Comparison under optimal access prices Assume consumer surplus (and / or
total welfare) is increasing in total output and regulators consider an access price to be
optimal if it maximizes total output under the restriction that the upstream firm can
recover its fixed costs. In general, the optimal access price can depend on the vertical
structure, and one may be interested to compare the total output, under the condition
that under each vertical structure the optimal access price is selected. Our results
imply that legal unbundling leads to (weakly) higher total output than separation and
vertical integration also for the case that such optimal access prices are chosen in every
vertical structure. Recall that we have shown that for every access price a > c0 legal
unbundling leads to (weakly) higher output than the other vertical structures. Thus
even for the access prices that yield the highest output under separation or vertical
integration, legal unbundling will lead to (weakly) higher output and (weakly) higher
upstream profits. The output difference will even increase if for legal unbundling one
would also choose the optimal access price.
Reverse legal unbundling In order to make our results comparable to Cremer et.
al. (2006), what is left to discuss is the case of “reverse unbundling”. Recall that
reverse legal unbundling means F0 maximizes pi0+pi1, whereas F1 has an independent
management and maximizes pi1. In practice, this would imply that e.g. a integrated
electricity company would have to form a legally independent sales unit which is owned
by the network operations (or by the whole group, including generation facilities). The
important point is that with reverse legal unbundling the essential facility would not
be separated into an independent unit. We find that reverse unbundling leads to
lower quantities in equilibrium compared to vertical separation and, by Proposition
2.1, also to lower quantities than legal unbundling.
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Proposition 2.4 Total output Q and upstream profits pi0 under reverse legal un-
bundling are weakly lower than under separation.
This finding is different to the results of Cremer et. al. (2006), because they compare
reverse legal unbundling with separation in a model that focuses on relation-specific
investments; in this framework, reverse legal unbundling is better suited than separa-
tion to overcome the hold-up problem.
2.3 Investments
2.3.1 Capacity Investments and Discriminatory Investments
Many types of upstream investments will influence output by downstream firms, e.g.
by changing the network capacity. Benefits and impediments from such investments
can accrue differently to different downstream firms. For example, investments into
interconnection capacity to a foreign country benefit foreign energy producers who
want to sell in the domestic market of the network operator.
In the policy debate, there are severe concerns that vertical integration and legal un-
bundling lead to socially inefficient allocations of such investments, because of over-
lapping interests of the network operator and the downstream incumbent. The EU
Commission states:
Vertically integrated network operators have no incentive for develop-
ing the network in the overall interests of the market and hence for facili-
tating new entry at generation or supply levels; on the contrary, they have
an inherent interest to limit new investment when this will benefit its com-
petitors and bring new competition onto the incumbent’s “home market”.
Instead, the investment decisions made by vertically integrated companies
tend to be biased to the needs of supply affiliates. Such companies seem
particularly disinclined to increase interconnection or gas import capacity
and thereby boosting competition in the incumbent’s home market to the
detriment of the internal market.9
The Commission also makes clear that in its opinion only ownership unbundling, i.e.
complete separation, can effectively solve this problem:
9Proposal for amending Directive 2003/54/EC concerning common rules for the internal market
in electricity, (issued 2007-09-19), p.5.
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Economic evidence shows that ownership unbundling is the most ef-
fective means to ensure choice for energy users and encourage investment.
This is because separate network companies are not influenced by over-
lapping supply/generation interests as regards investment decisions.10
As we have shown in our basic model, not all overlapping interests are problematic.
Under legal unbundling, the downstream expansion effect as one sort of an overlapping
interest, is rather beneficial. Therefore, a more careful analysis of the investment
incentives may turn out to be useful.
For the theoretical analysis it is helpful to split F0’s investment decisions into two
steps. One step is to decide on the allocation of investment if the total amount that
shall be invested is given. The other step is to decide which total amount shall be
invested.
Investment allocation with given budget We first analyze F0’s allocation deci-
sion, assuming that the total amount of investment spending is given. We simply take
our basic model and interpret F0’s strategic variable h not only as a sabotage strategy,
but also as a decision about the investment allocation, which influences downstream
firms’ costs and output. This interpretation is completely consistent with our model
where downstream firms’ output, prices and costs are given by some general functions
qi(x, h), pi(x, h) and Ci(x, h|a). It is also fulfilled that the allocation of investment
has no influence on F0’s costs, because the total amount invested is assumed to be
given in this step.
Thus, our output results also apply, i.e., for a given sum of investment, F0 will under
legal unbundling always choose that allocation of investment that maximizes total
output.
Endogenous investment budget Examining the second step, we cannot rule out,
however, that the total amount of investment is lower under legal unbundling than
under the alternative vertical structures. There even exist cases, where the resulting
quantities can be lower under legal unbundling.
We first illustrate why investments Is and resulting total output Qs under separation
may exceed the investments Iu and total output Qu under legal unbundling in some
circumstances. Assume that (i) the incumbent is more efficient than the entrants,
such that absent an investment, no entrants would be active and (ii) an investment
would yield a level playing field for entrants and the incumbent. Under separation
and without investment, the double marginalization problem would lead to a quantity
10EU Commission, An Energy Policy for Europe, p. 7, Brussels, 10.1.2007, COM(2007) 1 final.
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lower than under legal unbundling. Thus, investing would yield a large increase in
downstream quantities if, due to the investment, we moved from, say, a downstream
monopoly to a Bertrand duopoly with identical costs. This increases upstream prof-
its significantly and implies that the investment would be undertaken even if it is
relatively costly. With legal unbundling, however, the network unit F0 might find
it optimal not to invest, since it can anticipate that in the quantity decision of the
incumbent F1, the double marginalization problem is internalized and the quantity is
relatively large already without an investment.
That investments under vertical integration, Iv, can be higher than under legal un-
bundling, Iu < Iv, is less surprising and applies already in quite intuitive examples.
Consider an investment that benefits only the incumbent F1, who might then be able
to drive competitors out of the market. This might reduce overall quantity, such that
with legal unbundling the network unit F0 would abstain from such an investment.
While, in this case, investments are lower under legal unbundling, quantities will (typ-
ically) be higher under legal unbundling. However, it is not possible to generally rule
out that legal unbundling with discriminatory investments can yield lower quantities
than vertical integration.
Although total output may be lower under legal unbundling when the investment
budget is endogenous, we can establish the following results:
Proposition 2.5 With capacity investments F0’s profits from network operations pi0
minus investment costs are weakly higher under legal unbundling than under both
separation and vertical integration. Total output fulfills the following inequalities:
(a− c0) (Qs −Qu) ≤ Is − Iu and (a− c0) (Qv −Qu) ≤ Iv − Iu.
Concerns for the incumbent’s downstream profits play no role in those cases where
investment levels are lower under legal unbundling. If investments and total output
are lower under legal unbundling this is because higher investment is not worthwhile
for the network operator itself.
The inequalities of Proposition 2.5 show that the output differences Qs − Qu and
Qv−Qu can become large only if the difference in investment costs becomes large. One
can, therefore, conjecture that such “expensive” expansions of downstream quantities
are not welfare-enhancing. However, a comprehensive welfare analysis is not possible
in our general framework.
The inequality also shows that possible under-investment may be reduced by increas-
ing the access price a. This might be done in ways that do not distort downstream
firms’ demand when using the more general regulatory schemes illustrated in Section
2.5.
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2.3.2 Investments in reducing upstream marginal costs
We now consider process innovations, i.e., investments of F0 which reduce its marginal
costs c0 by some amount δ. Investment costs I(δ) are strictly increasing in the level
of marginal costs reduction δ. We first establish the following helpful lemma, which
just proves the intuitive idea that for a lower level of upstream marginal costs total
output will be weakly higher.
Lemma 2.1 Total output under legal unbundling is weakly decreasing in F0’s
marginal cost c0.
Provided with this intuitive result, we can show that investments and resulting output
are highest with legal unbundling.
Proposition 2.6 Investment into marginal cost reduction and total output under le-
gal unbundling are weakly higher than under vertical separation and vertical integra-
tion.
This investment result is, of course, mainly driven by the output results of Propositions
2.1 and 2.2. When a higher quantity is sold under legal unbundling there are obviously
higher gains from cost reduction. Although intuitive, Proposition 2.6 is not completely
trivial, since investments change the output and the extent to which marginal cost
reduction increases output can be larger under vertical integration than under legal
unbundling. Proposition 2.6 shows that investments are nevertheless always weakly
higher under legal unbundling.
2.3.3 Investments into network safety and reliability
An important issue for energy and railway networks is safety and reliability. If the
network breaks down, severe costs may be inflicted upon the network operator itself,
on downstream firms, as well as on final consumers and other members of society.
Appropriate investments into network reliability are therefore an important issue.
Integrated electricity companies sometimes claim that vertical integration is essential
to guarantee reliable network operations. One may argue that reliability investments
could, indeed, be larger under vertical integration, since not only losses of the network
operator but also losses of the own downstream operations are taken into account.
However, as long as the losses for the rest of society are not considered, reliability
investments will be too low under all vertical structures, including vertical integration.
54
Sufficient levels of reliability investments therefore require contractual solutions that
can impose fines in case of network break-downs or — in cases where contractual
solutions are not feasible — fines imposed by the regulator or direct regulation. We do
not see a compelling reason why such contractual and regulatory arrangements should
be more difficult to achieve under legal unbundling than under the other vertical
structures.
Sometimes, however, there may be problems to identify who was responsible for some
network failure. Was it a mistake on the part of the upstream firm or on the part of
the downstream firm that led to the break-down? In those cases there may be welfare
losses due to costly litigation. When F0 and F1 are vertically integrated there may be
some advantage, because for outsiders it is not important whether the upstream or
downstream operations of the integrated firm were responsible for some failure. But
also under legal unbundling there should be less costly litigation between F0 and F1,
since F1 receives all profits from F0 and has therefore no interests in a costly law suit.
2.4 Example: Duopolistic Price Competition
In the following, we illustrate the output result for a downstream duopoly that sells a
homogeneous product, like electricity, and competes in prices (with F1 moving first).
This example provides two additional insights. First, it allows for a full welfare anal-
ysis, showing that indeed legal unbundling yields the highest level of social surplus.
Second, it illustrates that the downstream expansion effect is not exclusively driven by
the double marginalization problem. We will make precise that the downstream ex-
pansion effect is ”significant” even when the double marginalization problem becomes
arbitrarily small.
Assumptions There are two downstream firms selling perfect substitutes. Total de-
mand is given by a downward sloping demand function Q(p), Q′(p) < 0.We maintain
the assumption that the incumbent F1 moves first. We assume constant marginal
cost of the downstream firms, with a cost disadvantage for the incumbent. Sabotage
linearly increases downstream costs. Thus, cost functions are given by
Ci (qi) = (ci + a+ hi) qi for i = 1, 2
with c1 > c2. Considering a cost disadvantage for the incumbent is of interest since
a standard argument for liberalizing markets is to allow more efficient firms to enter
the downstream market.
To avoid uninteresting case distinctions, we make some regularity conditions. First,
we assume that for some prices above the incumbent’s marginal cost plus access price
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a + c1 there is still positive demand, i.e. a separated incumbent could make positive
profits if it were a downstream monopolist. Second, we assume that if F2 were a
monopolist on the downstream market, its optimal monopoly price lies above a+ c1.
Third, we assume that the access price a is not so high that it is Pareto-dominated by
some lower access price. This means it is not the case that all firms and consumers
would be weakly better off (and at least one of them strictly better off) by some lower
access price.
As is well known, in this set-up multiple equilibria can arise. We only consider equi-
libria in which firms do not play weakly dominated strategies.
Finally, for the question of how the market is split between the two firms in case they
choose identical prices, we make the following tie-breaking assumptions. If the price
is above F2’s marginal costs, i.e. p > c2+a, we assume that F2 gets the whole market
(for the out-of-equilibrium event that p1 = p2 < c2 + a, we assume F1 gets the whole
market). This captures the idea that if prices were discrete on a sufficiently fine grid
then F2 as second mover would prefer minimally to undercut the price if p > c2 + a
and prefer not to sell any output if p < c2 + a.
If the price is equal to F2’s marginal cost, i.e. p = c2+ a, then F1 can decide whether
F1 gets the whole market, F2 gets the whole market, or the market is split equally,
i.e. q1 = q2 =
1
2
Q. This captures the idea that if prices were discrete, F1 could either
set a price slightly above F2’s marginal cost, in which case F2 gets the whole market,
exactly split the market at F2’s marginal cost, or slightly undercut F2’s marginal cost
to get the whole market.
Vertical separation This is the typical Bertrand case, except for the fact that F1
moves first. We find the following result:
Lemma 2.2 Under separation in every equilibrium F2 gets the whole market. The in-
fimum of the market prices from all equilibria where no firm plays a weakly dominated
strategy is given p = a+ c1.
The price p = a + c1, which equals the high cost firm’s marginal cost, is the typical
Bertrand outcome. Nevertheless there are additional equilibria. As under simultane-
ous moves, there are equilibria with prices between a + c2 and a + c1, but those are
equilibria where F1 plays a weakly dominated strategy. If there is only a small doubt
that F2 will not undercut F1, then F1 will never set a price below its own marginal
cost a+c1. Since F1 moves first and always makes zero profits, there are also equilibria
with prices above a+ c1, i.e. a price of a+ c1 is not the only outcome but the welfare
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optimal outcome when we neglect weakly dominated strategies.11
Legal unbundling Under legal unbundling, F0 again wants to maximize total output
and therefore will not sabotage. Contrary to vertical separation, now the downstream
incumbent F1 has an incentive to increase total output, since F0’s profits will accrue
to F1 under legal unbundling. Therefore F1 will price more aggressively in order to
increase output and thereby upstream profits sufficiently. This form of aggressive
pricing is taken to the extreme in our case of price competition with homogeneous
goods, because here F1 prices more aggressively without even having some positive
market share:
Lemma 2.3 Under legal unbundling F0 sets h2 = 0. F1 and F2 both set prices c2+ a
and F2 gets the whole market.
Note that even though the price set by F1, p1 = a+c2, can be below F1’s true marginal
costs c0 + c1, it is not a weakly dominated strategy for F1 to set such a price — in
contrast to what we found under vertical separation. This is because if F1 would set
a higher price, F2 would react with a higher price. That would reduce total output,
and therefore also the profit of the integrated firm.
Vertical integration With vertical integration, there are two candidates for an
equilibrium. Either the upstream firm uses sabotage in order to drive F2 out of the
market (the “monopolistic” outcome), or F0 does not sabotage F2 and then F1 acts
in the same way as under legal unbundling (the “competitive” outcome).
Lemma 2.4 If F0 and F1 are integrated. There are two candidates for equilibrium:
(m) monopoly case: Set h2 = ∞ and let F1 serve the whole market at the monopoly
price of the integrated firm, denoted by pm01.
(u) competitive case: The same as under legal unbundling. Set h2 = 0 and p1 = p2 =
c2 + a and let F2 get the whole market.
In the monopoly case profits of the integrated firm are given by
pim01 = (p
m
01 − c0 − c1)Q (pm01)
In the competitive case its profits are given by
piu01 = (a− c0)Q(c2 + a)
11To be precise, in the equilibrium with a price of exactly a+c1, F1 also plays a weakly dominated
strategy since for no action of F2 will F1 make positive profits. But there is a sequence of equilibrium
prices that converges from above to a + c1, where in no such equilibrium a firm plays a weakly
dominated strategy.
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We find
∂(piu01−pim01)
∂c1
> 0 and
∂(piu01−pim01)
∂c2
< 0. This means the competitive outcome occurs
whenever the cost disadvantage of the own downstream operations is sufficiently large.
With very inefficient own downstream operations, even the integrated firm might find
it optimal to use F2 as its “sales channel” and live only on the upstream profits. In
this case, clearly, sabotage would not make sense.
Reverse legal unbundling The following lemma shows that under reverse legal
unbundling we either have the same market price as under separation or the monopoly
price of an integrated firm. In fact, the worse of these two outcomes is realized, i.e.
reverse legal unbundling is weakly worse than both separation and vertical integration.
Lemma 2.5 Under reverse legal unbundling the market price will be p = max{pm01, a+
c1}. At price a + c1 firms F1 or F2 may produce, but at price pm01, F1 will serve the
whole market.
The intuition is that under reverse legal unbundling, F0 maximizes joint profits and
therefore has incentives for sabotage, and at the same time F1 only maximizes its own
profits and therefore has no incentives to lower prices in order to increase output.
Comparison of the four cases Equipped with the solutions for the four cases we
see that in this example legal unbundling is strictly superior to all other vertical struc-
tures (except for the competitive case of vertical integration, which yields an outcome
identical to legal unbundling). Total output and consumer surplus are inversely re-
lated to the market price and therefore highest under legal unbundling. Profits of F0
are increasing in total output and hence also highest under legal unbundling. Pro-
duction is efficient since F2 produces everything. Total welfare is increasing in total
output as long as market prices are weakly above marginal cost of production c0+ c2,
which is always the case. Thus we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 2.7 Under legal unbundling, prices are strictly lower, and total output,
profit of F0, consumer surplus and total welfare are strictly higher than under sep-
aration, reverse legal unbundling and the monopoly case of vertical integration. (In
the competitive case of vertical integration, we have identical outcomes to legal un-
bundling).
Proof.
Immediate from comparing the outcomes of the four cases.
Finally, we turn to the question what happens when the double marginalization prob-
lem becomes negligible. This happens when a → c0, since then also in the case of
separation the downstream firm calculates with (almost) the true marginal cost of
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the input good. Only under legal unbundling, the outcome will approach the welfare-
optimal outcome, i.e. a first-best market price of c0+c2. Under separation, the market
price converges to a higher level of c0 + c1 and under vertical integration always the
sub-optimal monopoly case arises.
Proposition 2.8 For a→ c0, the welfare-optimal outcome is approached under legal
unbundling, but not under the other vertical structures.
What is responsible for this striking difference is the induced output effect: In this
example, it yields significantly larger quantities under legal unbundling, i.e. a sig-
nificant downstream expansion effect, even when the double marginalization problem
becomes arbitrarily small.12
2.5 Alternative regulatory pricing schemes
2.5.1 A general class of price regulation schemes where legal
unbundling is optimal
So far we assumed that the regulator sets a linear access price a > c0. Such linear
access prices fulfill two conditions:
(L1) F0’s profits pi0 only depend on total output Q, but it does not matter which
downstream firms produce how much of it.
(L2) F0’s profits pi0 are strictly increasing in total output Q.
It turns out that our main results hold for every price regulation scheme that fulfills
conditions (L1) and (L2). Let α denote a price regulation scheme that fulfills (L1)
and (L2). It determines how much money F0 receives when selling a total output Q,
which we denote by a revenue function R(Q|α). Furthermore the scheme α specifies
how much downstream firms have to pay when actions x are chosen (which imply
quantities qi). Thus profits are given by
pi0(x, h|α) = R(Q(x, h)|α)− c0Q(x, h)−K + S
pii(x, h|α) = pi(x, h)qi(x, h)− Ci(x, h|α) for i = 1, ..., n
12We also have extended the price competition example for allowing investments into marginal
cost reduction. Legal unbundling then always yields the welfare-optimal level of investments. A
proof is available from the authors upon request.
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To ensure that (L2) is fulfilled, we require that for all Q′, Q with Q′ > Q it holds that
R(Q′|α)− c0Q′ > R(Q|a)− c0Q.
For these more general regulatory schemes, which provide scope for additional desir-
able features, all the results proven in Section 2.3 and 2.4 still hold.
Proposition 2.9 The following results hold for every regulatory pricing scheme that
fulfills (L1) and (L2): Proposition 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 2.5 (first sentence) and 2.6.
Our proofs for the mentioned propositions in the appendix all use the more general
class of regulatory schemes illustrated in this section. Thus, we find that also for the
larger class of regulatory schemes, legal unbundling can be seen as a golden mean
between separation and vertical integration as it still delivers higher quantities and
good investment incentives.
Example Consider the following example for such a pricing scheme: The regulator
pays the upstream firm a linear access price a > c0, but charges the downstream firms
a two-part tariff with an access price equal to c0 plus a fixed fee. It is not necessary
that the regulators’ revenues have to equal expenditures, i.e. the higher marginal price
paid to F0 may also be (partly) financed by subsidies.
13 This scheme has two benefits:
First, a high access price a provides F0 strong incentives to maximize total output,
which may be a good way to induce a sufficient high budget for capacity investments
(see Section 3.1). Second, output in downstream markets is increased because, for the
downstream firms, access is priced at its true marginal costs c0.
Although under this regulatory scheme there is no double marginalization problem,
output under legal unbundling may still be strictly above the output under separation.
For an illustration consider the price competition example from the previous section.
If we assume that F0’s markup a−c0 is financed by a subsidy (rather than a fixed fee),
the analysis under this regulatory scheme is very similar to the original analysis and
the results are straightforward: Under legal unbundling the entrant serves the whole
market at the welfare-optimal price of c0 + c2, while under separation the entrant
serves the market at a higher price of c0 + c1.
2.5.2 Inappropriateness of legal unbundling in the absence of
access regulation
It is important to note that legal unbundling can yield very bad outcomes if access
prices are unregulated. If F0 could freely decide on access prices, the strategy that
13Imposing high fixed fees can be problematic, because they may foreclose market entry by small
downstream firms. In such cases subsidies may be preferred.
60
maximizes upstream profits pi0 would be to charge the incumbent F1 a very high access
price and at the same time use all available measures to maximize F1’s output, which
could involve massive sabotage of downstream competitors. F1 is willing to pay such
a high access price, because it gets the money back through F0’s profits. Although in
reality this mechanism will likely not appear in this extreme way, the basic incentive
distortions are nevertheless likely to exist without price regulation. Along the lines
of this example, a seemingly harmless rule that only prescribes a maximum access
price for downstream competitors, but allows (or requires) higher access prices for the
downstream incumbent may have quite negative outcomes. Hence, whenever there is
no access price regulation or the conditions (L1) and (L2) from above are violated,
legal unbundling may lose its appealing properties.
2.6 Discussion
The analysis so far has shown that under rather general assumptions, legal unbundling
exhibits desirable properties. Nevertheless, regulatory authorities often evaluate legal
unbundling negatively. For instance, Neelie Kroes, European Competition Commis-
sioner, expressed her views as follows:
Speaking very personally, I see only one way forward if we are to restore
credibility and faith in the market. Europe has had enough of “Chinese
walls” and quasiindependence. There has to be a structural solution that
once and for all separates infrastructure from supply and generation. In
other words: ownership unbundling.14
A key concern in the European policy debate on vertical industry structures are invest-
ment incentives, in particular, for investments in cross-border transmission capacities.
Such investments could pave the way for an integrated European market for electricity
with an increased level of competition. Also for this issue, the EU Commission prefers
vertical separation over legal unbundling. In the words of Commissioner Kroes:
As you will know, where interconnector capacity is scarce, it is auc-
tioned off to the highest bidder, generating congestion revenues. If you
look at our report, you will find that from 2001 to 2005, three German
TSOs generated congestion revenues of over 400 million Euros. Of these
14Speech Neelie Kroes, A new energy policy for a new era, Conference on European Energy Strategy
– the Geopolitical Challenges, Lisbon, 30th October 2006.
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revenues, under 30 million Euros were used to build new interconnectors-
that’s less than 10%!
In contrast, our experience shows that fully unbundled operators see
clearer incentives for investment in interconnectivity, and act on those
incentives, because they are focused on optimizing the use of the network.15
Although the European Commission views vertical separation (or ownership un-
bundling) as the most preferred vertical industry structure, it has positively considered
an alternative structure with an “independent systems operator”:
[...] the Commission has also examined an alternative approach known
as ‘ISO’ or Independent System Operator, whereby the vertically inte-
grated company maintains ownership of the network assets and receives
a regulated return on them, but is not responsible for their operation,
maintenance or development.16
We believe that our analysis helps to understand better the effects from measures
mentioned in the three quotes. We discuss the three points in turn.
First, our theoretical analysis assumed that legal unbundling works perfectly in sep-
arating the interests of the network company from the rest of the integrated group.
This seems often not to be the case. Thus, it is important to understand what happens
if the network company acts not completely independently and also takes into account
the profits of the downstream firm F1. This is analyzed in detail in Ho¨ffler and Kranz
(2007). There it is shown that reducing the independence of the network firm yields
the expected result of lowering total output. Put differently: more independence, i.e.
a stronger regulation, increases the output. The optimum ownership structure there-
fore can depend on the strength of regulation. Ho¨ffler and Kranz (2007) show that
if regulation is weak, vertical separation can indeed yield higher quantities than legal
unbundling. However, if regulation is sufficiently strong, the results of the current
paper apply (i.e. highest quantities under legal unbundling).
Since the effect of legal unbundling therefore seems to depend on the strength of
regulation, the negative experiences of regulators may well be explained by insuf-
ficiently strong regulation. Although “sufficiently strong” regulation might not be
15Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner for Competition Policy, ’A new European Energy Policy;
reaping the benefits of open and competitive markets’ Energy conference: E-world energy & water’
Essen, 5th February 2007
16Neelie Kroes European Commissioner for Competition Policy ’A new European Energy Policy;
reaping the benefits of open and competitive markets’ Energy conference: E-world energy & water’
Essen, 5th February 2007.
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implementable as such,17 it might also be the case that intensifying regulation is pos-
sible and that such a strengthening of regulation will lead to a situation where legal
unbundling is the preferred vertical structure. This could be done either by stronger
legal requirements or by stricter implementation of existing rules. The second quote
illustrates the point. Only since 2005 have German network companies been legally
obliged to reinvest profits from the interconnector auctions18 — thus, legal require-
ments have become more strict (irrespective of the question whether this particular
tightening of regulation is sensible — below we propose an alternative approach to this
problem). If the integrated companies still get away with not reinvesting, this would
be due to a lack of enforcement of legal rules. The European Commission itself states
that the existing rules are not yet fully implemented.19 Thus, too little independence
might at least partially be due to too weak implementation of existing regulation.
The resulting policy implication, therefore, is to strengthen regulation and to thor-
oughly implement the existing regulations in order to increase the independence before
changing the regime towards full separation. Additionally, requiring legally unbun-
dled firms to take on a minority outside investor, could help to increase independence.
Consider a minority stake of, say 10%, of an institutional investor in the network com-
pany. The interest of the downstream firm in the network profits would still be large,
such that beneficial effects of legal unbundling are still significant; at the same time,
the investor has an interest in enforcing that the network company maximizes only
its own profits.
The issue of investments, addressed in the second quote, is also interesting in light of
our findings. From a theoretical perspective, completely separated network operators
will also have incentives to provide only a monopoly amount of interconnector capacity
— below the socially optimal level — if they directly receive the congestion revenues
from the interconnector auctions.20 Theory can also predict that legal unbundling can
17Although many legal rules exist to ensure independence (mentioned in section two), reaching
perfect independence might nevertheless be difficult. For instance, even if the management of the
network company today has no incentive to privilege the incumbent’s downstream operations, career
concerns within the group might bias decisions towards such a discriminatory behavior.
18In Germany, according to the Netzzugangsverordnung § 15 (3).
19That legal unbundling requirements are not yet fully implemented is explicitly noticed by the
European Commission: “Even where Member States have adopted unbundling provisions required
under the Second Gas Directive, this does not mean that TSOs necessarily comply with them.”
(Sector Inquiry, Part 1, para 153, p. 57).
20See Ho¨ffler and Wittmann (2007) for a discussion of ”supply reduction” in interconnector auc-
tions.
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exaggerate this problem, since under legal unbundling the downstream incumbent may
bid higher prices in the capacity auction in order to increase congestion revenues and
thereby the profits of the network operator.
In this context, our discussion of more general regulatory schemes proves useful. One
suggestion is to modify the capacity auction as follows: The regulator receives the
revenues from the capacity auction and pays the network operator a regulated fixed
access price for every unit that is sold in the auction. Then the network operator
cannot influence the price it receives and therefore has no incentives to act like a
capacity-reducing monopolist. Such a regime satisfies the assumptions of section 5.1;
thus, we expect that legal unbundling will yield a higher output than separation under
this modified regulation scheme.
Finally, consider the issue of independent system operators, subject to a rate of return
regulation, mentioned in the third quote. The driving force for the benefits of legal
unbundling over separation in our model is the fact that the downstream incumbent
receives the network operator’s profits and therefore wants to increase total output.
But if, as suggested, the downstream incumbent only receives a regulated return on
its network assets (independent of the profits from network operations), it has no
incentive to increase total output, and the benefits of legal unbundling compared to
separation would not arise.
To conclude the discussion, let us remark that we have left out some important issues.
For instance, we have not discussed “vertical economies”, i.e. possible efficiency gains
from vertical integration from a technological or transaction cost point of view. The
evidence for their existence is somewhat unclear, however. Fraquelli et. al. (2005),
Kowka (2002), or Kaserman and Mayo (1991), for example, find evidence for more or
less economically significant vertical economies. Although such economies of vertical
integration may not be fully realized under legal unbundling, they should be realized
to a larger extent than under complete separation. For example, the hold-up problem
is likely to be reduced under legal unbundling, since F1 would in an investment decision
take into account the surplus accruing to F0 and also has no interest in costly ex-post
bargaining with F0.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated that, from a theoretical point, legal unbundling
can be seen as a “golden mean” between complete separation and full vertical integra-
tion. If access prices are regulated and legal unbundling can ensure that the network
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company, controlling the essential facility, maximizes only the own profits, legal un-
bundling ensures higher quantities than the other vertical structures. This result is
important, since higher quantities typically imply that also consumer surplus will be
higher under legal unbundling.
A key message of our analysis is that, in addition to the sabotage effect, policy makers
should also consider the downstream expansion effect : Under legal unbundling — com-
pared to separation — the incumbent’s downstream operations not only internalize
the double marginalization problem but additionally can induce an output expansion
by competitors. Most pronounced, in the case of downstream price competition, the
incumbent prices more aggressively compared to a vertically separated downstream
company, since this leads to a price reduction and higher quantities of downstream
competitors and thereby to higher profits of the upstream operations.
We also analyzed investment incentives. Legal unbundling provides the better in-
centives for investments into the reduction of marginal costs and for the allocation
of a given budget for capacity investments. Although, we cannot generally rule out
cases where legal unbundling leads to lower budgets for capacity investments, our re-
sults suggest that even in those cases legal unbundling may often be welfare superior.
Concerning investments into network reliability, we argued that contractual solutions
or appropriate regulation are needed under all vertical structures to ensure sufficient
levels of investment.
We demonstrated that our results not only apply for linear access prices, but also for
more general regulatory regimes. In the absence of price regulation, legal unbundling
loses its appealing properties, however.
Policy recommendations cannot ignore the negative experiences regulators have made
so far with legal unbundling. Our contribution is to offer a fairly general economic
analysis of legal unbundling which helps to see potential benefits and to identify the
necessary prerequisites for these benefits to apply. Our tentative policy recommen-
dation would therefore be: Regulators should first try to implement legal unbundling
rigorously, with particular emphasis on the independent decision making in the un-
bundled network unit, considering also to oblige legally unbundled network operators
to take on minority shareholders. Only if experiences after full implementation are
still negative, a regime shift towards full vertical separation should be considered.
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Chapter 3
Imperfect Legal Unbundling of
Monopolistic Bottlenecks
3.1 Introduction
In many network industries like energy, rail, or telecommunications the network is a
naturally monopoly and network access is an essential input for firms competing in
downstream markets. Monopolistic bottlenecks are also an issue in other industries,
like the software industry where undiscriminating access to the functionality of an
operation system is an essential input for firms competing in the application markets.
An important question for regulatory policy is whether a firm active in the down-
stream market is allowed to operate the monopolistic bottleneck or to have ownership
shares in the upstream firm that controls this bottleneck. While most academic re-
search focuses only on the comparison between vertical integration and full ownership
separation, there is an important alternative: legal unbundling.
Legal unbundling means that the monopolistic bottleneck must be operated by a
legally independent upstream firm, but the upstream firm may be fully or partially
owned by a firm active in the downstream market. The downstream mother is not
allowed to interfere in the upstream operations, but its ownership share gives entitle-
ment to the corresponding proportion of upstream profits.
In Europe, legal unbundling is the standard requirement for the energy industry1, and
similar forms of “partial separation” are common in the telecommunications industry
in Europe and the US.2.
1For the electricity market see Directive 2003/54/EC, Articles 10 (1) and 15 (1), for the gas
market see Directive 2003/55/EC, Articles 9 (1) and 13 (1).
2For the US see Section 272 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; for the European Union see
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We know so far of only two papers — Ho¨ffler and Kranz (2007) and Cremer et. al.
(2006) — that perform a theoretical analysis of legal unbundling (Cremer et. al.
consider, however, the reverse case where the downstream firm is legally unbundled
and owned by the upstream firm). Both papers assume that legal unbundling is
perfect in the sense that the unbundled firm maximizes only its own profits, while
only the mother company maximizes joint profits.
Ho¨ffler and Kranz show that under this assumption and regulated access prices legal
unbundling leads to highest output quantities in a model where the upstream firm can
hamper the operations of downstream firms. They also show that the attractive fea-
tures of legal unbundling persist when upstream investments into capacity, marginal
cost reduction or network reliability are considered.
In this paper we extend their basic model to analyze cases of imperfect legal un-
bundling and partial ownership. There is one upstream monopolist (F0), a down-
stream incumbent (F1) that can have a positive ownership share σ in F0 and possible
has some influence on F0’s management, and n − 1 potential downstream competi-
tors. The upstream firm produces an essential input at constant marginal cost c0
which the downstream firms need in a fixed proportion (1:1) to produce the final
output. Downstream competition is modeled quite generally. Downstream decisions
could, for example, be made about quantities, (non-linear) prices, investments or
market entry. Access prices are set by the regulator. Our results hold for all price
regulation schemes where profits from upstream operations are strictly increasing in
total output. One example is a linear access price above the marginal costs of the
upstream firm. F0 can perform non-tariff discrimination by sabotaging downstream
firms or allocating investments in areas that benefit only specific downstream firms.
Imperfect unbundling is modeled by a non-negative weight ω that F0’s management
attaches in its decisions on the downstream profits of the incumbent F1.
In Section 3.3, we analyze how total output depends on this weight and on the in-
cumbent’s ownership share in F0. We find that total output weakly increases when
the upstream firm F0 attaches lower weight on incumbent’s downstream profit. This
result holds for every ownership share that F1 can have in F0. Thus, regulations that
increase independence of the upstream firm (but do not change ownership shares) seem
in general beneficial to consumers. When the weight that F0 attaches on downstream
profits is sufficiently low then total output also weakly increases in F1’s ownership
share. When this weight is higher, i.e. legal unbundling is less perfect, an increase in
F1’s ownership share has ambiguous effects: total output may increase or decrease.
Directive 2002/21/EC, Article 13 (1b).
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Hence, although legislation that forces F1 to give up ownership in F0 may increase
output under weak regulation (high ω), under more effective regulation (lower ω)
higher output can be achieved when the downstream incumbent F1 keeps ownership
shares in the upstream firm F0.
In Section 3.4, we examine a micro-foundation for the weight ω that the upstream
firm attaches on downstream profits of the incumbent. We especially want to gain
insight about plausible relations between this weight and F1’s ownership share in
F0. We derive an endogenous formula for ω from a model where F0 can either make
a decision that maximizes upstream profits, or is be manipulated by F1 and then
makes a decision that leads to higher downstream profits of the incumbent. For
F1 manipulation is costly. Manipulation costs can decrease in F0’s ownership share
whenever it becomes so large that no outside investors has any substantial stakes in
F0 that would give incentives to control F0’s management. Still, the model shows that
higher ownership shares of F1’s in the upstream firm F0 can cause F0 to put lesser
weight on F1’s downstream profits. The intuition for this — at first sight surprising
— result is that under larger ownership shares the incumbent F1 receives a higher
share of upstream profits and therefore has smaller incentives for manipulations that
reduce upstream profits.
The remaining paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we present the model.
Section 3.3 derives the general results and illustrates why total output may fall in F1’s
ownership share when ω is high. In Section 3.4 we give a micro-foundation for the
weight ω and examine its relation with F1’s ownership share. Section 3.5 summarizes
the results and concludes. Proofs are delegated to the appendix.
3.2 The model
Active firms There is a monopolistic upstream firm F0 that produces a good at
constant marginal costs c0, which is used as input good for n competing downstream
firms, F1, ..., Fn. Each downstream firm needs a constant and identical amount of the
input good to create an output good. For simplicity, we normalize input quantities
such that each firm needs exactly one unit of the input good to create one unit of an
output good.
Non-tariff discrimination We assume F0 is a regulated natural monopoly, e.g.
the owner of an essential transmission network in electricity or telecommunication
markets. Access prices are regulated such that upstream profits pi0 are strictly in-
creasing in total output (details are given below). We assume that F0 can perform
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the operation of the network in ways that may discriminate distinct downstream firms.
Formally, F0 chooses a discrimination (or sabotage) strategy h ∈ H that influences
output, costs and consumer prices of downstream firms. The strategy h can describe
measures like disclosure of confidential information to competitors, delay or excessive
formalities when dealing with requests, or network repairs at times that are especially
inconvenient for some downstream firms. We make the simplifying assumption that
the choice of h has no direct impact on the profits of F0, although perhaps indirectly
if it changes the total quantity sold. The variable h can also be interpreted as the al-
location of a fixed budget of capacity investments that influences the maximal output
of different downstream firms. For example, F0 can increase interconnection capacity
between countries or alternatively extend the domestic network. We do not consider
decisions about the total size of the investment budget. Those issues are analyzed,
however, in the related model of Ho¨ffler and Kranz (2007).
Downstream market The decision of downstream firm i is denoted by xi ∈ Xi and
x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ X1×...×Xn denotes the vector of chosen downstream actions. These
downstream actions describe very general decisions, e.g. about quantities, prices,
investments, entry or sabotage against competitors. Downstream actions x together
with upstream discrimination h determine downstream firms’ output qi(x, h), their
market prices pi(x, h) and their total costs Ci(x, h|a). Total output quantity is given
by Q(h, x) =
∑n
i=1 qi(x, h).
3 Profits of downstream firm i are given by
pii(x, h|α) = pi(x, h)qi(x, h)− Ci(x, h|α) for i = 1, ..., n (3.1)
We assume that no downstream firm can make infinite high profits or losses, i.e. the
set of possible downstream profits is bounded. Furthermore the regularity condition
C1 (see below) will require existence of subgame perfect equilibria. Otherwise, there
are no further restrictions on functional forms.
Access price regulation and upstream profits
The parameter α in downstream costs functions denotes an access price regulation
scheme. We assume that the access price regulation schemes α fulfills two conditions.
First, the profits of F0 shall depend only on total output Q, i.e. it does not matter
which downstream firm contributed how much to the total output Q. This is a sensi-
ble requirement, since otherwise the regulator would give the upstream firm explicit
incentives to prefer output from specific downstream firms, which may cause sabo-
tage of competitors of those firms. Second, we require that F0’s profits are strictly
3If firms play mixed strategies these variables denote expected values. In that case, we assume
that all firms are risk-neutral.
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increasing in total output. This also seems sensible, since there is typically a problem
of underprovision of output, because of downstream market power.
Thus upstream profits are given by a function
pi0(x, h|α) = pi0(Q(x, h)|α) (3.2)
that is strictly increasing in total output Q. A simple example for such a price scheme
is a common linear access price a above marginal costs c0. Another example is that the
regulator pays a linear access price above marginal costs to F0 but charges downstream
firms a two-part tariff with marginal access price of c0 plus a fixed fee. It is not
necessary that downstream payments have to equal the payments the upstream firm
receives; part of the payments may also be subsidies.
Timing The price regulation scheme is exogenously given in our model. Then
F0 chooses its discrimination strategy h. Afterwards the downstream incumbent
F1 chooses its action x1. These decisions are observed by the downstream entrants
F2, ..., Fn who then make their downstream decisions. Whether downstream entrants
move simultaneously or sequentially does not matter for our model.
Ownership by downstream incumbent The downstream incumbent F1 can own
some or the complete share of the upstream firm F0. We denote F1’s ownership share
by σ and assume that F1 maximizes its totally received profits, given by
u1 = pi1 + σpi0 with 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1. (3.3)
Imperfect legal unbundling Under perfect legal unbundling the upstream firm F0
has an independent management, which maximizes only upstream profits pi0, even if
F0 is wholly or partially owned by the downstream incumbent. Existing legislation,
for example, explicitly forbids direct interference by the mother company (Directive
2003/54/EC, Article 10 and 15) or prescribes arm’s length relations (US Telecom-
munications Act 1996, Section 272 (b) [5]). Still field evidence suggests that legal
unbundling is not always perfect. We model imperfect legal unbundling by assuming
that F0 attaches a positive weight ω on the downstream profits of the incumbent.
Thus F0 maximizes
u0 = pi0 + ωpi1 with 0 ≤ ω. (3.4)
Our model encompasses the 4 vertical structures studied in Ho¨ffler and Kranz (2007)
as special cases, which are vertical separation: σ = 0, ω = 0, (perfect) legal unbundling
(with full ownership): σ = 0, ω = 1, (perfect) reverse legal unbundling: σ = 0, ω = 1
and vertical integration: σ = 1, ω = 1.
Regularity conditions For every pair (σ, ω) our model formally consists of a multi-
stage game. The timing and strategy-space of these games is the same for all (σ, ω)
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and only the payoff functions for F0 and F1 differ. We call a situation a pair of (σ,ω)
and some history of the corresponding multi-stage game, where at least one player still
has to move. To avoid technical complications that could arise if some continuation
games have no subgame-perfect equilibrium, we require:
C1 In every situation there is a subgame-perfect continuation equilibrium.
Note that a given situation may have multiple subgame-perfect continuation equilib-
ria. We also make a regularity condition on equilibrium selection for those cases:
C2 Assume two situations have an identical set of subgame-perfect continuation equi-
libria. Then in both situations the same subgame-perfect continuation equilibrium shall
be selected from this identical set.
This regularity condition avoids tedious comparison of sets of equilibria. Note that
C2 is obviously not needed when in every situation there is a unique continuation
equilibrium.
We want to remark the following direct implications of our model under these regu-
larity conditions.
Remark Under the condition above entrants equilibrium decisions only depend on
h and the decision of the incumbent x1. This means given h firm 1 can choose be-
tween different decision profiles x = (x1, x2(x1, h), ..., xn(x1, h)). Furthermore the
incumbent’s decision x1 only depends on h and on his ownership share σ. Thus the
equilibrium choices in the downstream markets x can be described as a function of h
and σ.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 General output results
In this section we analyze the comparative statics of total output with respect to
changes in the degree of imperfection in legal unbundling ω and F1’s ownership share
σ. The results are formalized in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 and illustrated in Figure 3.1.
The arrows in Figure 3.1 indicate the direction of weakly increasing total output.
The downward oriented vertical arrows indicate that making F0 more independent,
i.e. reducing ω weakly increases output for any given ownership share of F1. This is
formally stated in Proposition 3.1:
Proposition 3.1 For every given ownership share σ the total output is weakly de-
creasing in ω.
71
Direction in which
total output
weakly increases
ω
σ (perfect) legal unbundling
(with full ownership)
complete
separation
reverse legal 
unbundling
vertical
integration
0
1
1
?
Figure 3.1: Effects of ω and σ on total output Q.
The horizontal arrows in Figure 3.1 have the following meaning: When F0 acts com-
pletely independent, i.e. ω = 0, we find that total output is weakly increasing in
F1’s ownership share σ. This result also holds approximately for small ω, but for high
levels of ω the effects of σ can be ambiguous, as we illustrate in the example of Section
3.3.2. Formally, we find:
Proposition 3.2 If ω = 0 then total output is weakly increasing in the incumbent’s
ownership share σ. Furthermore, the following limit result holds: Consider two own-
ership shares σa and σb with σa < σb and let Qa and Qb be the corresponding resulting
total outputs. Then Qb −Qa has a lower bound that converges to zero as ω → 0.
The two results imply that perfect legal unbundling with full ownership (σ = 1, ω = 0)
leads to a weakly higher output than every other combination of σ and ω. Thus
whenever higher total output is linked to higher welfare it would indeed be desirable
to achieve such perfect legal unbundling with full ownership.
The main results are quite intuitive. Output increases when F0 becomes more in-
dependent, since for lower ω the upstream firm attaches a smaller weight on F1’s
downstream profits and therefore a relatively bigger weight on output maximization.
Similarly, when F1’s ownership share σ increases, F1 attaches greater weight on up-
stream profits, which increase in total output. Intuitively, this should lead to an
increase in total output.
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3.3.2 Example of ambiguous effects of σ when ω is large
Given this intuition it is somewhat surprising that there can be cases where for a
given high level of ω an increase in ownership share σ may decrease total output. We
illustrate such a case with the following example. Assume there are two downstream
firms with constant marginal costs c1 = 0.4 and c2 = 0.3 who compete by setting
simultaneously quantities (Cournot).4 The inverse demand is given by p = 1−q1−q2.
There is a linear access price of 0.25 per input unit and F0 produces at zero marginal
costs c0 = 0. F0 can hamper downstream firm i by increasing marginal costs to
an arbitrary level ci + hi. Figure 3.2 illustrates the resulting total output for all
combinations of ω and σ.
ω
σ (perfect) legal unbundling
(with full ownership)
complete
separation
vertical
integration
reverse legal 
unbundling
M
C
Figure 3.2: Total output Q in Cournot example. Brighter colors indicate higher levels
of total output.
There are two classes of equilibria corresponding to the areas C and M in Figure
3.2. Either there is no sabotage and both downstream firms compete (area C) or
we have a downstream monopoly of F1 where the downstream competitor F2 will
be strongly sabotaged and therefore produces 0 (area M). As is intuitively clear,
the monopoly outcome arises only for sufficiently high levels of ω. Within the sets
of monopoly outcomes and competitive outcomes total output is always increasing
in F1’s ownership share σ, which is in line with the intuition that higher σ give F1
stronger incentives to increase total output. But for high levels of ω an increase in
4Although simultaneous quantity setting violates our assumption that F1 moves first, Cournot
competition nicely illustrates the intuition. Similar examples can be found where F1 moves first.
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σ may lead from a competitive outcome to a monopoly outcome with lower total
output. The intuition is that achieving the monopoly outcome by sabotaging F2 is
more attractive for F0 when F1’s ownership share σ is high, since for higher σ output
losses due to double marginalization are less severe. If ω is low this effect does not
arise because then F0 mainly cares about high output and therefore always prefers
the competitive solution.
3.4 A micro-foundation for imperfections in legal
unbundling and the relation with downstream
ownership
In this section we give an example for a simple a micro-foundation for the weight ω that
F0 attaches on downstream profits of the incumbent F1. The example also provides
insights how this weight may depend onF1’s ownership share σ in the upstream firm
F0.
Assume F0 can make a binary decision d ∈ {d0, d1}. Decision d0 will lead to a higher
total output Q and higher upstream profits pi0 than d1, whereas d1 leads to higher
downstream profits pi1 for the incumbent. Let ∆0 < 0 and ∆1 > 0 denote the change in
profits pi0 and pi1, respectively, when the decision changes from d0 to d1. Under perfect
legal unbundling F0 will always select decision d0. Assume that under imperfect legal
unbundling F1 has the opportunity to manipulate decision makers of F0 such that
they will change the decision to d1. For successful manipulation F1 has to spend an
amount −∆0c (with c > 0) of money, which is proportional to the loss −∆0 that F0
makes when the decision changes from d0 to d1.
These proportional costs capture the idea that detection risk and possible punishment
by the regulator are higher for manipulations that are very costly for the upstream
firm F0. Proportional costs are also plausible when the management of F0 directly
participates in the upstream profits of via incentive contracts and therefore needs
higher bribes to change decision from d0 to d1 whenever this reduces upstream profits
to a large extend.
In addition to the costs of manipulation, the downstream incumbent F1 will also take
into account that changing the decision from d0 to d1 reduces its share σpi0 of received
upstream profits. Considering these two kinds of costs, we find that manipulating the
decision from d0 to d1 is profitable for F1 if and only if
(σ + c)∆0 +∆1 > 0 (3.5)
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Thus whenever this inequality is fulfilled, d1 is selected instead of d0. It is straight-
forward to see that resulting behavior corresponds to the optimal decision rule for
maximizing the following weighted sum of profits pi0 +
1
σ+c
pi1. Hence, the actual de-
cisions of F0 look like F0 maximizes u0 = pi0 + ωpi1 with ω now being endogenously
given by
ω =
1
σ + c
. (3.6)
If manipulation costs c are independent of F1’s ownership share σ, we therefore find
that ω is strictly decreasing (!) in F1’s ownership share σ. Thus higher ownership
shares of the downstream incumbent cause the upstream firm to attach less weight on
the incumbent’s downstream profits. The intuition for this result is that with a higher
ownership share the downstream incumbent takes upstream profits more strongly into
account and has therefore less incentives to manipulate the upstream firm in a way
that decreases total output.
It is plausible, however, that F1’s manipulation costs c are decreasing in its ownership
share σ. One reason is the following: Assume F1 has not complete ownership of F0, but
there is also an independent outside investor that holds shares in F0 and has no stakes
in firms that operate downstream. Since such an outside investor participates only in
the upstream profits pi0, he has incentives to effectively control that the management
of F0 does indeed maximize pi0 and is not manipulated by the downstream incumbent.
If σ is lower, then outside investors have higher ownership shares, control should be
tougher and therefore manipulation costs for F1 should be higher than for higher levels
of σ. In result, if c is decreasing in σ, the total effect of a change in σ on the weight
ω becomes ambiguous.
It is perceivable that outside investors already have sufficient interests to control F0’s
management for a substantial minority share, like 20% ownership in F0 and that
higher shares of outside ownership do not increase control effort much. Assuming
that control costs are continuously decreasing in σ and strictly concave i.e. c′(σ) < 0
and c′′(σ) < 0 may therefore not be a bad approximation. Under this assumption
we find dω
dσ
= − 1
(σ+c)2
(1 + c′) for 0 < σ < 1 and ω is minimized either by the corner
solutions σ∗ = 0 or σ∗ = 1 or we have an interior solution σ∗ given by the simple
condition
c′(σ∗) = −1.
Considering the results from Section 3.3, we should note that the ownership fraction
σ∗ that minimizes the weight ω that F0 attaches on downstream profits pi1 is in general
not that ownership fraction that maximizes total output. If the minimal level of ω
is sufficiently small, increasing σ will weakly increase total output and therefore the
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level of σ that maximizes total output is likely above σ∗. If the minimal level of ω is
quite high, it may, however, be the case that total output is maximized for ownership
shares below σ∗.
3.5 Summary
We analyzed imperfect legal unbundling of a monopolistic provider of a bottleneck
input. The upstream monopoly is price regulated and fully or partially owned by an
incumbent active in the downstream markets. While under perfect legal unbundling
the upstream monopolist maximizes only its own profits, under imperfect legal un-
bundling the upstream firm can be manipulated by the incumbent and then attaches
a positive weight to the incumbent’s downstream profits. For every given ownership
share of the downstream incumbent we find that total output weakly increases when
manipulation is made more difficult by stronger regulatory requirements. If regulation
is sufficiently strong, such that the upstream firm attaches only a small weight to the
incumbent’s downstream profits, total output also weakly increases in the incumbent’s
ownership share. If regulation is weak the effect of incumbent’s ownership share on
total output can be ambiguous, however. Furthermore, we show that the incumbent’s
ownership share also has ambiguous effects on the weight that the upstream firm
attaches to the incumbent’s downstream profits.
We show that total output can be maximized under legal unbundling with partial
ownership by the incumbent and an additional independent outside investor in the
upstream firm. Since typically consumer surplus increases in total output, our analysis
suggest that these arrangements may be optimal for consumers.
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Chapter 4
Decision Structures in Franchise
Systems of the Plural Form
4.1 Introduction
Franchising is a widespread phenomena. According to estimates for the year 2001
(IFA and PWC, 2004), there were more than 760,000 franchised businesses in the US,
which generated a total economic output of more than $1.53 trillion.
One puzzling empirical regularity in franchising is the stable coexistence of franchised
and company-owned stores within a chain. Following Bradach & Eccles (1989), we
call this arrangement a plural form.1 In an extensive panel-data study Lafontaine and
Shaw (2005) show that after some adjustment period the fraction of company-owned
stores remains relatively stable in most franchise chains and seems to be deliber-
ately targeted.2 On average 15% of stores of established franchise chains are directly
company-owned, but this numbers varies considerably between and within sectors.
Several alternative explanations for the plural form have been discussed in the exist-
ing literature, which we will review in Section 4.2.
We have collected contract, interview and background data from the US fast-food
industry to motivate a game-theoretic analysis that illustrates an additional reason for
the plural form. The analysis is based on two stylized facts about franchise contracts,
which hold in our sample and are more generally observed in franchising (see e.g.
Bradach, 1998, or Blair & Lafontaine, 2005, for overviews): First, contracts typically
give the chain strong power to decide upon certain activities, like introduction of new
1This arrangement is also known as dual distribution or contract mixing.
2For previous empirical studies, see e.g. Lutz (1992), Lafontaine (1992), Thompson (1994), Scott
(1995) and Lafontaine and Shaw (1999).
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products or changes in building requirements. Once a chain selects such an activity, it
must be implemented by franchisees. Second, franchisees have to pay royalties, which
are fraction of sales-revenues, to the chain.3
These two contractual features create a source of inefficiencies in decision making.
Since royalties are based on revenues, and costs are born only by franchisees, the
chain has incentives to choose inefficient activities that lead to high revenues but
can be very costly for a store. A substantial fraction of company-stores can function
as a commitment device for the chain to select more efficient activities, however.
Such a commitment effect is present when the chain is obliged to uniform standards
that require that the same activities must be selected for company-owned stores as
for franchise stores. The reason is simply that for the fraction of the chain’s total
income that is contributed by company-owned stores, the cost of activities are fully
internalized. Therefore, inefficient activities that lead to high revenues — but are very
costly — become less attractive as the fraction of company-owned stores increases.4
In Section 4.3, we perform the game theoretic analysis in which we consider three
cases. In the first case, we assume that the chain is obliged to uniform standards
between company-owned and franchise stores and chooses endogenously the optimal
fraction of company-owned stores. We model the interaction between the chain and
franchisees via a three stage game. In the first stage, the chain commits to a fraction
of company-owned stores and offers a franchise contract that specifies the royalty.
When franchisees accept the contract in Stage 2, nature draws a state of the world
that determines revenues and costs, as well as the optimal chain-wide activities. In
Stage 3, the chain observes the state of the world and selects a chain-wide activity.
Finally revenues and costs are realized and split according to the franchise contract.
We show that the chain may select a positive fraction of company-owned stores, even
if company-owned stores are run less efficiently than franchise stores. Thus, the plural
form endogenously results from our model.
In the second case, the chain selects not only the fraction of company-owned stores, but
also decides whether to commit to uniform standards between franchise and company-
owned stores. The analysis straightforwardly shows that in this case it is always
optimal for the chain to contractually commit itself to such uniform standards.
Finally, we analyse the case where the optimal fraction of company-owned stores is
3The literature discuss several reasons for royalties on revenues, which we review in Section 4.2.
4The basic idea that company-owned stores may lead to to selection of more efficient activities has
already been previously examined in two unpublished papers, including a case study of 5 franchise
chains, by the second author — see Lewin-Solomons (2000a and 2000b).
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determined by factors outside our model (the literature review in Section 4.2 sum-
marizes several such factors). We consider the extreme case where the fraction of
company-owned stores is completely exogenous and analyse when it is optimal for the
chain to have a contractual commitment to uniform standards. We show that for a
sufficiently high fraction of company-owned stores, it is optimal to include such a com-
mitment into the contract whereas for a sufficiently low fraction of company-owned
stores, it is optimal not to have such a commitment.
This prediction is supported by our empirical analysis in Section 4.4. We find a
significant correlation between the fraction of company-owned stores and the strength
of a contractual commitment to uniform standards in the data. We confirm in an
ordered probit regression that this positive relation is robust to the inclusion of several
control variables like a chain’s size, age or its main product. Furthermore, Section
4.4 gives a descriptive overview of the contract contents and interview responses with
respect to questions about the plural form, decision structures, and commitment to
uniform standards. Section 4.5 briefly concludes. Unless stated otherwise, all proofs
can be found in the appendix.
4.2 Background and Related Literature
4.2.1 Company-owned Stores and Franchise Stores
Before we can explore how the mix of franchised and company-owned stores affects
a chain’s dynamic efficiency, we must understand the defining characteristics of these
two forms.
Probably the most important distinction can be found in the different incentives
induced by franchise contracts and employment contracts of company-stores manager:
A franchisee has to pay a fraction of revenues to the chain as a royalty. (Often there
is also an initial fee upon opening a store, which is mainly used to cover setup and
training costs — see Scott, 1995 or Lafontaine, 1992.) The remainder of profits are
hers to keep, however. By contrast, a company manager is an employee with a mainly
fixed salary.
Therefore, franchisees’ incentives for profit maximization are very strong, whereas
a company manager’s incentives are quite weak. In result, as even company repre-
sentatives often readily admit,5 franchised stores typically outperform those that are
5Profit statistics are not readily available due to their sensitivity. However, among five chains
studied in an in-depth case study by Lewin-Solomons (2000a), the staff of two chains reported
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company-owned.
A second issue is whether company-owned stores substantially differ from franchise
stores in so far that direct ownership grants additional residual rights of control. Such
residual rights of controls are an key element if ownership structures are compared
from a perspective of incomplete contracts, see e.g. Grossman and Hart (1986).
Overall, differences in control rights seem not to be very pronounced in franchise
chains, however, because the chain has typically also very strong control rights over
franchise stores. A franchisee is contractually bound to adhere to the chain’s ”oper-
ations manual”, which specifies how the store is to be run. Any deviation from this
manual occurs only with the permission or acquiescence of the chain, and most chains
have the power to change this manual unilaterally (more on this later in the empirical
section).
4.2.2 Reasons for Royalties on Revenues
Although royalties on revenues yield high powered incentives for franchisees, similar
incentives could also be created by alternative contractual arrangements like royalties
on profits or fixed annual fees. Considering the drawbacks outlined in the introduction,
it seems therefore somewhat puzzling that royalties on revenues are the standard
arrangement in franchising.
One important reason for their popularity is the impossibility to effectively monitor
costs (see e.g. Rubin, 1978 or Maness, 1996). Therefore, royalties on profits are usually
not implementable. Fixed annual payments are suboptimal when both franchisees and
the chain must exert costly effort to increase chain wide profits, as is analysed by Lal
(1990) and Bhattacharyya & Lafontaine (1995). Royalties can also be preferable
when franchisees are risk-averse (see e.g. Norton, 1988 or Mathewson and Winter,
1992). For an general overview on the topic see e.g. the surveys by Dnes (1996) and
Lafontaine & Raynaud (2002) or Chapter 3 in Blair & Lafontaine (2005). To keep our
theoretical analysis simple, we do not include these factors that make revenue-based
royalties optimal, but rather take the empirical fact that royalties are revenue-based
as given.
unambiguously that franchised units were more efficient (in terms of profit), one chain claimed that
franchisee profits were more variable, one gave ambivalent answers, and in the final chain, no company
units existed for comparison. Franchisees themselves almost uniformly claimed that franchises were
more efficient.
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4.2.3 Alternative Explanations for the Plural Form in the
Literature
The literature discusses several alternative explanations for the plural form, which we
briefly review. An early branch of literature (e.g. Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969) consid-
ered franchising and the plural form to be transitory phenomena that facilitate access
to initially scarce resources like capital (Caves & Murphy, 1976), managerial talent
(Norton, 1988) or local information (Minkler, 1990). In the model of Gallini and Lutz
(1992) the transition is reversed: chains start with company-ownership to signal prof-
itable business to franchisees but once signalling is successful they can move towards
a higher fraction of franchised stores.
To explain the long-run coexistence of company-owned and franchised stores, some
literature focus on differences between locations of individual stores. For example,
Brickely and Dark (1987) find empirically that a smaller distance to chain head-
quarters or a lower proportion of repeat business makes a store more likely to be
company-owned. Chakrabarty et. al. (2002) theoretically analyze how the plural
form can arise if the chain has better information about the profitability of different
store locations.
Affuso (2002) adopts a different approach where the plural form can be optimal when
managers are heterogeneous and self-select into franchise or company-employment
contracts. She shows empirically that characteristics of store managers indeed signif-
icantly differ between franchise and company-owned stores.
Other papers focus on chain wide implications of the decision to have some company-
owned stores. Scott (1995) and especially Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) have strong
empirical arguments that company ownership is important to protect a chain’s brand
value. Bai and Tao (2000) provide a corresponding theoretical model for the plural
form, where goodwill-effort of company-owned stores protects a chain’s brand name,
while franchise stores have higher sales efforts. Sorensen and Sorensen (2001) explain
the plural form by focusing on the different roles of franchise and company-owned
stores in exploration and organizational learning.
Our analysis, which focuses on the role of the plural form as a commitment device for
the chain and on the interaction with contractual commitments to uniform standards,
is definitely not targeted to substitute those existing explanations about the plural
form, but is meant to complement the previous insights.
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4.3 Theoretical Analysis
We first model the case where the chain decides endogenously on the fraction of
company-owned stores, but is obliged to uniform standards between franchise and
company-owned stores. Then, we briefly verify that within this set-up, it is indeed,
optimal for the chain to always make a contractual commitment to uniform standards.
Finally, we assume that the fraction of company-owned stores is exogenously given and
examine under which conditions the chain prefers to commit to uniform standards.
4.3.1 Case 1: Endogenous fraction of company-owned stores
when uniform standards are obligatory
We assume a store’s revenues and costs depend on external factors like customers’
preferences or input prices, and on the chain’s activities such as its choice of products,
advertisement, price-policy and the appearance of stores. The actual state of the
world, which characterizes all external factors, is denoted by x. Ex-ante, x is unknown
and will be randomly drawn from a commonly known distribution on a set of states
X.
The chain headquarters observes the state and can decide on chain wide activities. For
a given state x a real number a is assigned to each activity, which can be interpreted
as the ”size” of an activity. Activities of higher size yield higher revenues, but also
lead to higher costs. For all franchise stores, costs are identically given by a function
C(a|x) that is twice differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex in a for all
x, i.e. C ′(a|x) > 0 and C ′′(a|x) > 0. Furthermore, the Inada conditions C ′(0|x) = 0
and lima→∞C ′(a|x) =∞ shall hold for all x. A store’s revenues are given by a twice
differentiable, strictly increasing, and concave function R(a|x).
A chain consists of a continuum of stores with mass normalized to 1 (thus a chain’s
total size is fixed). The fraction of company-owned stores in the chain is denoted by
γ, so that the fraction of franchised stores is 1− γ.
Following the arguments given in Section 4.2, we assume that company-owned stores
are run less efficiently than franchise stores. This is incorporated simply by assuming
that profits of a company-owned store are by a fixed amount L lower than profits of
a franchise store.
When the state of the world is x and all stores of a chain implement activities a, total
profits are thus given by
pi(a|x) = R(a|x)− C(a|x)− γL. (4.1)
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An activity that maximizes total profits at a state x is called efficient and denoted
by ae(x). It follows from the assumptions on the cost and revenue functions that the
efficient size of activity is uniquely defined by the condition that marginal cost equal
marginal revenues, i.e.
C ′(ae|x) = R′(ae|x). (4.2)
We model the interaction between the chain headquarters H and a representative
franchisee F by an extensive form game with the following timing:
1. The chain-headquarters H chooses a fraction of company-owned stores γ. Fur-
thermore, H chooses a royalty ρ ∈ [0, 1], which denotes the share of revenues
that franchisees have to pay to the chain.
2. F accepts or rejects the offered franchise contract. If F rejects, H and F get
both an outside payoff of 0.
3. Nature draws the state of the world x. H observes the state and chooses an
activity au ≤ a(x), which is uniformly implemented in all company and franchise
stores.
Franchisee’s final payoffs are its profits net of the royalty payments:
piF = (1− ρ)R(au|x)− C(au|x) (4.3)
The chain’s payoff consists of the royalty income from franchisees plus the profits from
company-owned stores:
piH = (1− γ)ρR(au|x) + γ(R(au|x)− C(au|x)− L) (4.4)
We assume that both F and H are risk-neutral and maximize their expected payoff.
Depending on the state of the world x, there is an upper limit a(x) on the maximal
possible size of an activity. Without such a limit, the chain could impose activities of
arbitrarily high costs upon the franchisees, which is surely unrealistic, since franchisees
always have the option to breach the contract or to drop out of the chain. Furthermore,
reputational concerns of the chain may impose a limit on activities’ size even if the
state of the world is imperfectly observable by the franchisees. We implicitly capture
these considerations by imposing this upper bound a(x).
We now solve this game via backward induction.
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Stage 3
Since piH is concave in a, the activity that maximizes the chain’s payoff, denoted by
a∗u, is implicitly given by the first order condition
C ′(a∗u|x) =
(
1 +
(1− γ)ρ
γ
)
R′(a∗u|x) (4.5)
Comparing with Equation (4.2), we find that the chain’s preferred level of activity a∗u
is weakly higher than the efficient level of activities ae, and strictly higher whenever
there are positive royalties (ρ > 0) and some franchised stores (γ < 1). The gap
between a∗u and the efficient activity, is decreasing in the fraction of company-owned
stores γ. Especially, a∗u converges to the efficient activity as the fraction of company-
owned stores γ converges to 1.
The intuition behind these results is that an increased level of activity increases fran-
chisees’ revenues and thereby royalty payments to the chain, which gives H incentives
to demand activity levels above the efficient level ae. On the other hand, an activity
level above ae reduces profits of company-owned stores. A higher fraction of company-
owned stores makes the chain therefore prefer more efficient activities. H selects a∗u
unless the upper bound on activities’ size a(x) is binding. The selected activity is
thus given by
au(x, γ, ρ) =
{
a∗u(x, γ, ρ) if a
∗
u ≤ a
a(x) if a∗u > a
. (4.6)
Stage 2
Franchisees accept the contract if and only if their expected payoff, denoted by
ΠF (γ, ρ) is non-negative, where expectations are taken over the possible states of
the world x and the choice of au at Stage 3 is rationally predicted.
Stage 1
We denote the expected payoff of the chain, conditionally on the contract being ac-
cepted, by ΠH(γ, ρ). To avoid tedious case distinctions about whether it is profitable
to open up a chain or not, the following regularity condition is imposed:
Condition 6 There exist a combination of γ and ρ such that franchisees accept the
contract and H ′s expected payoff ΠH(γ, ρ) is strictly positive.
Lemma 4.1 characterizes the selected royalty rate ρ given γ :
Lemma 4.1 For any given fraction of compand-stores γ < 1 it holds true that
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1. the chain’s expected payoff (conditional on the contract being accepted) ΠH(γ, ρ)
is strictly increasing in the royalty ρ,
2. the franchisee’s expected payoff ΠF (γ, ρ) is strictly decreasing in the royalty ρ,
3. there is a unique royalty ρu(γ) such that F
′s expected payoff is zero,
4. H chooses ρu(γ) at Stage 1.
Since the royalty is set to the level ρu(γ) where franchisees have zero expected payoff,
the chain’s expected payoff is identical to the expected total profit in the chain. The
optimal choice of the fraction of company-owned stores γ now balances two factors:
On the one hand, company-owned stores are less profitable than franchise stores, but
on the other hand, a higher fraction of company-owned stores leads to the selection
of more efficient activities at Stage 3. The second effect is especially pronounced
when the upper bounds on sizes of activities a(x) are high, since without company-
owned stores inefficiencies would be quite large for high a(x). One the other hand,
the marginal gains from more efficient activities converge to zero as the fraction of
company-owned stores goes to 1. That is the intuition behind the following result:
Proposition 4.1 If there is an obligation to uniform standards and the upper bounds
on the size of activities a(x) are sufficiently large, the chain will be of the plural form,
i.e. H chooses γ ∈ (0, 1).
We thus have shown that the plural form can endogenously arise in our model, even
though company-owned stores are less profitable than franchise stores.
4.3.2 Case 2: Both commitment to uniform standards and
fraction of company-owned stores are endogenously de-
termined
To see whether the chain prefers a commitment to uniform standards, we briefly
examine the outcome of our model when the chain can select different activities for
franchise stores than for company-owned stores. The previous model is modified such
that at Stage 3 the chain headquarters can select different activities for company-
owned stores and franchise stores.
Now, the chain selects for company-owned stores the efficient level of activities ae
at Stage 3, in order to maximize company-owned stores’ profits. For franchise stores
the chain selects the maximum activity a(x) in order to maximize royalty payments
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(unless the royalty ρ is 0). As before, franchisees accept the contract at Stage 2 if and
only if their expected payoff is non-negative.
The analysis of Stage 1 is straightforward because the selected activities in Stage
3 do neither depend on the fraction of company-owned stores γ nor on the roy-
alty ρ. Obviously, the chain sets the royalty on that level where expected pay-
off of franchisees is zero. Thus, the headquarters’ expected income from a fran-
chise store is given by Ex[R(a|x) − C(a|x)] and from a company-owned store by
Ex [(R(ae|x)− C(ae|x))− L] . Neither of the two expressions does depend on the frac-
tion of company-owned stores γ. Hence, the chain will be completely franchised if
expected income from franchise stores is higher than that of company-owned stores,
and completely company-owned if the reverse is true. A plural form can at most be
equally profitable, but this happens only in the non-generic case where both types of
stores make the same expected profits.
This implies that it is weakly dominant for the chain to include a commitment to
uniform standards into the contract. Without uniform standards either complete
franchising or complete ownership is the optimal structure, but in those cases a com-
mitment to select the same activities for franchise and company-owned stores has
obviously no effect. This means a commitment to uniform standards can never harm.
Furthermore, it directly follows that whenever the plural form is strictly optimal un-
der a commitment to uniform standards, making such a commitment is also strictly
optimal. We summarize this result in Proposition 4.2:
Proposition 4.2 When the fraction of company-owned stores is endogenously se-
lected at Stage 1, it is always optimal for the chain to include a commitment to uniform
standards into the franchise contract.
Proof.
(see derivation above)
4.3.3 Case 3: Fraction of company-owned stores is exoge-
nously given
We now analyse the case where the optimal fraction of company-owned stores is
determined by factors outside our model, like those factors reviewed in Section 4.2. We
consider the extreme case where the fraction of company-owned stores is completely
exogenously given and examine under which conditions the chain optimally includes
a commitment to uniform standards between franchise and company-owned stores
into the franchise contracts at Stage 1. We especially analyse whether — ceteris
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paribus — such a commitment is optimal rather for a low or for a high fraction of
company-owned stores.
Since the fraction of companies stores is exogenously given, it does not matter for
the analysis whether franchise stores are more efficient than company-owned stores.
To simplify the exposition, we therefore assume that both type of stores are equally
efficient (i.e. L = 0).
Behavior in Stages 2 and 3 with uniformity requirement is the same as analyzed in Case
1 and without a uniformity requirement the same as analyzed in Case 2. Furthermore,
royalties are again uniquely determined by the condition that franchisee’s expected
payoff at Stage 2 is zero. The headquarters’ expected payoff is therefore given by
the expected profits of franchised restaurants plus expected profits of company-owned
restaurants and can be written as
ΠuH(γ) ≡ Ex[pi(au|x)] (4.7)
ΠnH(γ) ≡ Ex[(1− γ)pi(a|x) + γpi(ae|x)] (4.8)
for the cases with (superscript u) and without (superscript n) a commitment to uni-
formity standards, respectively. A commitment to uniform standards is optimal when-
ever ΠuH(γ) ≥ ΠnH(γ).
Before presenting the general results, consider a simple example. Assume costs and
revenues do not depend on the state of the world and are given by R(a|x) = a and
C(a|x) = a2. The efficient size of activities is then given by ae = 0.5. Assume the
chain can force activities up to a maximum size of a = 0.75. Figure 4.1 shows the
chains’ payoff with and without uniformity requirement as a function of the fraction
of company-owned stores.
Two features of the example are generally true: First, if the chain is completely fran-
chised or completely company-owned then uniform standards are obviously irrelevant
and have no effect on the chains’ expected payoff. Second, the chains’ expected payoff
(weakly) increases in the fraction of company-owned stores in both cases: with and
without a uniformity requirement.
With a uniformity requirement the chain’s payoff ΠuH(γ) increases in γ because a
higher fraction of company-owned stores leads to the selection of more efficient activ-
ities au at Stage 3. This effect occurs whenever the fraction of company-owned stores
is sufficiently high, such that the headquarter sets at Stage 3 activity au = a
∗
u. For
a small fraction of company-owned stores (in the example for γ ≤ 0.25) we find that
ΠuH(γ) is constant, because a
∗
u > a. This means the chain selects activities of maximal
possible size a(x), which does not depend on γ.
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Figure 4.1: Example: Chain’s income in cases with and without uniformity require-
ment as a function of the fraction of company stores.
Without a uniformity requirement, the chain’s payoff ΠnH(γ) increases in γ because
company-stores implement efficient activities whereas franchised stores are forced to
implement the inefficient activities a(x). In the example ΠuH(γ) crosses Π
n
H(γ) from
below at γ = 1
3
.
Thus, it is optimal for the chain to include a uniformity requirement into the contract
whenever the fraction of company-owned stores is higher than a third.
Parts of this result carry over to the general case. Under the sufficient condition
that the upper bound on activities is higher than the efficient level of activities, i.e.
a(x) > ae(x), for all possible states x, we can show that for sufficiently high levels of γ
it is optimal to commit to uniform standards and that for sufficiently low levels of γ it
is optimal not being committed to uniform standards. We cannot, however, generally
exclude the possibility that ΠuH(γ) and Π
n
H(γ) cross more than once. Proposition 4.3
states this result:
Proposition 4.3 If the fraction of company-owned stores γ is exogenously given,
there are thresholds γ < 1 and γ > 0, such that for all sufficiently high γ, i.e. γ <
γ < 1, committing to uniform standards is strictly optimal for the chain and for all
sufficiently low γ, i.e. 0 < γ < γ, it is strictly optimal not to be committed to uniform
standards.
This result suggests a positive correlation between the fraction of company-owned
stores and the existence of a uniformity requirement in contracts. This is one of the
questions we analyse in the following section.
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4.4 Empirical Analysis
4.4.1 Data
The data of our empirical analysis is derived from a study of franchise systems that
were selected using Entrepreneur Magazine’s 1997 Franchise 500. The data was col-
lected in the year 1999. Chains were limited to the food industry, and were also
included only if they contained a minimum number of franchised stores (40), had be-
gun franchising no later than 1987, and were reasonably stable in that they remained
in the Franchise 500 for at least three consecutive years. Chains that began franchising
in 1985 or later were included only if the ratio between franchised and company-owned
stores was stable. Of the 70 chains fitting these criteria, 24 were entirely franchised
or almost entirely franchised (5 or fewer company-owned stores or more than 99.5%
franchised). Due to the time-consuming nature of data collection and processing, we
included only 12 of such chains, chosen at random, resulting in a stratified sample of
58 chains. For these chains, we attempted to obtain the UFOC (Uniform Franchise
Offering Circular) and other documents. This information proved impossible to obtain
or inadequate in 21 chains (36.2%). The dataset therefore consists of 37 chains.
For each of these chains, the UFOC and other documents were analysed in order to
obtain measures for the decision power of the chain headquarters and the strength of
a contractual commitment to uniform standards. Different measures were created for
changes related to new products and changes related to building work. Furthermore,
for each chain two franchisees were chosen at random to be interviewed by telephone
or fax.6 These interviews focused on the extent of chain’s headquarters’ decision power
and franchisees influence, as well as the role of uniform standards between franchise
and company-owned stores. To avoid selection bias, the same franchisees were con-
tacted repeatedly until a response was obtained; thus the participation rate was close
to 100%. Basic statistics on each chain were also collected, including the numbers
of franchised and company-owned stores for 1998. Table 1 shows the distribution of
fraction of company-owned stores in the sample.
 
Table 1:  Distribution of fraction of company stores in the sample 
γ ∈ 0 (0,.1] (.1,.2] (.2,.3] (.3,.4] (.5,.6] (.6,.7] (.7,.8] (.8,.9] (.9,1] 
No. of chains 6 11 5 2 4 3 2 3 0 1 
 
6In one chain, only one such interview could be obtained.
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4.4.2 Structure of the analysis
We first give a descriptive overview of the contract analysis and the interview results
that shows that the decision power of the chain headquarters is indeed very strong in
most chains. Then we analyze whether a commitment to uniform standards between
franchise and company-owned stores appears in franchise contracts and how such a
commitment is related to a chain’s fraction of company-owned stores.
4.4.3 Decision power within a chain
Franchise contracts were classified according to the chain’s decision power in two
areas: the introduction of new products and changes in building requirements. Table
2 summarizes the results:
 
Table 2: Decision power according to franchise contracts prod. build. 
1: Nothing can be found in the contract suggesting that franchisees play a role in 
decisions about changes in products / building requirements. No franchise 
association exists. 
70% 62% 
2: Contract indicates that changes must be reasonable or that a franchisee body 
(such as a franchise association) exists (that must be consulted or is normally 
consulted as a matter of routine) 
24% 32% 
3: Contract indicates that the chain cannot enforce changes of this sort on franchisee 
unless franchisees agree, or unless a representative franchisee body agrees. 5% 5% 
 
The left column shows the classification category and the right columns the fractions
of chains whose contracts fall into these categories with respect to product and
building decisions. Overall, franchisees have slightly more rights with respect to
changes in building requirements, but nevertheless in most chains the contracts give
very strong or exclusive decision rights to the chain.
Note that although contracts usually grant franchisees only little decision power, the
chain nevertheless often seeks advice from franchisees. Table 3 summarizes results of
an interview question addressing this issue.
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Table 3: Influence of franchisees on product decisions 
Q: In deciding whether to introduce new products or change existing products, how much does your 
chain rely on advice from franchisees? Which of the following statements comes closest describing 
your chain? 
1: Franchisees do not provide important advice.  The chain relies on its own experts. 9% 
2: Franchisees sometimes provide important feedback, but our influence is limited. 36% 
3: The chain actively seeks out feedback from franchisees because often they are very 
critical and/or knowledgeable and the chain appreciates that.  Our influence is substantial.  35% 
4: The chain always seeks advice from our franchisees, and a change rarely takes place if 
franchisees don’t think it’s a good idea.  Our influence is tremendous. 19% 
Rank order correlation (Spearman’s ρ) between the two interviews of a chain: 0.62 
 
More than half of the answers state that franchisees chain often seeks advice from
franchisees, which can also give franchisees influence on actual decisions. Neverthe-
less, still 45% of franchisees characterize their actual influence in the decision process
as limited or not existent. Also, in our opinion such forms of informal influence
provide no guarantee that franchisees will not be exploited by the decisions made by
the franchise chain.
An important question for actual decision power in a chain is how strictly franchisees
must adhere to decisions made by the chain headquarters. Corresponding interview
results are summarized in Table 4.
 
Table 4: Leeway in diverging from official requirements 
Q: I want to understand how much informal leeway franchisees have when the chain makes a 
decision about new products or a change in an existing product.  Suppose that such a change takes 
place and a franchisee does not like the change. Which of the following statements comes closest 
describing your chain? 
1: He has to go along with the change because that’s part of the deal when you become a 
franchisee. 39% 
2: If he doesn’t want to implement the change, he can request an exemption and 
occasionally such exemptions are granted. 38% 
3: If he doesn’t want to implement the change, he can request an exemption, and very often 
such exemptions are granted.  12% 
4: The chain trusts its experienced franchisees and often looks the other way when they do 
their own thing because it knows that they must have good reasons for doing so. 11% 
Rank order correlation (Spearman’s ρ) between the two interviews of a chain: 0.76 
 
The answers suggest that in most chains, franchisees have to follow the chain’s deci-
sions quite strictly, although in some chains exemptions are regularly granted.
Our theoretical analysis focuses on diverging interests of the chain and its franchisees
in the selection of activities. Is dissatisfaction about chains’ decisions a commonly
observed element in franchise relations? Table 5 shows that indeed some, but also not
overwhelming much, dissatisfaction is reported by franchisees.
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Table 5: Franchisees’ satisfaction with chain’s decisions 
Q: In some chains, franchisees are very satisfied with decisions made by the chain.  In others, there 
is some conflict over certain decisions, or franchisees might quietly not like some of the things the 
chain asks them to do.  I want to understand how much conflict exists.  (There may be none at all.)  
Read all of the following choices and tell me which is closest to being your opinion: 
1: The chain is pretty much always right on.  I hardly even have any problem with their 
policies, and I wouldn’t object, even if I could. 30% 
2: I hardly ever have a problem with the chain’s policies, but occasionally, they ask me to 
do something that I’d rather not do. 49% 
3: They often ask me do something I would rather not do. It’s happened quite a few times.  22% 
Rank order correlation (Spearman’s ρ) between the two interviews of a chain: 0.09 (not signifcant) 
 
The low correlation of the answers from the interviewed franchisees of the same
chains, suggests, that satisfaction levels are specific for each franchisee and are not
necessarily a characteristic element of certain chains. We also do not find a significant
correlation between dissatisfaction and the fraction of company-owned stores in a
chain.
4.4.4 Uniform standards between franchise and company-
owned stores
Next, we examined whether a clause on uniform standards can be found in the fran-
chise contract and how strong is the commitment to uniform standards with respect
to product innovations and building requirements. The analysis is based on those 31
chains in our sample that have a positive number of company-owned stores. Table 6
summarizes the results.
Table 6: Uniformity requirement in franchise contracts prod. build. 
1: Nothing in the contract indicates a commitment to uniformity. No mentioning of 
a system of uniform units. 13% 13% 
2: The contract mentions a system of uniform units. 23% 16% 
3: Contract indicates that the chain cannot enforce activities on franchisees unless 
those activities are chain wide. Typically the contract includes a commitment by the 
chain to maintain uniform standards. 
55% 52% 
4: The contract is explicit about its statement connected to uniform standards, with 
no room for interpretation. 10% 19% 
 
Overall, uniformity is mentioned in 83% of contracts and a commitment to uniform
standards can be found in a majority of chains, although often with some room for
interpretation.
We now examine the theoretical prediction that a commitment to uniform standards is
more likely to be beneficial when the fraction of company-owned stores is high. There
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are indeed positive rank order correlations (Spearman’s ρ) between the fraction of
company-owned stores and our measures of commitment to uniform standards of 0.54
(product) and 0.53 (building), which both are significant at a one percent level. To
control for additional factors, like the royalty or the main product of the chain, we
perform ordered probit regressions, summarized in Table 7.
 
Table 7: Ordered probit regression for contractual commitment to uniform standards 
Independent variables Product Building requirements 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fraction of company stores γ     3.85*** 
(1.23) 
    5.12*** 
(1.64) 
     3.37*** 
(1.10) 
     3.53*** 
(1.27) 
Royalty -14.62 
(23.88) 
-9.88 
(31.95) 
-21.35 
(23.41) 
-10.94 
(29.93) 
Number of stores (100s) .001 
(.010) 
-.004 
(.012) 
.004 
(.010) 
.003 
(.011) 
Age of chain .010 
(.015) 
.006 
(.019) 
.006 
(.015) 
.001 
(.019) 
 
Chain’s main product 
 
    
Hamburger 
 
-.345 
(1.042) 
 -.525 
(1.00) 
Sandwich 
 
-.074 
(1.11) 
 -.731 
(1.09) 
Chicken  .447 
(.743) 
 .008 
(.704) 
Pizza  .311 
(.774) 
 -.082 
(.749) 
Familiy food  -.096 
(.928) 
 1.25 
(.971) 
Steak  -.691 
(1.103 
 .431 
(1.21) 
Ice cream    2.29* 
(1.39) 
 1.16 
(1.21) 
Mexican food  .141 
(.993) 
 .662 
(.936) 
 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.22 
 
0.30 
 
0.19 
 
0.27 
Notes: Estimated standard errors in parentheses.  Number of observations: 31 
*** / ** / * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
Despite the small sample size, we find for all four specifications a strongly significant
impact of the fraction of company-owned stores on the strength of a commitment
to uniform standards. Except for the weakly significant dummy for chains with ice
cream as main product (which may be due to spurious correlation), no other factor
can significantly explain the degree of contractual commitment to uniform standards.
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We also investigate the role of uniformity in our interview questions. Franchisees were
asked whether uniform treatment of franchisees and company-owned stores is often
violated or not.
 
Table 8: Uniform standards, interview results 
Q: Most of the time when a chain introduces a product, the introduction is system-wide, in 
both company stores and franchised stores.  I want to understand whether this is just the 
way things happen, or whether the chain actually has to do things this way, contractually. 
Which of the following statements comes closest to describing your chain? 
 
1: There is no policy to maintain uniform standards.  Sometimes franchisees must 
adopt practices that are different from those adopted in company stores. 12% 
2: The chain does not legally have to maintain uniform standards, but they do so as a 
matter of policy. 2% 
3: The chain does maintain uniform standards (between company stores and 
franchised stores), but I’m not sure if they legally have to do this. 56% 
4: The chain must maintain the same standards in franchised and company-owned 
stores.  Franchisees cannot legally be forced to adopt any practice that is not also 
adopted in company stores.   
31% 
Rank order correlation (Spearman’s ρ) between the two interviews of a chain: 0.57 
 
The results (see Table 8) show that uniformity standards generally seem quite strong,
although still 12% of franchisees report that they sometimes have to adopt differ-
ent practices than company-owned stores. Somewhat surprising, from our theoretical
perspective, the answers to this question are neither significantly correlated with our
contractual measure of uniformity, nor is there a significant correlation with the frac-
tion of company-owned stores in a chain. This indicates that — at least for most
decisions — adherence to uniform standards is driven also by alternative factors of
the business-environment that seem to be to some degree independent of the actual
contractual clauses.
In line with our model it is generally true, however, that the maintenance of uniform
standards plays an important role for franchisees:
 
Table 9: Importance of uniform standards 
Q: How important is it to you that the chain maintain uniform standards? 
1: This policy is not very important. 0% 
2: This policy is moderately important. 35% 
3: This policy is very important. 65% 
Rank order correlation (Spearman’s ρ) between the two interviews of a chain: -0.06 (not signif.) 
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4.5 Summary
We presented a formal model that analyses the optimal choice of the fraction of
company-owned stores and contractual commitments to uniform standards. The main
idea is based on the well known fact that franchisees pay revenue-based royalties, which
can lead to selection of inefficient activities by the chain. Since company-ownership
allows the chain a credible commitment to select activities that are more efficient,
a positive fraction of company-owned stores can arise in our model where franchise
stores are always run more efficiently. This mechanism only works if the chain must
maintain uniform standards that require to select the same activities in franchise and
company-owned stores.
If the fraction of company-owned stores is determined by exogenous factors, the analy-
sis showed that it is optimal for a chain to include a commitment to uniform standards
into franchise contracts if the fraction of company-owned stores is high, but to omit
such a commitment if the fraction of company-owned stores is low.
An empirical analysis of contract and interview data from the US fast-food industry
gave an descriptive overview of the distribution of decision power within the chains and
the importance of uniform standards and tested whether uniform standards are more
often observed in chains where the fraction of company-owned stores is high. There
is indeed a significantly positive correlation between the fraction of company-owned
stores and the occurrence of a commitment to uniformity standards in the analysed
franchise contracts. The positive relationship remained significant when controlling
for additional chain-specific characteristics.
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Appendices
Appendix of Chapter 1
Proof of Proposition 1.2: We first proof the existence of complier-optimal norm equi-
libria. The proof makes use of the existence result for subgame-perfect equilibria
in games with continuous strategy spaces using discrete approximations by Bo¨rgers
(1991).
To apply Bo¨rgers’ result, we first construct for any given κ a two-stage game Γ(κ)
with n+1 players. Player 0 can be thought off as an agent for all compliers and
players 1, ..., n correspond to selfish players. In stage 1, player 0 selects a norm r ∈ S.
This move is perfectly observed by all players. In stage 2, players i = 1, ..., n play
the game Gκ,r, where they simultaneously choose a strategy si ∈ Si. Final payoffs of
players 1, ..., n are given by the payoffs of Gκ,r, i.e. by uκ,r(s). Final payoffs of player
0 are given by compliers expected payoffs in the game Gκ,r when s is selected, i.e. by
1
n
∑n
i=1 u
κ,r
i (ri, s−i).
In every subgame-perfect equilibrium of Γ(κ), at stage 2 a Nash equilibrium of Gκ,r
is selected. At stage 1, player 0 chooses a norm r that maximizes compliers expected
payoff given the specific selection of selfish Nash equilibria in stage 2. This implies
that (r∗, s∗) is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of Γκ if and only if there exists
some selfish equilibrium selection function ψ for which (r∗, s∗) is a complier optimal
norm equilibrium for κ and G.
It remains to show that there always exists a subgame perfect equilibrium for the
game Γ(κ). Let Sj ⊂ S be some finite subset of the strategy space and let Γj(κ)
be a game constructed like Γ(κ) with the only difference that in stage 1 player 0
has to select a norm r from the finite set Sj. Since for every norm a continuation
equilibrium exists at stage 2 (by Proposition 1.1) and out of a finite set there is always a
norm that maximizes compliers expected utility, there always exists a subgame perfect
equilibrium for the game Γj(κ). Since S is compact, there exists a sequence of finite
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strategy spaces {Sj}∞j=1 that converges to S in Hausdorff distance.7 The corresponding
sequence of games Γj(κ) then converges to Γ(κ) according to the definition of Bo¨rgers
(1991). Existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium of Γ(κ) then follows from Corollary
2 of Bo¨rgers (1991).
The proof for existence of rule-utilitarian norm equilibria proceeds similarly, with the
only difference that Γ(κ) is constructed such that player 0’s final payoffs are given by
1
n
∑n
i=1 (κu
κ,r
i (ri, s−i) + (1− κ)uκ,ri (s)) .
Proof of Proposition 1.6: We only proof the result for complier optimal norms, the
proof for rule-utilitarian norms is then straightforward and ommited here. Take a
norm ro where a compliant player 1 offers xo and a compliant player 2 accepts xo for
sure and rejects all other offers.
I. In the first part of the proof we show that in the norm equilibrium with ro a selfish
player 1 also offers xo.When a selfish player 1 offers x, his expected utility is given by
uκ,r
o
1 (x) =

0 if x < x∗
(1− κ)(1− x) if x∗ ≤ x < xo
1− x if xo ≤ x ≤ 0.5
1− x− α(2x− 1) if 0.5 < x
.
There are only two candidates for maxima: x∗ and xo. The selfish player offers xo if
and only if (1 − κ)(1 − x∗) ≤ 1 − xo ⇔ xo ≤ κ + (1 − κ)x∗, which is fulfilled by the
definition of xo.
II. In the second part of the proof we show that every norm equilibrium with a
different equilibrium outcome than under ro yields a strictly lower compliers’ expected
utility.We start by discussing some upper bounds on compliers’ expected utility. The
expected sum of utility of player 1 and 2 is given by T := 2 [(1− κ)U + κV ]. We
call T total utility. Since V1 ≤ U1 and V2 ≤ U2 has to hold, compliers’ expected
utility is bounded from above by 1
2
T. If we know that a compliant player 1 has strictly
lower expect utility than a selfish player 1, i.e. ∆1 := U1 − V1 > 0, the upper bound
decreases to 1
2
(T−∆1), because V2 ≤ U2 must still hold. For a given norm equilibrium,
let A denote the expected total disutility caused by envy and let R be the expected
share of rejected offers. Total utility is then given by T = 1 − A − R. This implies
1
2
(1− A−R−∆1) as upper bound for compliers’ expected utility.
Consider first the case xo = 0.5. Under ro no player ever feels envious and therefore
total utility is given by 1 and compliers’ expected utility reaches its upper bound of
7The Hausdorff distance between a set Sj and S is given by maxs∈S minsj∈Sj d(s, sj), where d(.)
is the metric on the strategy space S.
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0.5. In any other equilibrium outcome there would either be some envy or rejected
offers, which would lead to a strictly lower compliers’ expected utility.
Consider now the case xo < 0.5. Compliers’ expected utility under ro is then given by
V o = 1
2
(1−Ao), where Ao=α((1−xo)−xo) = α(1−2xo) is the total disutility by envy
(experienced by player 2). In the following 5 steps we show that norms with different
behavior on the equilibrium path must lead to strictly lower compliers’ expected utility
than ro.
1. Let r′ be a norm that differs from ro such that with positive probability offers
below xo are made and accepted. Since there are lower offers under r′, total envy
A′ under r′ is strictly higher than under ro. This means compliers’ utility is bounded
from above by 1
2
(1− A′) < V o.
2. Consider a norm r′ that differs from ro such that with positive probability an offer
of xo is rejected on the equilibrium path. Rejecting an offer of xo reduces total envy
by α(1−2xo) but also reduces total monetary payoff by 1. This reduction in monetary
payoff reduces the total utility by more than the reduction of envy increases it. This
is most easily seen by observing that xo > x∗ and that therefore a player 2 considers
the decrease in monetary payoff (already of his share) to be more severe than the
positive effects of the reduction in envy. Hence, under r′ total utility is bounded by a
level strictly below V o.
3. Consider a norm r′ that differs from ro such that with positive probability offers
below xo are made and accepted and offers of xo are rejected on the equilibrium path.
It is also straightforward to show that such a norm yields compliers’ expected utility
strictly below V o (we omit the steps that are very similar to 1. and 2.).
4. There exists no norm where a selfish player 1 makes offers above xo (in the actual
case with xo < 0.5). To see this, assume compliers want to induce a selfish player to
offer some xs > xo. The best way to achieve this is to accept only offers of xs and to
reject all other offers. Using similar calculations like in the first part of the proof, we
find, however, that a selfish player 1 offers x∗ instead of xs whenever (1−κ)(1−x∗) >
1− xs ⇔ xs > κ+ (1− κ)x∗ = xo.
5. Finally, we show that there is no complier optimal norm r′ where compliers make
offers above xo with positive probability. Note that it cannot be complier optimal
to make offers above 0.5, since total envy is minimized by offering 0.5. Further, a
compliant player 2 should accept all offers x ≥ xo, since it is obviously not complier
optimal to reject an offer between xo and 0.5.
Let F (x) denote the distribution function of compliant player 1’s offers under r′. The
difference in expected utility of a selfish player 1 to that of a compliant player 1 is
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given by ∆′1 =
∫ 0.5
xo
(x − xo)dF (x). The difference in total envy between ro and r′
is given by Ao − A′ = 2κα ∫ 0.5
xo
(x − xo)dF (x). Compliers’ expected utility under r′
is bounded from above by 1
2
(1 − A′ − ∆1) = 12(1 − Ao) + 12(Ao − A′) − ∆1), which,
therefore, can be written as V o + 1
2
[2κα − 1] ∫ 0.5
xo
(x − xo)dF (x). This upper bound
is greater or equal than V o only if 2κα − 1 ≥ 0, i.e. α ≥ 1
2κ
. For α ≥ 1
2κ
we find,
however, x∗ ≥ 1
2(1+κ)
, which implies κ+(1−κ)x∗ ≥ 0.5+ κ2
1+κ
and thus xo = 0.5. This
contradicts the assumption, made for this case, that xo < 0.5.
Proof of Proposition 1.8: Since it has only a single community, the described society is
Nash-stable. It remains to show that there exists no successful announced migration.
First note that no announcement that asks only selfish players to migrate can be
successful, since they would get expected utility of Uκ=0 in the new community, if no
one followed. Since by C3, Uκ=0 ≤ V (κ̂, ro(κ̂)) ≤ U(κ̂, ro(κ̂)) selfish players cannot be
strictly better off by such migration.
Consider now the case that the announcement asks some compliers to migrate to a
community Cd. This is only successful if compliers are strictly better off in Cd. Then
if there are still compliers outside Cd, they want to follow to Cd by uncoordinated
migration. In the (unlikely) case that V (κ, rd) is not weakly increasing in κ, compliers’
expected utility in Cd may already drop after this uncoordinated migration below the
initial level V (κ̂, ro(κ̂)). Otherwise, the remaining selfish players outside Cd want to
follow to Cd, since (using again C3) Uκ=0 ≤ V (κ̂, ro(κ̂)) < V (κd, rd) ≤ U(V (κd, rd)).
Now all inhabitants are in Cd and compliers of the announced migration cannot be
strictly better off than initially.
Proof of Proposition 1.9: We now show that in every migration-proof equilibrium
compliers’ expected utility equals V (κ̂, ro(κ̂)) in all communities. It follows directly
from the definition of a Nash-stable society that compliers’ expected utility must be
equal in all communities.
1. In no Nash-stable society can compliers have utility higher than V (κ̂, ro(κ̂)). This is
because in every society there is at least one populated community C ′ with a compliers’
share κ′ ≤ κ̂ and by C4 compliers’ expected utility in community C ′ cannot exceed
V (κ̂, ro(κ̂)).
2. It remains to check that there can exist no migration-proof equilibrium where
compliers’ expected utility is smaller than V (κ̂, ro(κ̂)). Denote compliers’ expected
utility in the original society by Vorig. Suppose for a proof by contradiction that
this society is a migration-proof equilibrium with Vorig < V (κ̂, r
o(κ̂)). By C5 there
exists a complier optimal norm ro(κ̂) with V (κ, ro(κ̂)) ≥ V (κ̂, ro(κ̂)) > Vorig for all
κ ≥ κ̂. Consider an announced migration that asks all compliers to migrate to a new
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community Co with this norm ro(κ̂). No matter how many selfish players follow to Co,
the compliers’ share in Co is always bigger than or equal to κ̂. By the inequality stated
above, compliers’ expected utility in Co is therefore strictly higher than originally,
which means the announced migration is strongly successful. The original society was
therefore not a migration-proof equilibrium.
100
Appendix of Chapter 2
We prove Propositions 2.1, 2.3, 2.4 (first sentence), 2.5, 2.6 and Lemma 2.1 and
2.2 directly for the more general regulatory schemes introduced in Section 2.5. The
original propositions are a special case of this set-up, since a linear access price a > c0
fulfills conditions (L1) and (L2). We will generally use the notation Qu, Qv and
Qs to denote the resulting outputs, under legal unbundling, vertical integration and
separation, respectively and similarly hu, hv, hs and xu, xv, xs for firms’ equilibrium
choices in the different vertical structures.
Proof of Proposition 2.1: Under legal unbundling, F0 sets h in order to maximize up-
stream profits pi0, and by choosing the same sabotage strategy than under vertical
integration, F0 can guarantee the same level of upstream profits — recall from the re-
mark before Proposition 2.1 that the outcome under both structures will be the same
whenever the sabotage strategy h is the same, even if downstream firms move simul-
taneously. Since pi0 is strictly increasing in total output Q and vice versa, also total
output under legal unbundling is always as least as high as under vertical integration.
Proof of Proposition 2.2: We show that F0 can guarantee a weakly higher total output
under legal unbundling than under separation, i.e. Qu ≥ Qs by choosing under
legal unbundling the same sabotage strategy than the optimal sabotage strategy hs
under separation, i.e. by setting hu = hs. Under full separation, the incumbent F1
then chooses xs to maximize pi1(x, h
s), and under legal unbundling F1 chooses x
u to
maximize pi1(x, h
s) + pi0(x, h
s). Optimal choice by F1 thus implies
pi1(x
s, hs) ≥ pi1(xu, hs)
pi1(x
u, hs) + pi0(x
u, hs) ≥ pi1(xs, hs) + pi0(xs, hs)
Adding both inequalities yields pi0(x
u, hs) ≥ pi0(xs, hs) and since upstream profits pi0
are strictly increasing in total output, this implies that total output is weakly higher
under legal unbundling than under separation, i.e. Q(xu, hs) ≥ Q(xs, hs).
Proof of Proposition 2.3: (Cournot) F0 can guarantee the same output under legal
unbundling than under separation, an output of Qu = Qs, by setting hu1 = h
s
1+(a−c0)
and hampering all other entrants in the same way as under vertical separation, i.e.
setting hui = h
s
i for all i = 2, ..., n. With such hampering F1 maximizes under legal
unbundling
pis1(q) + (a− c)q2.
where pis1(q) denotes F1’s profit function under vertical separation. The added term
(a−c)q2 has no influence on F1’s best reply function and therefore both firms have the
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same best reply functions as under vertical separation, leading to the same equilibrium
outcome.
Proof of Proposition 2.4: If F0 sets the same sabotage strategy under separation than
under reverse legal unbundling, i.e. hs = hr the total output and pi0 will be the same,
since downstream firms will act in the same way. Since under separation F0 wants to
maximize total output and pi0, it will at least achieve output and pi0 at least as high
as under reverse legal unbundling, which is guaranteed by setting hs = hr.
Proof of Proposition 2.5: If under legal unbundling the same total amount would be
invested as under separation (vertical integration), we only have an investment al-
location problem, which is equivalent to our basic model as explained in the text.
Thus, Proposition 2.1 applies and we know that pi0 must be weakly higher under legal
unbundling. F0 chooses a different investment level under legal unbundling than the
optimal level under separation (vertical integration), only if this would lead to even
larger net profits pi0 − Iu. Therefore the first sentence is true. The second sentence
follows directly from the first result, under a linear access price a > c0, by inserting
pi0 and rearranging the inequalities.
Proof of Lemma 2.1: Let ca0 and c
b
0 be two marginal costs with c
a
0 > c
b
0. Let h
a denote
F0’s optimal h if marginal costs are ca, and let x
a be the selected downstream equilib-
rium given ha and ca. We define h
a and xb correspondingly. Under legal unbundling
F0 wants to maximize total output Q. We show that F0 can guarantee Q
b ≥ Qa by
setting hb = ha. Optimal choice by F1 then implies
pi1(x
a, ha) +R (Q(xa, ha))− ca0Q(xa, ha) ≥ pi1(xb, ha) +R
(
Q(xb, ha)
)− ca0Q(xb, ha)
pi1(x
b, ha) +R
(
Q(xb, ha)
)− cb0Q(xb, ha) ≥ pi1(xa, ha) +R (Q(xa, ha))− cb0Q(xa, ha)
Adding up the two inequalities yields (ca0 − cb0)Q(xb, ha) ≥ (ca0 − cb0)Q(xa, ha) and
therefore Q(xb, ha) ≥ Q(xa, ha).
Proof of Proposition 2.6: Let Ia and Ib be two investment levels with Ia < Ib and
let ca0 and c
b
0 with c
a
0 > c
b
0 be the resulting marginal costs. Generally subscripts or
superscripts a and b index the investment level that is considered, while u, v and s
index in the vertical structure in the common way. Let ∆uab := pi
b
0(h
u
b , x
u
b )−pia0(hua, xua),
∆sab := pi
b
0(h
s
b, x
s
b)− pia0(hsa, xsa) and ∆vab := pib01(hvb , xvb)− pia01(hva, xva) denote the changes
in F0’s objective function when marginal costs change from ca to cb (excluding the
change in investment costs Ib − Ia) under the different vertical structures.
We will first derive a lower bound on ∆uab. Recall that pi0 is strictly increasing in total
output. Therefore Q(hub , x
u
b ) is the highest quantity that F0 can achieve with marginal
costs cb0 and by Lemma 2.1 also no higher quantity can be achieved under marginal
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costs ca0. Therefore pi
a
0(h
u
a, x
u
a) ≤ pia0(hub , xub ). Furthermore, pib0(hub , xub ) − pia0(xub , hub ) =(
ca0 − cb0
)
(Q(hub , x
u
b )). Together with the definition of ∆
u
ab, these two results imply
∆uab ≥
(
ca0 − cb0
)
Q(hub , x
u
b ).
We will now show that ∆uab −∆sab ≥ 0 and ∆uab −∆vab ≥ 0, which implies that under
legal unbundling we will always find weakly higher investment than under separation
as well as integration.
(i) ∆uab −∆sab ≥ 0 : Under complete separation, the total quantity Qs is independent
of F0’s cost structure. Thus moving from ca to cb changes F0’s profits by
∆sab =
(
ca0 − cb0
)
Qs.
By Proposition 2.1, Qub ≥ Qs and using the lower bound on ∆uab we find
∆uab −∆sab ≥
(
ca0 − cb0
)
(Qub −Qs) ≥ 0.
(ii) ∆uab −∆sab ≥ 0 : Since under vertical integration both F0 and F1 want to maxi-
mize pi01, we have pi
a
01(h
v
a, x
v
a) ≥ pia01(hvb , xvb). Furthermore, pib01(hvb , xvb) − pia01(hvb , xvb) =(
ca0 − cb0
)
Q(hvb , x
v
b). Together with the definition of ∆
v
ab, these two results imply
∆vab ≤
(
ca0 − cb0
)
Q(hvb , x
v
b). By Proposition 2.1, we have Q(h
u
b , x
u
b ) ≥ Q(hvb , xvb) and us-
ing the lower bound on ∆uab, we therefore find ∆
u
ab−∆vab ≥
(
ca0 − cb0
)
(Qub −Qvb) ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.2: Standard case of price competition, see derivation in Section
2.4.
Proof of Lemma 2.3: At price c2 + a the incumbent F1 prefers to give the whole
market to F2, since pi1 is strictly negative for all prices below c1+a. F0 can guarantee
this outcome by not sabotaging F2, and therefore no equilibrium with a higher price
than c2 + a can exist. If a is large there could be cases, however, with an equilibrium
price p′ strictly between c0+c1 and c2+a where F1 gets the whole market. Although pi1
would then be negative, joint profits pi1+ pi0 could be higher than under the outcome
where F2 gets the whole market at price c2+a, because output Q and upstream profits
pi0 are higher. Such an equilibrium with a price p
′ < c2+ a can only arise, however, if
the access price is Pareto-dominated by a lower access price. To see this, consider an
access price a′ < a that fulfills a′+ c2 = p′.With such an access price, F1 would prefer
to give the whole market to F2 at price p
′ instead of taking the market itself (since
pi1 is negative under p
′). Access price a′ Pareto-dominates access price a, because no
firm nor consumers are worse off and F1 is strictly better off under this outcome with
access price a′.
Proof of Lemma 2.4: If F1 gets the market, then the optimal price is F1’s monopoly
price under costs c1+ c0. If F2 gets the total market it is optimal that this happens at
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the lowest possible price that F2 is ever willing to pay, i.e. c2+ a. Joint profit pi01 can
also not be higher in a situation where both firms split total output at some price p.
Since goods are perfect substitutes and marginal costs linear, pi01 from splitting the
market is at least as high if either only F1 or only F2 gets the total market at the
same price p.
Proof of Lemma 2.5: Since under reverse legal unbundling F1 maximizes its own prof-
its pi1 and by assumption plays no weakly dominated strategy, F1 will never set a price
below a+ c1, which implies that no equilibrium with a price below a+ c1 exists. Since
F0 maximizes joint profits pi0 + pi1 and pi1 is non-negative for all prices p ≥ a+ c1, F0
weakly prefers that F1 serves the whole market. Joint profit pi01 is then maximized
by the monopoly price would be pm10. If a+ c1 ≤ pm10, then F0 can achieve this outcome
by setting h2 such that a + c2 + h2 = p
m
10. Then F1 will a price equal to p
m
10 and
get the whole market. If a + c1 > p
m
10 the from all prices achievable in equilibrium
the price p = a + c1 maximize pi01. This can be achieved by F0 setting h2 such that
a + c2 + h2 = a + c1. Whether F1 or F2 gets the market in this equilibrium does not
matter.
Proof of Proposition 2.9: We prove the first sentence of the proposition for the case of
legal unbundling; for vertical separation, the steps are similar. Total welfare, excluding
investment costs, under legal unbundling is in our Bertrand model given by
W u = CS(pu) + puQ(pu)− (c0 − δ + c2)Q(pu)
where the market price pu = a + c2 does not depend on c0 and δ. We thus find
∂Wu
∂δ
= Qu and ∂
2Wu
∂δ2
= 0. Maximization of W u(δ)− I(δ) is therefore equivalent to the
first order condition
I ′(δou) = Q
u.
F0 will choose its actual level of cost reduction δu in order to maximize its profit
(a− c0 + δ)Q(pu)− I(δ). The profit-maximizing δu fulfills the same first order condi-
tion than δou, i.e.
I ′(δu) = Qu.
Therefore δu = δ
o
u and Iu = I(δu) = I(δ
o
u) = I
o
u.
The proof of the second sentence is by use of an example. Let Q(p) = 1 − p and
I(δ) = 3
4
δ2 such that I ′(δ) = 6
4
δ. Let c1 = 0.3, c2 = 0.25, c0 = 0.5 an a = 0.74.
Then for all δ the monopoly case will be selected under vertical integration since,
1 − 0.8 + δ − 2√(0.24 + δ) (0.01) ≥ 0 for all δ > 0. We will get δom = 0.2 and
δm = 0.1. As well as
Iom
Im
= 4. This means the optimal investment would be 4 times
higher than the actual investment under vertical integration.
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Appendix of Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider two different ownership shares ωa and ωb with ωa <
ωb. Since σ is the same in both cases, the action profile x selected by downstream firms
only depends on the F0’s choice of h (see remark above). Let pii(h) = pii(x(h, σ), h)
denote the resulting profits of firm i as a function of h only. Let ha and hb denote
those disctimination strategies that maximize F0’s objective function u0 under ω
a and
ωb, respectively. Optimal choice by F0 implies:
pi0(h
a) + ωapi1(h
a) ≥ pi0(hb) + ωapi1(hb)
pi0(h
b) + ωbpi1(h
b) ≥ pi0(ha) + ωbpi1(ha).
If ωa = 0, we find directly from the first inequality pi0(h
a) ≥ pi0(hb). If ωa > 0 we
divide the first inequality by ωa and the second inequality by ωb. Adding the two
resulting inequalities yields ( 1
ωa
− 1
ωb
)pi0(h
a) ≥ ( 1
ωa
− 1
ωb
)pi0(h
b). Dividing by ( 1
ωa
− 1
ωb
)
yields again pi0(h
a) ≥ pi0(hb). Since total output is strictly increasing in upstream
profits pi0 this inequality implies that total output must be weakly higher under ω
a
than under ωb.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let ha and hb denote the optimal choice of F0 under σ
a and
σb, respectively. Let xa denote the resulting downstream equilibrium after optimal
choice of F1 given σ
a and ha. We define xb correspondingly. Furthermore, let xba
denote the resulting downstream equilibrium after optimal choice of F1 given σ
b and
ha. Optimal choice by the incumbent F1 implies
pi1(x
a, ha) + σapi0(x
a, ha) ≥ pi1(xba, ha) + σapi0(xba, ha)
pi1(x
ba, ha) + σbpi0(x
ba, ha) ≥ pi1(xa, ha) + σbpi0(xa, ha)
Adding these two inequalities and dividing by (σb − σa) yields:
pi0(x
ba, ha) ≥ pi0(xa, ha)
Optimal choice by the upstream firm F0 implies
pi0(x
b, hb) + ωpi1(x
b, hb) ≥ pi0(xba, ha) + ωpi1(xba, ha)
Combining with the previous inequality and rearranging yields
pi0(x
b, hb)− pi0(xa, ha) ≥ ω
(
pi1(x
ba, ha)− pi1(xb, hb)
)
The term on the RHS equals 0 for ω = 0. Also its limit for ω → 0 is 0, because we as-
sumed that minimal and maximal downstream profits are bounded. Since pi0 only de-
pends on total output Q and is strictly increasing in Q, this implies the proposition.
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Appendix of Chapter 4
Proof of Lemma 4.1: 1. We have the definition ΠH(λ, ρ) := Ex[piH(au(x, γ, ρ), γ, ρ|x)].
Differentiating w.r.t. ρ we find
∂ΠH
∂ρ
= Ex
(
∂piH(a|x)
∂a |a=au
∂au
∂ρ
+
∂piH
∂ρ
)
.
Recall that for a given state of the world, H either selects au = a
∗
u or au = a (if
a∗u ≥ a). In the first case, we have ∂piH(a|x)∂a |a=au = 0, since a∗u maximizes piH(a|x). In
the second case, we have ∂au
∂ρ
= 0. In both cases the first term vanishes and hence,
∂ΠH
∂ρ
= Ex
(
∂piH
∂ρ
)
= (1− γ)ExR(au|x) > 0.
2. Differentiating ΠF (γ, ρ) w.r.t. ρ we find
∂ΠF
∂ρ
= Ex
(
∂piF (a|x)
∂a |a=au
∂au
∂ρ
+
∂piF
∂ρ
)
= Ex
(
((1− ρ)R′(au|x)− C ′(au)) ∂au
∂ρ
−R(au|x)
)
If au = a then the derivative
∂au
∂ρ
is zero. We then find ∂ΠF
∂ρ
= −ExR(au|x) < 0.
If au = a
∗
u we can use Equation (5) C
′(a∗u|x) =
(
1 + (1−γ)ρ
γ
)
R′(a∗u|x) to find ∂ΠF∂ρ =
−Ex
[
ρ
γ
R′(au|x)∂a∗u∂ρ +R(au|x)
]
< 0.
3. F ′s expected payoff ΠF (γ, ρ) is non-positive for ρ = 1 (franchisees do not keep
any revenues) and non-negative for ρ = 0 (follows from Condition 1 and the fact that
efficient activities ae are selected at Stage 3 if ρ = 0) . Since, furthermore, for every
given γ the function ΠF (γ, ρ) is continuous in ρ and strictly decreasing in ρ, there
exists for every fraction of company-owned stores a unique royalty rate ρu(γ) such
that ΠF (γ, ρu(γ)) = 0.
4. As last step, we show that for H always selects a royalty of ρu(γ). If ΠF (γ, ρ) < 0
then F would reject the contract, which cannot be optimal for H, since by Condition 1
there exists a contract under which H makes strictly positive profits. If ΠF (γ, ρ) > 0
then by continuity there exists a small increase in ρ such that ΠF (γ, ρ) is still non-
negative. Such a small increase in ρ, however, strictly increases H ′s expected payoff.
Proof of Proposition 4.1: We first show that the chain will not be completely
franchised. Assume by contradiction H maximizes payoff with a completely franchised
chain (γ = 0). In this case, H sets maximum activities a(x) at Stage 3 whenever there
is a positive royalty ρ > 0. However, when these activities a(x) are sufficiently big,
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franchise stores’ profits before royalties are paid, i.e. R(a(x)|x) − C(a(x)|x), are
already negative. This follows directly from our assumptions on cost and revenue
functions. Thus, for sufficiently big a(x) and no company-ownership, franchisees ac-
cept a contract if and only if the royalty is ρ = 0. But for ρ = 0 and γ = 0, the
chain has a payoff of zero. This cannot be optimal, since we assumed that there is a
combination of γ and ρ such that contracts are accepted and the chain has a strictly
positive expected payoff.
We now show that it is also not optimal to have a completely company-owned chain,
since it always increases H ′s expected when at least a small fraction of stores is
franchised. For any γ < 1, the royalty is set such that franchisees expected profits are
0. Thus, H’s payoff per store equals the average profits per store, given by
pi(γ|x) = R(au|x)− C(au(x, γ, ρ)|x)− γL
Differentiating pi(γ|x) w.r.t. γ yields
dpi(γ|x)
dγ
= (R′(au|x)− C ′(au|x)) dau
dγ
− L
Consider first the case where the efficient activities can be implemented, i.e. ae(x) <
a(x). In a fully company-owned chain, efficient activities are selected at Stage 3, i.e.
au(x|γ = 1) = ae(x). Since R′(ae|x)− C ′(ae|x) = 0 (Equation 1), we find
dpi(γ|x)
dγ |γ=1
= −L < 0
The same formula holds in the case ae(x) > a(x), since then au = a and thus
dau
dγ
= 0.
In summary, a small decrease of γ below 1 strictly increases the chain’s expected
payoff.
For the proof of Proposition 4.3, let
D(γ) ≡ ΠuH(γ)− ΠnH(γ)
denote the difference in the chain’s payoff from the optimal contract with uniformity
requirement compared to the optimal contract without uniformity requirement. We
first establish Lemma 4.2, which characterizes the derivative of D :
Lemma 4.2:
D′(γ) = Ex[(1− ρu + (1− γ)dρu
dγ
)R(au|x)− C(au|x)
− ((1− ρn)R(ae|x)− C(ae|x))].
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.Proof of Lemma 4.2: The proof is based on straightforward calculation. First note
that D can be written as
D(γ) = Ex[(1− γ)ρuR(au|x) + γ(R(au|x)− C(au|x)− L)]
− Ex[(1− γ)ρnR(a|x) + γ(R(ae|x)− C(ae|x)− L)]
Differentiating w.r.t. γ yields
D′(γ) = Ex[(1− ρu + (1− γ))dρu
dγ
R(au|x)− C(au|x)
+ (((1− γ)ρu + γ)R′(au|x)− γC ′(au)) dau
dγ
− ((1− ρn)R(ae|x)− C(ae|x))]
To evaluate this expressions we need two distinguish two sets of states. For those
states where a∗u(x) ≥ a(x), we find au(x) = a(x) and thus daudγ = 0, i.e. the term in
the second line becomes 0. For those states with a∗u(x) < a we find au(x) = a
∗
u(x) and
the identity C ′(au|x) =
(
1 + (1−γ)ρu
γ
)
R′(au|x) holds. Inserting this equality into the
expression for D′(γ) above, we find that the term in the second line again becomes 0.
Therefore, the equality stated in the lemma holds.
We can now proof Proposition 4.3. As noted in the text, we assume that the condition
a(x) > ae(x) holds for all states x.
Proof of Proposition 4.3: Note that D(γ) is a continuous function with D(0) =
D(1) = 0. Therefore, it suffices to show that D′(0) < 0 and D′(1) < 0. First con-
sider the case γ = 0. We then have au = a, ρu = ρn and
dρu
dγ
= 0. Inserting into the
expression of D′(γ) from Lemma 4.2 yields
D′(0) = Ex [(1− ρn)R(a|x)− C(a|x)− ((1− ρn)R(ae|x)− C(ae|x))] < 0
This is the difference of F ′s payoff under the maximum size of activities and F ′s payoff
under efficient activities. This difference is clearly negative.
Now consider the case γ = 1. Then au = ae and ρu > ρn, which gives
D′(1) = Ex [(1− ρu)R(ae|x)− C(ae|x)− ((1− ρn)R(ae|x)− C(ae|x))]
= − (ρu − ρn)ExR(ae|x) < 0.
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